A sentiment often expressed today is that the political situation in present-day America strongly resembles Weimar Germany. ThOverall Rating: 4.75/5.0
A sentiment often expressed today is that the political situation in present-day America strongly resembles Weimar Germany. This sentiment comes mainly from the left, where many fear that the rise of populism under Donald Trump is setting America on a course where it "could lose its democracy" and become a fascist state. The depth of this belief strengthens the further one goes out on the left.
On the right, fears of similarities to Weimar are expressed less frequently but still exist, albeit cast differently. For those on the right who see similarities, there is growing moral and intellectual decadence, including a rise in sympathy for extreme leftist ideologies. For some, such as Christian Nationalists, they also see a political system not up to the task of saving itself from these existential threats.
Robert Gerwarth's study of early Weimar is, thus, very timely. Gerwarth's central thesis is that Weimar was more resilient to existential threats than many now believe and that its ultimate fall to National Socialism was only foreseeable retrospectively. Indeed, Gerwarth suggests that without the singular event of the Great Depression, Weimar's demise would likely not have happened at all, despite all the other extraordinary challenges the Weimar Republic faced.
WWI and Weimar
November 1918 focuses on the period from about 1916 until the end of 1923. The coverage of WWI is particularly fascinating. Gerwarth discusses how, although Germany understood it was likely to draw America into the war, it felt it had to escalate submarine warfare; otherwise, it would slowly suffocate under the Allies' naval blockade.
Critical to later Weimar attitudes, Gerwarth discusses the sudden swing of military fortunes in favor of Germany in late 1917. This began with Ludendorff's stunning victories in the east, Russia's withdrawal from the war and vast concessions of land in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the emergence of stormtroopers with tactics capable of breaking the years-long stalemate of trench warfare on the Western Front. From such near giddy heights, it is easy to see how Germans were shocked, and many later fell into denial about the complete reversal of fortunes on the Western Front.
Gerwarth makes it clear, however, that there was no "stab in the back." At the time of the military mutinies and the November Revolution, Germany was indeed understood, including by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, to be beaten, even if its front had not completely collapsed. Indeed, Gerwarth argues that the mutinies and Revolution were due to the fact that, in Germany, it was widely recognized that Germany was beaten and, hence, needed to get out of the war before total annihilation. Gerwarth shows that the Weimar Republic was quite popular and that its most important leaders, though on the left, were utterly determined to prevent Bolshevism from spreading into Germany.
Betrayal at Versailles
Today, it is well understood that a primary reason for the rise of Hitler and the world's descent into a Second World War was the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles. Gerwarth discusses this in detail, emphasizing not only the treaty's harshness but the sense of betrayal Germans felt. They had believed Wilson would, at least to some extent, deliver on his promises of "peace without victory" if they changed their government from a rather militaristic monarchy to a liberal, constitutional Republic. Germany had fulfilled its end of this implicit understanding, but it seemed to scarcely matter. Unlike the Congress of Vienna, which dealt with the defeat of Napoleon and France and included France's input in the final decision, Germany had no input in drafting the Treaty of Versailles and, essentially, no option but to accept all of it.
The Left's Sense of Betrayal
Although it is well known that the German right felt that the country had been betrayed by the Revolution of November 1918, Gerwarth tells the less well-known story of how many on the left, even to this day, also felt the Revolution was a betrayal. They thought the Revolution presented a missed opportunity to create a government that was even more "of people," meaning especially labor, than what emerged.
Although, from all the feelings of betrayal, left and right, it would seem that nobody liked Weimar, Gerwarth shows that the Revolution, in the direction of Social Democracy as opposed to Bolshevism, was very popular at the time and would remain so until the Great Depression.
Weimar Culture
In addition to his coverage of political and military events, Gerwarth spends some time discussing the culture of Weimar. This includes the emerging political power of women, early optimism regarding tolerance of gay people, and the backlash that these generated. Gerwarth vividly describes German soldiers' alienation after returning home as losers in a war they sacrificed so much to win. He discusses the rift between those on the front who often wanted to continue the fight and what they regarded as weak military elements in the rear who favored withdrawal. Gerwarth discusses how many found the way to deny losing the war was to fail to move on and continue "fighting the war" by joining extreme right-wing paramilitaries and other organizations. Most interestingly, Gerwarth discusses how the regions that initially saw the greatest success for the radical left experienced the strongest backlash from the right, with cities like Munich, for instance, later becoming their greatest strongholds.
The Book's Strengths and Weaknesses
Gerwarth's book provides a highly engaging, often vivid recount of the earliest days of Weimar. The reader can feel the sense of shock at the reversals in the fortunes of war; they can understand the sense of betrayal by the Treaty of Versailles and can easily see how these led many into a sense of denial. Gerwarth is quite masterful in tying this all together in what is relatively short for a history book: just a hair under 10 hours of listening time on Audible. In addition, Gerwarth has an uncommon take that Weimar's Democracy was quite resilient, as demonstrated by the fact that it survived severe challenges from the extreme left and extreme right early on and was able to bounce back from hyperinflation.
The book's only real weakness is that, in being so short, most readers will likely feel some areas were not covered adequately. I would have liked to see more detail, for instance, on how the situation on the Western Front fell apart in 1918, and more specifics on why the right felt Weimar was morally decadent.
Comparing Weimar and Present-Day America
The great contemporary relevance of a book like this is that it allows us to see how many things in Weimar were quite different from what we see in contemporary America. This, in my view, if it does not shatter, at least dramatically undermines those who see powerful parallels between present-day America and Weimar. Yes, with a superficial look, there are some vague semblances. For instance, Hitler was a nationalist, and Trump is a nationalist. A similarity it is true. But what are the key differences?
Although it has lost wars recently, America has suffered nothing comparable to German causalities in WWI. No Treaty of Versailles has been imposed upon us. We do not have a millstone of reparations around our necks. Although there was some extreme leftist violence in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the scale was much less than leftist violence in Weimar. There have been no comparable coup attempts. Some may argue Jan 6 was a coup attempt, but compare the death tolls and ask how many genuinely seem willing to die for the cause of a "stolen election" versus how many died in the name of extreme left and right-wing ideologies in Weimar.
Additionally, no powerful foreign adversary is openly aligned with domestic extremists to the extent that the Bolshevists were aligned with German Communists. Compare America's military tradition, which has entailed strong domestic opposition to nearly all foreign wars resulting in significant American causalities and long engagements, to that of Germany pre-Weimar. Consider also that although there was street violence in and around 2020, it is orders of magnitude less than what was seen in Weimar.
Although it was not an explicit intent of Gerwarth's book, a great strength is providing readers with the opportunity to see the differences between now and Weimar. Additionally, contrary to the beliefs of some on the right, the book clarifies that in extreme situations, where there is a mix of moderate and radical leftists, the more ruthless extreme left is not guaranteed to crush the weak Kerenskyist moderates. Weimar's Social Democrats were deeply determined to keep Germany from turning Bolshevist and were successful. Sometimes, emergency powers were used by the moderate left, but, in contrast to another common belief on the right, that such powers are never temporary and only ratcheted up over time, things did return to normal after the crises had passed.
Conclusion
Overall, I highly recommend November 1918 for providing a highly engaging and concise discussion of Weimar with an uncommon take that Weimar was a more resilient and popular Republic than many today imagine....more
The general idea for this book is a good one: compare present day American versus periods leading up to Bolshevist* takeovers to see if there are simiThe general idea for this book is a good one: compare present day American versus periods leading up to Bolshevist* takeovers to see if there are similarities. (*In this review I will use the term "Bolshevist" as opposed to the term "communist" which is often used colloquially as a synonym for it since I do not think that much of what happened in Russia and Eastern Europe had anything to do with communism as envisioned by Marx.) Despite the good idea for the book, the execution suffers from many flaws. There are definitely good insights in this book, but the problems mean that the book ends only being in the "okay" range.
First off the good:
Many of the stories the author recounts do, indeed, show similarities between the happenings leading up to Bolshevist takeovers and what is happening today in America. One area the author is particularly successful with is stories discussing the risk of ubiquitous data collection and surveillance, how Big Tech already has or could easily be subverted to exploiting this toward totalitarian ends and how the level of concern is just not where it should be. Stories which convey the sense of always worrying about what you say because it might be politically incorrect and cost you your job and never being sure who you can trust also seem to ring true in the current woke age. There is also a warning that social isolation and loneliness were common in pre-Bolshevist societies (as well as in the Weimar Republic), leaving people vulnerable to totalitarian ideologies to fill the void. Dreher mentions studies showing that these things are again on the rise in America today.
The book is also successful in sounding a general alarm to prepare for things to get worse and discusses some of the things that the preparation should involve. The author emphasizes that the most important areas of resistance if things do go totalitarian will be the family and small communities. He explicit refers to these as "resistance cells" and discusses how they formed the backbone of resistance to Bolshevism in Eastern Europe.
Another strength of the book is emphasizing that in life there will be suffering. It is unavoidable and especially if you want to stand on the side of the truth. Ray Dalio, a hedge fund manger, once said that if you live primarily to avoid pain you will end up having a very miserable life. I also thought Dreher offered good advice in encouraging Christians to be prepared to suffer but to neither actively seek it out nor to avoid it once it becomes necessary to endure. There is a theme of picking the right battles but not rationalizing away the need to fight at some point.
Finally, on the plus side, Dreher encourages Christians to co-operate with folks of other religious faiths and with atheists. He says not look to just look at the latter merely as conversion targets but as people, and people that Christians can genuinely learn from having, in some areas, better insights into certain aspect of society.
The Problems:
The biggest problem with the book is that it is not clear exactly where Dreher sees things going. He insists that America is more likely to turn into a "soft" versus "hard" totalitarianism due to its prior history and traditions. Despite this, the vast majority of examples involving people enduring things he thinks are unlikely to happen under America's coming soft totalitarianism. For example many of the stories involve people being imprisoned for long periods of time, tortured or having their children taken from them and placed in orphanages. There are also stories of mass executions. Since Dreher does not think these things are likely to happen in America it makes the discussions seem too abstract and, frankly, despite how horrific the abuses described are, it becomes boring at times. Why not, instead, discuss things he thinks are likely to actually happen under the "soft totalitarianism" he forsees? The stories are presumably so dramatic to capture your attention, but by being abstract compared to what is likely to happen, just ended up failing for me.
Another problem I had with Dreher's notion of a soft totalitarianism is that there is not much discussion of why he thinks it will stop at “soft”. Dreher correctly thinks the woke have fervor and moral certitude which can only be described as of being at a religious level. In history such people rarely stop at anything to crush all dissent once they have power in society and enemies in mind. It is my sense, and I am sure that I am not alone, that there is a certain bloodthirsty, retributive element to wokeism that should alert us to the danger of it turning into “hard totalitarianism". Dreher cites America's history and traditions as preventing this, but only spends a sentence stating this without elaborating on his reasoning. If he is thinking of our constitutional safeguards, well constitutional safeguard have been worked around in the past. All that is needed is the sense of an "existential threat" maybe from "fascists" or "literal Nazis" to secure a "temporary suspension" as occurred during the French Revolution. There its leaders, apparently, fully intended for it to be temporary. If the book had argued that a hard totalitarianism was likely, then the examples of Bolshevist abuses would have seemed far more relevant.
One big area that Dreher barely scratches the surface of is that wokeism appears to prefer to "capture" churches as opposed to proceeding into immediate battle with them. This is happening with the Southern Baptist Convention, for instance, as well as with the Mormon Church. It is likely that what will happen is that as much of existing churches will be captured as possible and the remnants will then present a particularly appealing targets since they will be taken to represent institutional or systemic problems with society. Again Dreher hints at this, but it deserves more than a sentence or two discussion.
Finally, I found that some of the claims in the book were not well presented or ran counter to what is really happening in society. For example, Dreher claims that "everyone" he talked to from Eastern Europe who had lived under Bolshevism saw parallels to what is happening in present day America. That would certainly be an extraordinary fact and something that should alarm us if true. The problem is that it needs to presented from at least a somewhat rigorous survey. Was it really every single person? How big was the sample size? How were the participants chosen? What exactly were the questions asked?
With regard to trends the author cites some which run contrary to what actually is happening in society. In "file under news you never thought you would hear" young people today are actually less interested in sex than previous generations. Also marriage is actually trending toward being more stable now than when divorce rates peaked during the late 70s and early 80s....more
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