Pappe's Controversial Takes on 1967, Oslo, and More
I was in high school in the late 1980s when the first intifada flared up. Luckily for me, my fatherPappe's Controversial Takes on 1967, Oslo, and More
I was in high school in the late 1980s when the first intifada flared up. Luckily for me, my father and I stopped in at a university bookstore around this time, where I stumbled upon a copy of The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict: Eighth Revised and Updated Edition. This was a collection of primary source material presenting both sides of the history of the conflict, which proved invaluable in helping me see through the propaganda of the day.
Unbeknownst to me, also around this time, Israel's "new historians," including Ilan Pappe, were starting to uncover more evidence, in IDF archives, for instance, to substantiate challenges to the version of history pushed by Israel, which The Israel-Arab Reader had brought to my attention.
My interest in the conflict waned after college, however, due to the breakdown of Oslo, and especially after 9/11. I thought maybe the Palestinians would just keep fighting forever, with unrealistic expectations of what Israel's military dominance meant they could ever hope for, whether they were right or not, in terms of a peace agreement. Israel's rhetoric after the appalling events of Oct 7, 2023, for instance, calling Palestinians "human animals" and saying that every inch of Gaza was a war zone, alarmed me and made me realize that I needed to revisit the conflict. To that end, Ilan Pappe's work has been tremendously helpful in getting me up to speed on what has been learned since the late 1980s. The Biggest Prison on Earth is essential to this work. It is particularly effective in challenging the common perspective about the causes of the 1967 War, the breakdown of Oslo, and whether or not peace initiatives have failed primarily due to inexplicable Arab aggression and intransigence.
The Six-Day Way
This book covers Israeli/Palestinian history, starting with the end of the War of Independence and continuing to the time the book was written: 2017, the 50th anniversary of the Six-Day War, which is a particular area of focus.
Pappe makes the case that many Zionists in 1948-9 were disappointed that Israel did not take the West Bank when it could have. They harbored thoughts of using conflicts with Israel's neighbors after that as pretexts to correct this mistake. Pappe mentions 1963, in particular, as the beginning of meticulous planning in Israel on how they would go about occupying the West Bank and Gaza Strip once a suitable pretext occurred.
Pappe then dives into the proximate causes of the 1967 War. Pappe's thesis is that although there were some border skirmishes around this time and some saber-rattling by Nasser, it was nothing out of the ordinary and certainly nothing that called for a pre-emptive Israeli strike on its neighbors. Instead, Pappe believes that it was merely the pretext that Zionists had long been looking for but something that could easily have been managed back to peace had Israel been willing. Pappe argues, however, that Israel was not willing, largely due to its increased military prowess, especially in terms of its air force, which it had acquired thanks to a closer relationship with Washington, DC.
The Occupation
A substantial portion of Pappe's book describes how quickly Israel began to implement its occupation plans: a testimony to how systematic and thorough the planning had been. Pappe makes it clear that almost immediately, Palestinians were expelled from their homes. He puts the total for 1967 at around 180,000. Also, almost immediately, Israel began a program of moving settlers into the occupied territories.
Pappe describes the extraordinary legal reasoning, sometimes blocked by Israel's Supreme Court, and how Israeli leaders such as Sharon sought to work around it by various subterfuge. This included the invocation of laws from Jordan, Mandatory Palestine, and even the Ottoman Empire to justify the land grabs.
As the title implies, Pappe believes a prison model describes the situation well. He cites Israeli officials explicitly stating they want to use a carrot-and-stick model. If Palestinians were accepting of the situation, treatment would be better, an open-air prison, although expansion via settlements would continue. If Palestinians, however, were resistant, there would be a crackdown where freedoms were restricted: a maximum security prison. Pappe points out that although there are some imperfections with the analogy, for instance, Israel would love for all prison inhabitants to just leave for another country, it is a good description overall.
Pappe sees the prison model as a strategy for dealing with the fact that Israel does not want to annex the territories, as that would mean making the Palestinians citizens. This, in turn, would mean Jews would no longer be a substantial majority in Israel. Along these lines, Pappe sees the peace process as a canard: Israel has no intention of giving up much of its gains in the West Bank, although it is less interested in Gaza. The occupation means that it does not have to grant citizenship to the Palestinians there. It can point to the unsurprising resistance, often provoked by Israel, as a reason to continue expansion and not make a serious offer regarding a two-state solution. Israel, Pappe argues, also points to the resistance as a reason not to seriously discuss the Palestinians' right of return.
Another particularly fascinating aspect of Pappe's book is his discussion of the role of Ultra-Orthodox and other marginalized Jews in implementing the expansionist plan. Pappe describes how their religious beliefs mean they believe they are entitled to expand into the West Bank and engage in violence with Palestinians already there. They are further encouraged to do so by tax breaks and the understanding that Israel's government will leave them alone in creating religious communities even where there are some conflicts with laws in the rest of Israel.
Strengths and Weaknesses
The book is remarkably engaging, given that a substantial part deals with the laws and bureaucracy of occupation: something one would not expect to be the most riveting of subjects. Here, Pappe manages to find a good balance in providing enough detail to see the harm the bureaucracy did to the Palestinians while also not going into excessive details as The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine did in parts.
The book also does a remarkably good job of discussing the critical events in the last 75 years in what is relatively short for a history book. Beyond just a raw recounting of events, however, Pappe generally makes a compelling case that there is a strategy behind it all dating back to the late 1930s. In addition, Pappe, in this book, does more to proactively address challenges to his admittedly controversial interpretations of history. An example of this is his dismissal of common arguments taken as evidence that Israel's neighbors' actions warranted a pre-emptive strike in 1967.
In terms of downside, I was not ultimately convinced by Pappe's argument that Israel's policy turned into one of genocide in Gaza beginning around 2006. He claims that one needs to look beyond numbers and consider whether Israel wants to kill many people and otherwise wreak sufficient destruction to make the place is unlivable. This, of course, is logically possible. Still, it seems more plausible to me that Israel had no plan to deal with Gaza other than to maintain a tight blockade and accept that Hamas would fire some rockets and make some occasional raids necessitating "mowing the lawn" every few years. This was damage that, until Oct 7, they likely felt was small enough to live with.
Conclusion
This book, like The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, is invaluable in understanding the current conflict in Gaza. Specifically, it helps in analyzing whether pro-Palestinian protesters are correct in claiming that Israel is engaged in settler-colonialism, apartheid, genocide, and, of course, maintaining an open-air prison. Other than for genocide, I felt that Pappe made a convincing case. The book also substantially challenges the notion that Israel's pre-emptive strike in 1967 was necessary. This, of course, is controversial, and readers should compare it with Benny Morris's view, for instance, that although a pre-emptive strike was justified, the case is not as clear-cut as it has historically been made out to be.
Pappe, additionally, makes a compelling case that it was not primarily Arafat and the Palestinians "never missing an opportunity to miss an opportunity" that led to the breakdown of the Oslo Accords.
Overall, I rate the book 4.0/5.0. This book is better written than The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine as it is more engaging and better at anticipating counterarguments. On the other hand, if you only wish to read one book by Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine is better as it discusses the origins of the fundamental issue: the history and aftermath of the Nakba, in greater detail. ...more
In the Eye of Controversy: Free Speech and Militarism in the Israeli Academy
Ilan Pappe is a Jewish historian born in Israel who now lives and teaches In the Eye of Controversy: Free Speech and Militarism in the Israeli Academy
Ilan Pappe is a Jewish historian born in Israel who now lives and teaches in the UK. He is one of the most controversial historians of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and, along with others like Chomsky, Finklestein, and Shlaim, one of Israel's harshest critics. In Out of the Frame, Pappe recounts the story of how his research and conclusions regarding Israel's War of Independence from 1947-9 caused his ostracism in the Israeli academic community and greater Israeli society, forcing him to ultimately leave the country. Along the way, Pappe describes what he feels it is about Israeli culture that led to these attacks on academic freedom and what it means for future possibilities of peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Given what is currently happening on US campuses with a claimed rise in antisemitism, Pappe's story provides an excellent reference point by bringing free speech issues to the forefront.
Overview of Contents
Out of the Frame is a set of memoirs focused on aspects of Pappe's life centered around his controversial academic career. He recounts early memories of growing up in Israel in the 1950s and ‘60s; his interactions with Palestinian students; his feeling that Israel was trying to be a cheap knockoff (my paraphrase) of Europe; his military service; and his subsequent academic career. He describes the path that led him to become one of Israel's "New Historians."
Pappe was already skeptical of Israel's official story regarding what happened in 1948 after having written his doctoral thesis at Oxford on British policy towards Israel leading up to their withdrawal in 1948. He recounts how, after returning to Israel, he and others, such as Benny Morris, found evidence in Israel's military archives and elsewhere confirming that Israel had deliberately expelled many Palestinians from their homes in 1948. This debunked Israel's claims that most Palestinians had simply fled when asked to by Arab leaders under the notion that there would be a swift defeat of Israel and they could quickly return.
Pappe describes how the work of the New Historians led to the brief emergence of a "post-Zionist" school of thought in academia in Israel, which spilled over, somewhat, into at least certain parts of the broader culture, such as artists. Pappe writes that "post-Zionism" even looked like it might impact the Israeli delegation negotiating the Oslo Accords, as some came with books showing that they had read the work of the New Historians.
Pappe goes on to recount how neither he nor the Palestinians nor the Israeli government really trusted the Oslo peace process. For Pappe and Palestinians such as Arafat, this was because they saw a refusal of Israel to seriously confront the core issue of Israel's responsibility for the expulsions of 1948. Indeed, Pappe describes this as the main reason for the failure of Camp David in 2000. The Israelis, he writes, had gotten the false idea that Arafat was willing to relinquish the notion of a right to return when, in fact, Arafat had never actually backed away from this desire.
Out of the Frame then describes how the bottom immediately fell out of any sympathy Israel had for the Palestinians and for research and teachings with a post-Zionism slant. A central theme of Pappe's book is that all important aspects of Israel's government, culture, and education system have always been dominated by militarism. Starting with the breakdown of Camp David and the beginning of the second intifada, Pappe argues there is essentially no restraint now, with the situation only getting worse year after year.
For Pappe, personally, this resulted in attempts by Haifa University to censure him, along with a graduate school named Teddy Katz looking into a possible massacre at Tantura in 1948. Pappe describes this incident in detail, noting that although Katz was briefly intimidated into retracting his claims, the same people never dared bring a libel suit against Pappe himself. Pappe says this is because they knew that he would not back down and would, indeed, relish the opportunity to present the case against Israel's actions in 1948.
Pappe wraps up the book by discussing what he thinks can be done about Zionism, Israeli militarism, and Israel's refusal to confront its past.
Strengths and Weaknesses
The book was insightful and engaging, especially considering that the inner workings of academia might not be expected to be the most riveting of subjects going in. Like his other books, Pappe keeps it down to a reasonable length by skillfully deciding the most important events and themes to discuss. He highlights the fundamental flaw with Zionism itself: Although it initially had admirable aims, it lost these when it turned its focus to Israel, where an existing population of people was already living and which it did not go to adequate lengths to work with peacefully. Pappe's description of militarism's permeation into all aspects of Israeli life is particularly valuable and, likely, less well-known to outsiders. Particularly fascinating is Pappe's description of how Israel's military has prepared itself for quick, grand nation-level battles and how this has had disastrous consequences when dealing instead with low-level, long-term urban warfare where civilian and military targets become blurred together.
In terms of weaknesses, there are, unfortunately, some. One is that Pappe does not always provide references to check his most controversial claims. For instance, he claims that the British had made an offer to Zionists to make Britain a safe haven for Jews such that Israel would not be necessary. However, there is no reference to check this, and looking into it further, I found it appeared to be a shaky claim. Similarly, it is generally hard to know just by reading the book in isolation which claims are generally widely accepted and which are not since Pappe rarely bothers to describe the status himself.
An equally significant weakness, in my view, is that in an important sense, and as Pappe acknowledges, the book does not go that far in answering the fundamental question Pappe was seeking an answer to. What was it about his situation that caused him to break from the strong grip Zionism and militarism have on Israeli society? Pappe feels that an important component was spending time outside the country while writing his doctoral dissertation. He hints, however, that this alone is not a sufficient explanation and that the break was actually also due to being raised with true Jewish values regarding a commitment to truth. I would have liked to see Pappe discuss this in more detail. Right now, there is only a sentence. Additionally, in mentioning this book in a recent interview, Pappe noted that he feels that Jewish exceptionalism plays a role in Israel being in denial about its past. Since there is no doubt that Jews are an exceptional group who, perhaps, have contributed more to human achievement than nearly any other of significant size, I would have liked to see how this, perhaps, sometimes comes at the cost of a darker aspect.
Finally, I feel there are likely personality traits, not just his time abroad, which caused Pappe to break from Zionist culture and become one of its leading critics. Examining these would have been interesting and likely helpful to cultural critics in general. Hopefully, Pappe did not simply omit this discussion out of modesty.
Conclusion
In a relatively short book, Pappe does a commendable job of discussing his experiences as one of Israel's New Historians, bringing dark aspects of Israel's history to light. He describes how, after a brief flourish, this movement was essentially crushed in Israeli universities by rising militarism. Very relevant to today is Pappe's recounting of how Israel's playbook has always been to try and silence any criticism of Israel as antisemitic with frequent allusions to the Holocaust, the latter of which Pappe claims is a yardstick that much in Israel is measured against.
Until the epilogue, Pappe's account discouraged me from the prospect of there ever being peace in Israel. In Pappe's ultimate analysis, however, he is hopeful. He thinks there is a strong resemblance with the history of apartheid in South Africa. Along these lines, Pappe thinks Israel is unlikely to change any time soon due solely to internal pressure. Rather, he sees the need for external pressure. He argues for support of the BDS (Boycott, Divest, Sanction) movement in particular. This, of course, would require strong international pressure, and here, Pappe ends optimistically.
Pappe argues that the true history of Israel is getting to be known in the West, and hence, there is growing support to put needed pressure on Israel. (Something we, arguably, see highlighted in the recent pro-Palestinian protests.) At the same time, Pappe acknowledges that Palestinians have had failures on their part, especially in describing what they would like the area to look like post-Zionism and articulating a desire for peace as opposed to revenge. ...more
What really happened during Israel's War of Independence?
Ilan Pappe attempts to answer this question in The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, which is, What really happened during Israel's War of Independence?
Ilan Pappe attempts to answer this question in The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, which is, without a doubt, the most controversial book I have read in my life. In it, Pappe presents the controversial thesis that Palestine has been subject to a systematic ethnic cleansing policy pre-dating Israel's Independence Day on May 14, 1948. This policy, Pappe argues, continues up to the present day.
For this review, it is important to note, and Pappe clarifies right off the bat, that he is not using the phrase ethnic cleansing in the colloquial sense in which it is a synonym for genocide. Instead, Pappe refers to formal definitions in which ethnic cleansing's goal is to rid a geographical area of people of a specific, often ethnic, group. This contrasts with genocide, in which the goal is to wipe them out of existence. Pappe notes that although the goal of ethnic cleansing is different, it is also generally accompanied by massacres to scare the population into fleeing. Pappe argues this is precisely what happened in Israel/Palestine during the 1947-8 War. Indeed, in the epigraphs preceding most chapters, there is a running comparison to Serbian ethnic cleansing in the 1990s.
A Cleansing Plan Pre-Dating the 1947 UN Partition Resolution?
Before the late 1980s, there was a notion in much of the West that the answer to the question of where all the Palestinian refugees came from was that they were told to flee their homes around the time Israel's Arab neighbors invaded on the very day of Israel's independence. Pappe is one of Israel's "new historians" who was granted some access to the IDF's archives from the 1947-8 War and began to challenge the notion that those fleeing generally did so voluntarily at the request of Arab leaders. Some more moderate historians, like Benny Morris, found evidence of massacres of Palestinians by Jewish force but did not feel there was a systematic plan behind them and the forced expulsions. Pappe, by contrast, disagrees. Pappe concluded that there was a systematic plan centering around Plan Dalet by considering other sources such as the diaries of key Israeli leaders, interviews, and other oral history.
According to Pappe's research, Zionist leaders, especially Ben-Gurion, had decided well before 1947 that they should try to capture much more of Mandatory Palestine than was likely to be offered. Pappe describes how the planning included detailed Jewish intelligence on every village following the 1936 uprising in preparation for this effort.
The Zionists' main fear, Pappe writes, was having too small a majority in Israel to protect Jewish interests. This was because, at the time of the 1947 resolution, the Jewish state had about 60% Jews, while nearly all the rest were Arabs. Pappe quotes Ben-Gurion saying that 80% Jews was needed for stability. Pappe further argues that while Ben-Gurion publically accepted the UN partition plan, he only did so knowing Arabs would reject it. This, he realized, would allow Israeli leaders to not recognize Palestinian land as other than "disputed."
Pappe further recounts how Ben-Gurion felt it was a problem that Arabs did not act violently enough to the 1947 partition plan. Indeed, they just resigned themselves to living under another "foreign" ruler as they had adapted to others for centuries before. According to Pappe, Ben-Gurion and a cabal called "The Consultancy" worked to increase provocations against Arabs, hoping for reactions that could be used as pretexts for attacks, expulsions, and inevitable massacres. Pappe portrays this as not having the success hoped, initially, and thus leading Israeli forces to become increasingly aggressive in their strategies and tactics, often deliberately crossing the line into war crimes.
My Evaluation
Evaluating this book is, unfortunately, rather difficult. The two main reasons are:
- There is disagreement between Pappe and fellow new historian Benny Morris as to the proper historical methodology. Pappe criticizes Morris for confining his conclusions to IDF archives and treating them as gospel (or, perhaps, rather, Tanakh?) Morris, in turn, criticizes Pappe for over-reliance on oral history. Since Pappe, unfortunately, does not dive deeply into the methodological questions, it is hard for a non-professional to weigh the merits and detriments of the different approaches.
- Much of Pappe's source material is not readily available, at least to non-professionals. This is either because it is IDF archival material, books that no longer appear to be in print, and interviews.
Fortunately, there is much that Pappe and Morris, who draws more conservative conclusions, agree on. The main things are:
- Many Palestinians only left their homes involuntarily in 1947-8; Israeli forces were definitely pushing many of them out - Jewish forces did commit war crimes
One thing Pappe and Morris disagree on significantly is the number of Palestinians massacred. Morris puts the figure around 800, whereas Pappe has it around a few thousand. Even more significant, however, is whether it was all part of a systematic plan or not. Pappe's quotes, especially from Ben-Gurion's diary, do seem compelling, however. With regard to the massacres, Pappe admits there is no smoking gun in official documents regarding a central directive. Instead, he argues that it was implicitly understood that they would be tolerated and necessary in the case of stubborn resistance. Pappe points out how those involved were generally careful not to leave a paper trail behind.
Is a Systematic Plan Believable?
I do believe that Pappe makes a compelling case that there was a systematic plan. Adding to the believability is Pappe's discussion of how Palestinians were treated after the war. Much of this post-war treatment is more open to verification. Remaining Palestinians were moved from their homes; the property of those who had fled was confiscated through some extraordinary legal machinations; those of Arab descent did not receive equal treatment under Israeli law; Palestinian history was systematically erased.
However, even if things were not part of a Zionist grand strategy to permanently claim 80% of Mandatory Palestine, it is remarkable that they worked out, in practice, as if that were the plan all along. Sympathizers of Israel will argue that Israel has simply wanted to live in peace, but their Arab neighbors keep attacking them unprovoked for no good reason. After reading this book, however, especially the parts most open to verification, and considering Israel's treatment of the Palestinians and denial of their right to return (or, if no longer practical, monetary compensation in lieu of it), the credibility of Israel claims regarding history fell into even greater doubt for me.
The Book's Style and Weaknesses
A little over two-thirds of the book is highly engaging reading. Nevertheless, the book took me about twice as long to read as expected. Part of the reason this is a difficult book to read is that it is a very somber subject. Nor is it so far removed from the present as to provide the usual degree of detachment that studying more distant history allows. That contribution to making the book difficult is inevitable, given the subject.
However, some of Pappe's choices made the book difficult and were not inevitable. For instance:
- The Jews seemed very concerned about Arab aggression, given what happened in 1936. Pappe does not detail 1936 enough to understand why they were worried. - Too many massacres are detailed even once one gets the gist of what happened overall. Likely, Pappe is trying to ensure that the victims are not forgotten. Still, unfortunately, it leads to an emotional numbing and time spent here that could have been better spent on issues such as what happened in 1936 and discussing the debate over methodology.
Finally, Pappe is clearly biased. For instance, he correctly states that Palestinians objected to Israel being given the majority of the land in the 1947 resolution, even though they were only one-third of the population. What Pappe omits is the Jewish position that they needed more land because of the large number of immigrants into Israel expected.
Conclusion
Given the current war in Gaza, this book is vital reading to understand how we got to this point and what may lie ahead. Readers will be better able to evaluate whether the accusations of ethnic cleansing, genocide, and apartheid leveled against Israel are fair. At the same time, however, it is essential to check what sources Pappe uses, compare with others, and look up contrary interpretations of history, such as Benny Morris's. ...more
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