A sentiment often expressed today is that the political situation in present-day America strongly resembles Weimar Germany. ThOverall Rating: 4.75/5.0
A sentiment often expressed today is that the political situation in present-day America strongly resembles Weimar Germany. This sentiment comes mainly from the left, where many fear that the rise of populism under Donald Trump is setting America on a course where it "could lose its democracy" and become a fascist state. The depth of this belief strengthens the further one goes out on the left.
On the right, fears of similarities to Weimar are expressed less frequently but still exist, albeit cast differently. For those on the right who see similarities, there is growing moral and intellectual decadence, including a rise in sympathy for extreme leftist ideologies. For some, such as Christian Nationalists, they also see a political system not up to the task of saving itself from these existential threats.
Robert Gerwarth's study of early Weimar is, thus, very timely. Gerwarth's central thesis is that Weimar was more resilient to existential threats than many now believe and that its ultimate fall to National Socialism was only foreseeable retrospectively. Indeed, Gerwarth suggests that without the singular event of the Great Depression, Weimar's demise would likely not have happened at all, despite all the other extraordinary challenges the Weimar Republic faced.
WWI and Weimar
November 1918 focuses on the period from about 1916 until the end of 1923. The coverage of WWI is particularly fascinating. Gerwarth discusses how, although Germany understood it was likely to draw America into the war, it felt it had to escalate submarine warfare; otherwise, it would slowly suffocate under the Allies' naval blockade.
Critical to later Weimar attitudes, Gerwarth discusses the sudden swing of military fortunes in favor of Germany in late 1917. This began with Ludendorff's stunning victories in the east, Russia's withdrawal from the war and vast concessions of land in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the emergence of stormtroopers with tactics capable of breaking the years-long stalemate of trench warfare on the Western Front. From such near giddy heights, it is easy to see how Germans were shocked, and many later fell into denial about the complete reversal of fortunes on the Western Front.
Gerwarth makes it clear, however, that there was no "stab in the back." At the time of the military mutinies and the November Revolution, Germany was indeed understood, including by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, to be beaten, even if its front had not completely collapsed. Indeed, Gerwarth argues that the mutinies and Revolution were due to the fact that, in Germany, it was widely recognized that Germany was beaten and, hence, needed to get out of the war before total annihilation. Gerwarth shows that the Weimar Republic was quite popular and that its most important leaders, though on the left, were utterly determined to prevent Bolshevism from spreading into Germany.
Betrayal at Versailles
Today, it is well understood that a primary reason for the rise of Hitler and the world's descent into a Second World War was the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles. Gerwarth discusses this in detail, emphasizing not only the treaty's harshness but the sense of betrayal Germans felt. They had believed Wilson would, at least to some extent, deliver on his promises of "peace without victory" if they changed their government from a rather militaristic monarchy to a liberal, constitutional Republic. Germany had fulfilled its end of this implicit understanding, but it seemed to scarcely matter. Unlike the Congress of Vienna, which dealt with the defeat of Napoleon and France and included France's input in the final decision, Germany had no input in drafting the Treaty of Versailles and, essentially, no option but to accept all of it.
The Left's Sense of Betrayal
Although it is well known that the German right felt that the country had been betrayed by the Revolution of November 1918, Gerwarth tells the less well-known story of how many on the left, even to this day, also felt the Revolution was a betrayal. They thought the Revolution presented a missed opportunity to create a government that was even more "of people," meaning especially labor, than what emerged.
Although, from all the feelings of betrayal, left and right, it would seem that nobody liked Weimar, Gerwarth shows that the Revolution, in the direction of Social Democracy as opposed to Bolshevism, was very popular at the time and would remain so until the Great Depression.
Weimar Culture
In addition to his coverage of political and military events, Gerwarth spends some time discussing the culture of Weimar. This includes the emerging political power of women, early optimism regarding tolerance of gay people, and the backlash that these generated. Gerwarth vividly describes German soldiers' alienation after returning home as losers in a war they sacrificed so much to win. He discusses the rift between those on the front who often wanted to continue the fight and what they regarded as weak military elements in the rear who favored withdrawal. Gerwarth discusses how many found the way to deny losing the war was to fail to move on and continue "fighting the war" by joining extreme right-wing paramilitaries and other organizations. Most interestingly, Gerwarth discusses how the regions that initially saw the greatest success for the radical left experienced the strongest backlash from the right, with cities like Munich, for instance, later becoming their greatest strongholds.
The Book's Strengths and Weaknesses
Gerwarth's book provides a highly engaging, often vivid recount of the earliest days of Weimar. The reader can feel the sense of shock at the reversals in the fortunes of war; they can understand the sense of betrayal by the Treaty of Versailles and can easily see how these led many into a sense of denial. Gerwarth is quite masterful in tying this all together in what is relatively short for a history book: just a hair under 10 hours of listening time on Audible. In addition, Gerwarth has an uncommon take that Weimar's Democracy was quite resilient, as demonstrated by the fact that it survived severe challenges from the extreme left and extreme right early on and was able to bounce back from hyperinflation.
The book's only real weakness is that, in being so short, most readers will likely feel some areas were not covered adequately. I would have liked to see more detail, for instance, on how the situation on the Western Front fell apart in 1918, and more specifics on why the right felt Weimar was morally decadent.
Comparing Weimar and Present-Day America
The great contemporary relevance of a book like this is that it allows us to see how many things in Weimar were quite different from what we see in contemporary America. This, in my view, if it does not shatter, at least dramatically undermines those who see powerful parallels between present-day America and Weimar. Yes, with a superficial look, there are some vague semblances. For instance, Hitler was a nationalist, and Trump is a nationalist. A similarity it is true. But what are the key differences?
Although it has lost wars recently, America has suffered nothing comparable to German causalities in WWI. No Treaty of Versailles has been imposed upon us. We do not have a millstone of reparations around our necks. Although there was some extreme leftist violence in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the scale was much less than leftist violence in Weimar. There have been no comparable coup attempts. Some may argue Jan 6 was a coup attempt, but compare the death tolls and ask how many genuinely seem willing to die for the cause of a "stolen election" versus how many died in the name of extreme left and right-wing ideologies in Weimar.
Additionally, no powerful foreign adversary is openly aligned with domestic extremists to the extent that the Bolshevists were aligned with German Communists. Compare America's military tradition, which has entailed strong domestic opposition to nearly all foreign wars resulting in significant American causalities and long engagements, to that of Germany pre-Weimar. Consider also that although there was street violence in and around 2020, it is orders of magnitude less than what was seen in Weimar.
Although it was not an explicit intent of Gerwarth's book, a great strength is providing readers with the opportunity to see the differences between now and Weimar. Additionally, contrary to the beliefs of some on the right, the book clarifies that in extreme situations, where there is a mix of moderate and radical leftists, the more ruthless extreme left is not guaranteed to crush the weak Kerenskyist moderates. Weimar's Social Democrats were deeply determined to keep Germany from turning Bolshevist and were successful. Sometimes, emergency powers were used by the moderate left, but, in contrast to another common belief on the right, that such powers are never temporary and only ratcheted up over time, things did return to normal after the crises had passed.
Conclusion
Overall, I highly recommend November 1918 for providing a highly engaging and concise discussion of Weimar with an uncommon take that Weimar was a more resilient and popular Republic than many today imagine....more
Living up to its title, this book provides good insights into the nature of cults along with political and religious extremism. Lifton argues that theLiving up to its title, this book provides good insights into the nature of cults along with political and religious extremism. Lifton argues that they are, essentially, the same phenomena. The book contains updated essays from Lifton's other writings and, as such, seems like a good introduction to his work. Topics covered are The Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Aum Shinrikyo cult responsible for the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system, Nazi doctors, Trump, along with nuclear and climate cults. Most chapters are very interesting although the quality does seem to drop off as the book gets closer to the end.
The two chapters on the Chinese Cultural Revolution provide a good introduction to its history along with insights into Mao's life and conjectures regarding his psychology. The techniques used during the Cultural Revolution have been used many times throughout history, and continue to be used, but Lifton argues that Mao implemented them the most systematically and on the largest scale. Lifton conjectures that it was Mao's sense of his own pending death that caused him to instigate the Cultural Revolution and that he wanted young people to be the guards due to a combination of the fact that they were still young and, hence, pure enough to cleanse Chinese society and to set an example that perpetual revolution was possible.
Many of the tactics used during the Cultural Revolution do seem to be similar to woke tactics used today. Lifton's description of the Red Guards as wandering bands of zealots roaming the country in search of evil to stomp out seems to apply well to today's woke although, of course, on a less violent scale. It did make me wonder, however, just how far the woke will be willing to go if a charismatic leader ever emerges among them.
The chapter on the Aum Shinrikyo cult was also fascinating as it seems to be the most extreme cult possible. Aum saw people of the world as evil who could only, maybe, be saved from their evil by being killed by members of the cult. Aum, to this effect, sought to obtain nuclear weapons and hoped to start a nuclear war as part of a program to cleanse and save the world. After nuclear war they imagined that members of cult would be magically guided to food not contaminated by radiation. The other aspect of this cult that seems as extreme as possible is the notion that there was only the guru: all others existed merely to ultimately merge with him. Another key learning from studying Aum, is that unlike other cults its guru was not bound to prior religions. This meant there were no restraints, at all, as to what was ultimately permissible towards it ultimate goal.
The chapter on Nazi doctors was also strong. In this chapter Lifton argues that the Nazi biomedical community was one of the most Nazified and was considered by Hitler and considered itself to be the key vanguard responsible for purifying the German nation. Lifton states that the doctors who performed the selections at Auschwitz were the ultimate symbol of the Nazi regime. He also documents how rather unremarkable the doctors were: not striking one as particularly evil (unless you knew of their work) and neither particularly brilliant nor stupid. Echoing something others have noted, Lifton uses them as the prime example of how almost anyone can ultimately rationalize doing what an extreme regime or cult asks of them.
Before reading the chapter on Trump I braced myself. When reading other academic writings on Trump I have ended up thinking that academic writers merely end up showing themselves to be just as prone to group and polar thinking as anyone and have, hence, just ended up producing low quality work. This even when writing on topics they are paid to approach with supreme objectivity. I was pleasantly surprised to find that Lifton did not fall victim to this "Trump Derangement Syndrome". Indeed, Lifton argues against the notion that Trump is a fascist thinking him lacking, and incapable of, holding the rigid ideology and discipline necessary to be a fascist. He argues that Trump is not even a populist. Rather, Lifton argues, Trump, without actually being psychotic, is just as solipsistic as someone who is, with constantly changing beliefs regarding reality which he thinks he can make true by stating them. Lifton casts Trump's followers as being resentful of elites who look down upon them.
Lifton argues that Trump is, ultimately, afraid of his base. Although Trump is clearly not as extreme as Shoko Asahara, the founder of Aum, Lifton argues that Trump is psychologically dependent on his base. In the chapter on Aum, Lifton describes how when Asahara was revealed not to be a guru his followers viciously turned on him. Until this point Ashara did not have psychotic breaks but losing his followers’ belief finally triggered them. Lifton feels it reasonably likely that Trump’s base will turn on him. Lifton conjectures that failing to build the wall could trigger this. Even though this possibility did not play out it did solve a mystery for me:
I always wondered why Trump simply did not play it cool when he lost the 2020 election. After all, it seems extremely likely that, if it had not been for covid, Trump would have won in 2020 in a landslide. So why not just play it cool, take snipes at Biden for anything that went wrong, whether within his control or not, and run again in 2024? Why claim "massive election fraud" and risk what seemed like a safe bet? From Lifton's conjecture regarding being afraid of his base, I have to wonder if Trump worried that losing an election would break his spell on his followers and cause them to turn on him once they saw he could not deliver? Indeed in Sam Harris's recent interview with David French, French describes how many of Trump followers of the evangelical bent support him so strongly because they feel, at some level, that his unlikely wins in 2016 showed that he has divine favor and that he is on a mission to save the nation from various evil forces such as the radical left and the deep state.
Unfortunately, the close of the book is not that strong. In the section on "nuclearism" Lifton seems amateurish. A minor example is how he misinterprets the notion of “complementary” in quantum mechanics. More serious is his consideration of why the "nuclear priesthood" built so many weapons. Was it really because of religious reverence for the weapons or, for the reasons that seem more apparent from their writings: that in a nuclear war or leading up to it we do not really know what will happen so why not keep all options on the table? How does the cost of building weapons compare to the cost of being wrong if they are not built?
The sections on climate change are stronger. Here Lifton thinks it will be one of humanity's greatest challenges. Climate change is real but how will we deal with both the cults of deniers and the cults of "pending climate change causing the end of the world" extremists that are likely to emerge?
The books ends with Lifton's notion that the way to fight cultism is by emphasizing the "protean self". This sounds good, in theory, but there are too few specifics provided. Lifton invokes post-modernism here suggesting that modern and, presumably, Enlightenment thinking would do more to contribute to the less mature and polar thinking necessary to enable cults and other extremism. Then, on a hopeful note, Lifton discusses how, although they will not project it outwardly, even in the most extreme cults and under the most extreme political cults there is always resentment toward the extremists that people keep internal while finding ways to go on living with the contradictions. It is always there ready to burst and turn on the cult or extremists. Lifton also describes how cults and extremists most dangerous days are early on although there always remains a danger that the early fanaticism will re-emerge.
I found the book gave good insights into the polarization and extremism from, yes, both the left and right that we see today. There also seem to be some definite predictions, although none 100% certain, that we can make. One thing, however, that I would have liked to see is looking at cults more from an evolutionary point of view. Why did man evolve to be prone to such extremism? Ultimately, Lifton says that he sees cultism more as a cultural and historical phenomena than a personal one. Perhaps combining this with evolutionary conjectures could give even more insights?...more
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