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Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal
The Battle of Guadalcanal has long been heralded as a Marine victory. Now, with his powerful portrait of the Navy’s sacrifice, James D. Hornfischer tells for the first time the full story of the men who fought in destroyers, cruisers, and battleships in the narrow, deadly waters of “Ironbottom Sound.” Here, in stunning cinematic detail, are the seven major naval actions that began in August 1942, a time when the war seemed unwinnable and America fought on a shoestring, with the outcome always in doubt. Working from new interviews with survivors, unpublished eyewitness accounts, and newly available documents, Hornfischer paints a vivid picture of the officers and enlisted men who opposed the Japanese in America’s hour of need. The first major work on this subject in almost two decades, "Neptune’s Inferno" does what all great battle narratives do: It tells the gripping human stories behind the momentous events and critical decisions that altered the course of history and shaped so many lives.
516 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2011
About the author
James D. Hornfischer
14 books385 followersJames Hornfischer’s writing career grew out of a lifelong interest in the Pacific war. He appeared on television on The History Channel, Fox News Channel’s “War Stories with Oliver North” and C-SPAN’s “BookTV.” A frequent speaker on the subject of the war in the Pacific, the U.S. Navy, and the experience of America’s sailors in World War II, he frequently spoke to veterans organizations, youth and civic groups, and professional naval organizations on the inspiring stories found in his books. Mr. Hornfischer took great pride in the fact that each of his books was placed on the Chief of Naval Operations’ Required Reading List.
A native of Massachusetts, and a 1987 graduate of Colgate University, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and graduated with high honors in German. He received a Juris Doctor degree from the University of Texas School of Law in 2001. Mr. Hornfischer was a member of the Naval Order of the United States, the Navy League, and was appointed by Texas Governor Rick Perry as an “Admiral in the Texas Navy.” Mr. Hornfischer was a book editor at one time and president of the literary agency Hornfischer Literary Management, located in Austin, Texas, where he lived with his wife and their three children.
Mr. Hornfischer passed away on June 2, 2021 in Austin Texas after a lengthy illness . He was fifty-five years old at the time of his death.
A native of Massachusetts, and a 1987 graduate of Colgate University, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and graduated with high honors in German. He received a Juris Doctor degree from the University of Texas School of Law in 2001. Mr. Hornfischer was a member of the Naval Order of the United States, the Navy League, and was appointed by Texas Governor Rick Perry as an “Admiral in the Texas Navy.” Mr. Hornfischer was a book editor at one time and president of the literary agency Hornfischer Literary Management, located in Austin, Texas, where he lived with his wife and their three children.
Mr. Hornfischer passed away on June 2, 2021 in Austin Texas after a lengthy illness . He was fifty-five years old at the time of his death.
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December 20, 2019
“From the destroyer Patterson ahead came a blinker signal, “WARNING – WARNING – STRANGE SHIPS ENTERING HARBOR.” Out in the storm-lit sound, the forms of unidentified ships were dimly visible, approaching nearly head-on. The Patterson’s battery barked, lofting star shells, aiming to backlight the bogeys. The Chicago followed suit, but her phosphorous candles failed to light. Critical minutes passed in the dark. The Bagley swung left, drew on the enemy, and fired four torpedoes from her starboard battery. Seeing targets against the glow of his star shells, Commander Frank R. Walker ordered the Patterson’s helm left and shouted an order to launch torpedoes. Then [Captain Howard D.] Bode [of the Chicago] heard a report of torpedoes in the water, inbound on several bearings…”
- James D. Hornfischer, Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal
The naval battles around the island of Guadalcanal (the largest island in the Solomons, located in the southwest Pacific) were old-timey, throwback engagements. Naval warfare in World War II was dominated by two distinctly different weapons: the submarine and the aircraft carrier. The consequence of these vessels was that the war at sea often involved opposing forces that never came into direct contact. At Midway, for instance, America’s planes attacked Japanese ships, while Japanese planes attacked American ships. There was never an instant when an American ship went toe-to-toe with a Japanese ship.
At Guadalcanal, it was different. Here, the navies of Japan and American mixed it up in the Coral Sea in seven devastating battles that harkened back to the days of Nelson or the Armada. Here, opposing ships faced off with such ferocity that the waters around the Solomon Islands became known as Ironbottom Sound.
It is fitting that a book about throwback battles should be written by something of a throwback author.
James Hornfischer’s Neptune’s Inferno has an old fashioned feel to it. It could have been released back in 1943, along with MGM’s Bataan, as a way to inspire patriotism and sell war bonds. It lacks the balance, clarity of analysis, and sharpness of judgment that mark today’s best World War II books, such as the volumes by Max Hastings. Instead, Hornfischer relies on the tools of the novelist. Neptune’s Inferno is at its best during the battles, which are immediate, visceral, and exhausting.
Neptune’s Inferno is first and foremost a battle narrative. It covers all seven encounters around Guadalcanal, which took place between August and November 1942: the Battle of Savo Island; the Battle of the Eastern Solomons; the Battle of Cape Esperance; the Battle of Santa Cruz; the First and Second Naval Battles of Guadalcanal; and the Battle of Tassafaronga.
Hornfischer has twin aims in covering all these engagements in such slavish detail. First, he believes (and probably rightfully so) that the Marines have gotten the lion’s share of the credit for winning the Battle of Guadalcanal. In books (The Thin Red Line, Guadalcanal Diary) and movies (The Thin Red Line, Guadalcanal Diary), it is the riflemen who are portrayed as doing all the heavy lifting. Neptune’s Inferno certainly helps balance the scales a bit.
Hornfischer’s second aim, his thesis, is that the naval clashes in the Solomons marked the “rising” of a fighting fleet. To that end, he endlessly repeats the circumstances of 1942, when the United States was split between a war on two hemispheres, and when the Pacific War was fought on something of a shoestring, ad hoc basis. I’m not entirely sure Hornfischer proves this point. Certainly, the Navy eventually completed their objective of strangling Guadalcanal, of keeping the Japanese navy from reinforcing its ground troops. Still, from my tabulations, the Japanese won the majority of the individual engagements, while in terms of tonnage lost, the matter was a draw (with a slight advantage to the Japanese).
Neptune’s Inferno is an American story. There is scant – almost zero – attention paid to the Japanese side. As to overall strategy, this is drawn in broad strokes, with very little insight into the decisions made by the top admirals. Furthermore, in a book that is so reliant on personal recollections and a you-are-there point-of-view, Hornfischer’s attempt at character sketches are woefully inadequate. Never once did I get the sense that I understood Admiral Ghormley or Admiral Nimitz at any but the most surface level.
These omissions are made more glaring by the inconsistent writing. I’m not sure who to blame: Hornfischer or his editor. In any event, the book is often as choppy as the South Pacific (for purposes of that simile, I hope the South Pacific is choppy). Often, the narrative doesn’t seem to cohere: sentences are strangers, one to the other, while paragraphs contain information that is only distantly related. The uneven flow of the storytelling is most glaring in segues between the macro (detailing overall strategy) and the micro (describing the battles) sections.
The highlights, as befits a book of this type, is the blood-and-thunder, the moments when two ships square off in the dead of night, the blackness lit by muzzle flashes and star shells. There are many times when Hornfischer loses himself in overblown prose (“In the northern cruiser force on its night of doom…”), but I was far more likely to be swept along than to stop and ponder his Homeric word choice.
As good as certain set-pieces are (and the First and Second Naval Battles of Guadalcanal are magnificent), they often suffer from a needless lack of clarity. Hornfischer never takes the time to explain the weaponry or the technology (especially American radar) that played such a large role in the battle. Moreover, he omits any description of the ships, their layouts, and the purpose and function of various shipboard positions. Men are running all over the place, from the bridge to the boilers, but without some overview, or at least a rough schematic, it doesn’t mean much. How a World War II-era cruiser actually fought remains a mystery. For instance, Hornfischer continually wrote about men in the “fire control director” without ever explaining how each ship’s fire-control system worked. (How were the guns aimed? Who controlled the targeting? Etc., etc.).
(This might be common knowledge among rivet-heads and graduate-level amateur naval historians, but I – for one – have let my subscription to Jane’s Fighting Ships lapse. As this is a work of popular history, I feel like this is something that Hornfischer needed to cover, rather than assume foreknowledge. I do give credit to Hornfischer for supplying helpful maps for each battle that chart the approximate movements of the engaged ships. A little more effort such as this would have made this a far better book).
With that said, even confused readers (see: me) can’t help but be swept up in the gut-churning turmoil. The details of these seven oceanic bouts are the book’s highpoints. It is also a reminder that these events took place, long after they have slid into the shadows of more recognizable historical landmarks.
And certainly, this is one of Hornfischer’s purposes. He is, in his own way, like (the controversial) Stephen Ambrose before him, a monument maker; his tools are not granite and chisel, but a word processor and thesaurus.
Though he is unabashed in his admiration of the American fighting men, Hornfischer doesn’t flinch from the brutal truth of war: that the stories are told by the survivors, and that however heroic were the dead, the dead would rather have lived.
A brief benediction is provided by sailor Robert Graff, whom Hornfischer accompanies on a return trip to Guadalcanal:
Unlike some paeans to the Greatest Generation, Hornfischer does not airbrush the facts. He dwells on the psychological wounds of the war, including those of Captain Bode, a one-time rising star who lost his ship, the Chicago. After being posted to Panama, he took the time to pen a letter to his wife before entering a restroom with a .38 caliber revolver.
This is a story of glory, yes – and the price of glory.
- James D. Hornfischer, Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal
The naval battles around the island of Guadalcanal (the largest island in the Solomons, located in the southwest Pacific) were old-timey, throwback engagements. Naval warfare in World War II was dominated by two distinctly different weapons: the submarine and the aircraft carrier. The consequence of these vessels was that the war at sea often involved opposing forces that never came into direct contact. At Midway, for instance, America’s planes attacked Japanese ships, while Japanese planes attacked American ships. There was never an instant when an American ship went toe-to-toe with a Japanese ship.
At Guadalcanal, it was different. Here, the navies of Japan and American mixed it up in the Coral Sea in seven devastating battles that harkened back to the days of Nelson or the Armada. Here, opposing ships faced off with such ferocity that the waters around the Solomon Islands became known as Ironbottom Sound.
It is fitting that a book about throwback battles should be written by something of a throwback author.
James Hornfischer’s Neptune’s Inferno has an old fashioned feel to it. It could have been released back in 1943, along with MGM’s Bataan, as a way to inspire patriotism and sell war bonds. It lacks the balance, clarity of analysis, and sharpness of judgment that mark today’s best World War II books, such as the volumes by Max Hastings. Instead, Hornfischer relies on the tools of the novelist. Neptune’s Inferno is at its best during the battles, which are immediate, visceral, and exhausting.
Neptune’s Inferno is first and foremost a battle narrative. It covers all seven encounters around Guadalcanal, which took place between August and November 1942: the Battle of Savo Island; the Battle of the Eastern Solomons; the Battle of Cape Esperance; the Battle of Santa Cruz; the First and Second Naval Battles of Guadalcanal; and the Battle of Tassafaronga.
Hornfischer has twin aims in covering all these engagements in such slavish detail. First, he believes (and probably rightfully so) that the Marines have gotten the lion’s share of the credit for winning the Battle of Guadalcanal. In books (The Thin Red Line, Guadalcanal Diary) and movies (The Thin Red Line, Guadalcanal Diary), it is the riflemen who are portrayed as doing all the heavy lifting. Neptune’s Inferno certainly helps balance the scales a bit.
Hornfischer’s second aim, his thesis, is that the naval clashes in the Solomons marked the “rising” of a fighting fleet. To that end, he endlessly repeats the circumstances of 1942, when the United States was split between a war on two hemispheres, and when the Pacific War was fought on something of a shoestring, ad hoc basis. I’m not entirely sure Hornfischer proves this point. Certainly, the Navy eventually completed their objective of strangling Guadalcanal, of keeping the Japanese navy from reinforcing its ground troops. Still, from my tabulations, the Japanese won the majority of the individual engagements, while in terms of tonnage lost, the matter was a draw (with a slight advantage to the Japanese).
Neptune’s Inferno is an American story. There is scant – almost zero – attention paid to the Japanese side. As to overall strategy, this is drawn in broad strokes, with very little insight into the decisions made by the top admirals. Furthermore, in a book that is so reliant on personal recollections and a you-are-there point-of-view, Hornfischer’s attempt at character sketches are woefully inadequate. Never once did I get the sense that I understood Admiral Ghormley or Admiral Nimitz at any but the most surface level.
These omissions are made more glaring by the inconsistent writing. I’m not sure who to blame: Hornfischer or his editor. In any event, the book is often as choppy as the South Pacific (for purposes of that simile, I hope the South Pacific is choppy). Often, the narrative doesn’t seem to cohere: sentences are strangers, one to the other, while paragraphs contain information that is only distantly related. The uneven flow of the storytelling is most glaring in segues between the macro (detailing overall strategy) and the micro (describing the battles) sections.
The highlights, as befits a book of this type, is the blood-and-thunder, the moments when two ships square off in the dead of night, the blackness lit by muzzle flashes and star shells. There are many times when Hornfischer loses himself in overblown prose (“In the northern cruiser force on its night of doom…”), but I was far more likely to be swept along than to stop and ponder his Homeric word choice.
The Wasp absorbed two [torpedoes], producing a series of blasts fed by aviation fuel and stored bombs. In minutes the carrier was a pyre, her pall visible for miles. The torpedoes that missed boiled onward, toward the Hornet task force six miles away…The dying Wasp drew in her escorts in a feverish rescue effort. It was the way of the South Seas that episodes like this were well attended by sharks. As the escorting vessels moved in with cargo nets thrown over the gunwales, the sailors were horrified. “Sharks were everywhere,” wrote Fred Richardson, a sailor from the destroyer Farenholt… “A shark would catch a man by an arm or a foot and pull him under, cutting off his screams. The poor devil would pop up again, and again, like a cork on a fishing line. Each time his scream would be weaker than before…Sometimes the shark would grab a poor man in the middle and shake him like a dog shaking a rat. Then the shark would back off, dragging the dying man’s entrails behind him. The water would turn milky with blood.”
As good as certain set-pieces are (and the First and Second Naval Battles of Guadalcanal are magnificent), they often suffer from a needless lack of clarity. Hornfischer never takes the time to explain the weaponry or the technology (especially American radar) that played such a large role in the battle. Moreover, he omits any description of the ships, their layouts, and the purpose and function of various shipboard positions. Men are running all over the place, from the bridge to the boilers, but without some overview, or at least a rough schematic, it doesn’t mean much. How a World War II-era cruiser actually fought remains a mystery. For instance, Hornfischer continually wrote about men in the “fire control director” without ever explaining how each ship’s fire-control system worked. (How were the guns aimed? Who controlled the targeting? Etc., etc.).
(This might be common knowledge among rivet-heads and graduate-level amateur naval historians, but I – for one – have let my subscription to Jane’s Fighting Ships lapse. As this is a work of popular history, I feel like this is something that Hornfischer needed to cover, rather than assume foreknowledge. I do give credit to Hornfischer for supplying helpful maps for each battle that chart the approximate movements of the engaged ships. A little more effort such as this would have made this a far better book).
With that said, even confused readers (see: me) can’t help but be swept up in the gut-churning turmoil. The details of these seven oceanic bouts are the book’s highpoints. It is also a reminder that these events took place, long after they have slid into the shadows of more recognizable historical landmarks.
And certainly, this is one of Hornfischer’s purposes. He is, in his own way, like (the controversial) Stephen Ambrose before him, a monument maker; his tools are not granite and chisel, but a word processor and thesaurus.
Though he is unabashed in his admiration of the American fighting men, Hornfischer doesn’t flinch from the brutal truth of war: that the stories are told by the survivors, and that however heroic were the dead, the dead would rather have lived.
A brief benediction is provided by sailor Robert Graff, whom Hornfischer accompanies on a return trip to Guadalcanal:
War is unlike life,” he said. “It’s a denial of everything you learn life is. And that’s why when you get finished with it, you see that it offers no lessons that can’t be better learned in civilian life. You are exposed to horrors you would sooner forget. A disconnect needs to be made to get yourself cleaned.
Unlike some paeans to the Greatest Generation, Hornfischer does not airbrush the facts. He dwells on the psychological wounds of the war, including those of Captain Bode, a one-time rising star who lost his ship, the Chicago. After being posted to Panama, he took the time to pen a letter to his wife before entering a restroom with a .38 caliber revolver.
This is a story of glory, yes – and the price of glory.
January 18, 2023
An amazing book on a part of naval history much needed to be told.
"Guadalcanal." Most people if they know anything about that word at all, they think "Marines". And quite rightly so --- the stand of the Marines at Guadalcanal is one of the epic stories of bravery and heroism that have given the Leathernecks their place in military history. However, there is another part of the Guadalcanal Campaign that gets forgotten too much in all that --- the role that the Navy and Coast Guard played in the victory at Guadalcanal.
In World War 2, many people know about the Battle of Midway ---- which occurred before Guadalcanal ---- how the United States scored an incredible victory over the Imperial Japanese fleet, sinking 4 of their carriers to America's 1. Then, the thinking goes, this was the turning point of the War in the Pacific Theater ---- that from then on, the outcome of an eventual American victory was only a matter of time --- a foregone conclusion.
As "Neptune's Inferno" relates, that thinking is way off base. In fact, what Midway really represented was not so much a breaking the back of Japan as it was a leveling of the playing field where before Japan held overwhelming advantages over American forces, holding the initiative and America largely on the defensive --- to a strategic parity between the Japanese and American fleets.
In this contest between equals, Guadalcanal, for a variety of reasons emerged as the point at which they would meet. The U.S. Navy had decrypted the Japanese codes enough to determine that the Japanese were in the initial stages of constructing a base with an airfield there --- and the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Ernest J. King determined that America would get there first.
Both sides had carrier aviation forces in roughly equal numbers at this point. As the Campaign unfolded, both would inflict casualties on these and receive them with the result that naval commanders from both sides were careful to husband their carriers carefully. The upshot of this is that the surface naval forces ---- the destroyers, cruisers, and battleships --- would play a larger role at Guadalcanal than they had previously in the War --- doing battle against each other with naval gunfire and torpedoes --- instead of from long distances like in Coral Sea and Midway.
To be frank, these were battles that the U.S. Navy was unprepared for ---- and that the Japanese Navy had been preparing for years and even decades. The Japanese Navy had fought peer competitors in its wars with China and Russia in the past, and had studied and learned from these -- perfecting night surface warfare especially. America, on the other hand, had really not had a naval war against a superior or equal fleet since the War of 1812.
The results were catastrophic. In the first naval battle of Guadalcanal, the Battle of Savo Island, the U.S. Navy would take a beating like it hadn't received in over a century --- completely outclassed in command and control and tactics.
The learning curve in August-November 1942 was a steep one. It would take time that the U.S. Navy did not have to find leaders who were fighters ---- as opposed to the careerists, adminstrative types, and technocrats --- that advance just as easily in peacetime militaries.
Yet, fortuitously, the U.S. Navy did learn quickly and did find fighting leaders.
Nevertheless, it was ugly and brutal. The Third Naval Battle of Guadalcanal reads like a naval version of the night subway gun battle in the movie, "Predator 2" --- a melee in the dark in which friend and foe could scarcely tell each other apart, gun and torpedoes blazing in a fiery hellish chaos, as commanders and sailors each fought to survive as much as they fought to waste their foes. On the flagship, USS San Francisco, it was so hard hit, in addition to losing the entire flag staff, it lost its CO and XO --- with command of what was left of her eventually falling to one of the junior officers, the Damage Control Officer, LCDR Herbert E. Schonland.
I could go on and on with this remarkable book.
Long story short, the naval battles of Guadalcanal devolved into a war of attrition --- one in which the U.S. Navy prevailed, in my opinion, as much as by force of will and determination --- at the behest of such leaders as ADM Halsey, RADM Lee, RADM Turner --- and other notables, as by tactical acumen and weaponry.
The bravery and valor of the sailors, their leaders, and the narrative make this book one of the most compelling history books I've ever read. It's a story that needs to be remembered.
Yes, the Marines rightly earned their place in history --- losing over 1,000 at Guadalcanal. But so did the the Navy --- losing over 5,000 men at Guadalcanal
Had the Navy failed, the Marines would have suffered the fate of those at Bataan and Wake Island --- isolated, cut off, and destined to slowly waste away from starvation and lack of ammunition. No doubt, such a defeat would have resulted in the reliefs of naval leaders now thought of as great --- King, Nimitz, Halsey. And likely the U.S. Navy would have had to play defense for years to come --- the Pacific War may have taken until 1946 or even 1947 to defeat Japan --- at the cost of hundreds of thousands or even a million lives.
An outstanding book. I recommend it to anyone with an interest in history. One of the best!
"Guadalcanal." Most people if they know anything about that word at all, they think "Marines". And quite rightly so --- the stand of the Marines at Guadalcanal is one of the epic stories of bravery and heroism that have given the Leathernecks their place in military history. However, there is another part of the Guadalcanal Campaign that gets forgotten too much in all that --- the role that the Navy and Coast Guard played in the victory at Guadalcanal.
In World War 2, many people know about the Battle of Midway ---- which occurred before Guadalcanal ---- how the United States scored an incredible victory over the Imperial Japanese fleet, sinking 4 of their carriers to America's 1. Then, the thinking goes, this was the turning point of the War in the Pacific Theater ---- that from then on, the outcome of an eventual American victory was only a matter of time --- a foregone conclusion.
As "Neptune's Inferno" relates, that thinking is way off base. In fact, what Midway really represented was not so much a breaking the back of Japan as it was a leveling of the playing field where before Japan held overwhelming advantages over American forces, holding the initiative and America largely on the defensive --- to a strategic parity between the Japanese and American fleets.
In this contest between equals, Guadalcanal, for a variety of reasons emerged as the point at which they would meet. The U.S. Navy had decrypted the Japanese codes enough to determine that the Japanese were in the initial stages of constructing a base with an airfield there --- and the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Ernest J. King determined that America would get there first.
Both sides had carrier aviation forces in roughly equal numbers at this point. As the Campaign unfolded, both would inflict casualties on these and receive them with the result that naval commanders from both sides were careful to husband their carriers carefully. The upshot of this is that the surface naval forces ---- the destroyers, cruisers, and battleships --- would play a larger role at Guadalcanal than they had previously in the War --- doing battle against each other with naval gunfire and torpedoes --- instead of from long distances like in Coral Sea and Midway.
To be frank, these were battles that the U.S. Navy was unprepared for ---- and that the Japanese Navy had been preparing for years and even decades. The Japanese Navy had fought peer competitors in its wars with China and Russia in the past, and had studied and learned from these -- perfecting night surface warfare especially. America, on the other hand, had really not had a naval war against a superior or equal fleet since the War of 1812.
The results were catastrophic. In the first naval battle of Guadalcanal, the Battle of Savo Island, the U.S. Navy would take a beating like it hadn't received in over a century --- completely outclassed in command and control and tactics.
The learning curve in August-November 1942 was a steep one. It would take time that the U.S. Navy did not have to find leaders who were fighters ---- as opposed to the careerists, adminstrative types, and technocrats --- that advance just as easily in peacetime militaries.
Yet, fortuitously, the U.S. Navy did learn quickly and did find fighting leaders.
Nevertheless, it was ugly and brutal. The Third Naval Battle of Guadalcanal reads like a naval version of the night subway gun battle in the movie, "Predator 2" --- a melee in the dark in which friend and foe could scarcely tell each other apart, gun and torpedoes blazing in a fiery hellish chaos, as commanders and sailors each fought to survive as much as they fought to waste their foes. On the flagship, USS San Francisco, it was so hard hit, in addition to losing the entire flag staff, it lost its CO and XO --- with command of what was left of her eventually falling to one of the junior officers, the Damage Control Officer, LCDR Herbert E. Schonland.
I could go on and on with this remarkable book.
Long story short, the naval battles of Guadalcanal devolved into a war of attrition --- one in which the U.S. Navy prevailed, in my opinion, as much as by force of will and determination --- at the behest of such leaders as ADM Halsey, RADM Lee, RADM Turner --- and other notables, as by tactical acumen and weaponry.
The bravery and valor of the sailors, their leaders, and the narrative make this book one of the most compelling history books I've ever read. It's a story that needs to be remembered.
Yes, the Marines rightly earned their place in history --- losing over 1,000 at Guadalcanal. But so did the the Navy --- losing over 5,000 men at Guadalcanal
Had the Navy failed, the Marines would have suffered the fate of those at Bataan and Wake Island --- isolated, cut off, and destined to slowly waste away from starvation and lack of ammunition. No doubt, such a defeat would have resulted in the reliefs of naval leaders now thought of as great --- King, Nimitz, Halsey. And likely the U.S. Navy would have had to play defense for years to come --- the Pacific War may have taken until 1946 or even 1947 to defeat Japan --- at the cost of hundreds of thousands or even a million lives.
An outstanding book. I recommend it to anyone with an interest in history. One of the best!
July 20, 2021
I had just finished the Last Stand of the Tin Can Soldiers. I considered it one of the best books I have ever read. A fellow GoodReads friend suggested I check out Neptune’s Inferno by the same author. I received the book on a Friday, started reading it on a Saturday and, in spite of a busy schedule, I finished it by the next Friday. The conclusion is that Hornfischer has done it again. As my friend JP say’s “the guy really pitches strikes when it comes to Pacific naval warfare.” James D. Hornfischer has the ability to describe naval engagements like Bruce Catton or Stephen W. Sears describe Civil War battles.
I had previously read Richard Frank’s The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle for Guadalcanal several years ago. This was a great overview of the land and sea campaign. I remembered being in awe of the sea battles. The focus of Hornfischer’s book is the naval side of the story. The Marine Corp likes to spin their own story of Guadalcanal and tell how they were abandoned by the United States Navy. There is more than a grain of truth to this. However, the key to victory at Guadalcanal was to control the seas around Guadalcanal. In the end, three sailors would give their lives for every infantryman that was killed on the island. This was a team effort and the victory was forged in blood.
The Guadalcanal campaign included 7 naval battles between August 9th and November 30th. Only two of the battles included carriers. Five of those battles pitted surface ship vs surface ship. These were desperate slugfests between two desperate foes involving capital ships as big as battleships firing massive guns at ranges that were sometimes inside of 1,000 yards! Imagine that! Ships that were designed to fire salvos at ranges exceeding 17,000 yards were as close as 450 yards!!!!!!
The USN had not experienced victory in a battle involving surface ships in the first 10 months of the war. The first battle on August 9th called the battle of Savo Island would be no different. The US lost over 1,000 sailors. The combined allied forces were routed. This was kept secret from the public. The situation was desperate. Something had to be done.
There were several factors that led to these early defeats. Upon reading the book, I was left with the impression that the greatest factor was the USN’s old breed of flag admirals and captains that did not understand the tactical advantage presented by SC/SG radar. The IJN relied on optics. The USN had radar. Theoretically, we could fire a shot before the IJN could ever see that we were in the area. Also, the USN did not have to walk shots in. The fire controlled by radar meant the first shots fired would likely meet their targets.
I found the events very frustrating. After the first loss, Admiral Norman Scott is given charge of a task force and the USN wins a great victory. The reader is left thinking that the USN has finally figured out how to fight night battles with surface ships and has a leader that the men believe in. Prior to the next battle, the USN will combine Norman Scott’s task force with Callaghan’s taskforce. Callaghan was untested in battle, did not understand the advantage of the SC/SG radar. Scott was coming off a decisive victory and helped rewrite the navy’s doctrine of night fighting. However, Callaghan was promoted to Admiral 15 day prior to Scott so Callaghan was put in charge of the combined force for November 13th. The USN prevails in spite of this and both Scott and Callaghan are killed during the November 13th engagement. Next, the US sends in two Battleships with a force under the command of Admiral Lee to counter the Japanese battleships. Admiral Lee understands radar as well as anyone in the Navy and he wins a decisive victory. You think the USN has finally learned their lesson. Shortly after Admiral Lee’s victory another USN force is sent in with a skipper that once again does not understand radar. As a result, several US cruisers are sunk and that battle was lost but it was too little too late for Japan. They were pulling out.
After Guadalcanal, the IJN lost their confidence. I had read in other publications that the IJN ran short of pilots. At the end of this book an IJN naval officer commented that radar directed anti-aircraft fire was the greatest contribution to the shortage of Japanese pilots. Also, the IJN did not believe that the decadent Americans would be willing to slug it out with the IJN in far-away lands fighting for unknown territory that belonged to some European colonial empire. The Guadalcanal campaign also helped to destroy this stereotype of Americans for Japan. Americans were willing to fight!
Guadalcanal was a major turning point of the war for the USN surface navy like Midway was a turning point for the carrier fleet.
If you are like me you will love this book. James D. Hornfischer has the ability to describe naval engagements like Bruce Catton or Stephen W. Sears describe Civil War battles. Let us hope that he keeps writing. I am a fan of this guy! Ship of Ghosts is on order.
I had previously read Richard Frank’s The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle for Guadalcanal several years ago. This was a great overview of the land and sea campaign. I remembered being in awe of the sea battles. The focus of Hornfischer’s book is the naval side of the story. The Marine Corp likes to spin their own story of Guadalcanal and tell how they were abandoned by the United States Navy. There is more than a grain of truth to this. However, the key to victory at Guadalcanal was to control the seas around Guadalcanal. In the end, three sailors would give their lives for every infantryman that was killed on the island. This was a team effort and the victory was forged in blood.
The Guadalcanal campaign included 7 naval battles between August 9th and November 30th. Only two of the battles included carriers. Five of those battles pitted surface ship vs surface ship. These were desperate slugfests between two desperate foes involving capital ships as big as battleships firing massive guns at ranges that were sometimes inside of 1,000 yards! Imagine that! Ships that were designed to fire salvos at ranges exceeding 17,000 yards were as close as 450 yards!!!!!!
The USN had not experienced victory in a battle involving surface ships in the first 10 months of the war. The first battle on August 9th called the battle of Savo Island would be no different. The US lost over 1,000 sailors. The combined allied forces were routed. This was kept secret from the public. The situation was desperate. Something had to be done.
There were several factors that led to these early defeats. Upon reading the book, I was left with the impression that the greatest factor was the USN’s old breed of flag admirals and captains that did not understand the tactical advantage presented by SC/SG radar. The IJN relied on optics. The USN had radar. Theoretically, we could fire a shot before the IJN could ever see that we were in the area. Also, the USN did not have to walk shots in. The fire controlled by radar meant the first shots fired would likely meet their targets.
I found the events very frustrating. After the first loss, Admiral Norman Scott is given charge of a task force and the USN wins a great victory. The reader is left thinking that the USN has finally figured out how to fight night battles with surface ships and has a leader that the men believe in. Prior to the next battle, the USN will combine Norman Scott’s task force with Callaghan’s taskforce. Callaghan was untested in battle, did not understand the advantage of the SC/SG radar. Scott was coming off a decisive victory and helped rewrite the navy’s doctrine of night fighting. However, Callaghan was promoted to Admiral 15 day prior to Scott so Callaghan was put in charge of the combined force for November 13th. The USN prevails in spite of this and both Scott and Callaghan are killed during the November 13th engagement. Next, the US sends in two Battleships with a force under the command of Admiral Lee to counter the Japanese battleships. Admiral Lee understands radar as well as anyone in the Navy and he wins a decisive victory. You think the USN has finally learned their lesson. Shortly after Admiral Lee’s victory another USN force is sent in with a skipper that once again does not understand radar. As a result, several US cruisers are sunk and that battle was lost but it was too little too late for Japan. They were pulling out.
After Guadalcanal, the IJN lost their confidence. I had read in other publications that the IJN ran short of pilots. At the end of this book an IJN naval officer commented that radar directed anti-aircraft fire was the greatest contribution to the shortage of Japanese pilots. Also, the IJN did not believe that the decadent Americans would be willing to slug it out with the IJN in far-away lands fighting for unknown territory that belonged to some European colonial empire. The Guadalcanal campaign also helped to destroy this stereotype of Americans for Japan. Americans were willing to fight!
Guadalcanal was a major turning point of the war for the USN surface navy like Midway was a turning point for the carrier fleet.
If you are like me you will love this book. James D. Hornfischer has the ability to describe naval engagements like Bruce Catton or Stephen W. Sears describe Civil War battles. Let us hope that he keeps writing. I am a fan of this guy! Ship of Ghosts is on order.
January 3, 2022
To begin on a personal note my discovery of this book is a demonstration of the value GR friendships and the reviews we all write. I had recently finished reading The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors when I discovered the review of Neptune's Inferno written by a GR friend that had also recently read and enjoyed The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors. My friend had had Neptune's Inferno recommended to him by a GR friend of his who enjoyed both books for the same reasons I enjoyed them. Based on this exchange I purchased a copy of Neptune's Inferno and have not for one page been disappointed in the expectations I formed from reading the review of my GR friend and his GR friend. The exchange of our reading discoveries with our friends and the rest of the GR membership is what makes this platform so valuable to those of us whose curiosity makes reading a necessity.
As for Neptune's Inferno it is almost exclusively about the U.S. naval engagements in support of the Marine efforts to invade and conquer the island of Guadalcanal during WWII. I have mentioned several times in other reviews that WWII is not a serious interest of mine for reasons I will not bore you with now. However, I love history and a good history of any period is always worth reading. As I stated above my particular interest in this book is based on the experience I had reading another book
with a similar subject, WWII naval combat. What most of us know about Guadalcanal is that it was an extremely demanding land battle for the U.S. Marines. Some of us may know of Navy involvement and some criticism of the Navy for "abandoning" the Marines on Guadalcanal but otherwise very little is known about what the Navy did there. This book attempts to correct that impression as well as to use this battle to illustrate a number of important factors in the evolution of modern warfare.
To begin with one of the things the Navy did at Guadalcanal was to amass three times the fatalities that the Marine Corps did. That was a stunning fact to learn so the idea that this island was entirely a Marine Corps show and that the Navy had little or nothing to contribute to the ultimate taking of the island is a serious misconception. The Japanese were aggressively committed to keeping this island and to pushing the Marines back into the sea. To achieve this goal the Japanese Navy, the IJN, sent one multi-ship task force after another to bombard the Marine's Henderson airfield on Guadalcanal and then to land an amphibious counter invasion force. In seven separate engagements from August to November of 1942 the surface naval forces of the IJN and the U.S. faced off in do or die struggles resulting in horrific slaughter and destruction on both sides but with the U.S. getting the worst of both. While suffering severely the Navy managed to prevent the Japanese from achieving their objectives and thus insured the Marine victory on the island.
While the book clearly illustrates the massive destructive power of modern naval weaponry and what it does to both men and machines the book does a great deal more. The early introduction of radar in naval combat highlights the use of modern technology in warfare and its rejection by old school senior naval officers. Guadalcanal was the re-birth by fire of the U.S. Navy into the modern era. Antiquated thinking and methods would no longer work and the ideas and methods of younger men would need to be considered and implemented if victory was to be achieved. The limitations of fighting a two theater war is also illustrated. Guadalcanal's protection was hampered by the fact that naval resources were divided by two wars being fought on opposite sides of the world. At the same time Guadalcanal was being fought the invasion of North Africa in Operation Torch was also underway. These two campaigns each had their demands for material resources as well as for personel and the Pacific was not as high on priority list at that time. Certainly starting with the U.S. success at Midway it was becoming more evident that the aircraft carrier was now the major capital ship in any navy and that battleships were diminishing in value and usefulness. One of seven naval engagements at Guadalcanal pitted battleships v battleships but it was the smaller destroyers and cruisers that were responsible for the majority of the destruction. The composition of U.S. fleets would need to rethought as well as how ships should be utilized and deployed. There is a lot to be learned from reviewing the details of what happened at Guadalcanal and how that event resulted in significant changes which the U.S. Navy successfully made while the IJN persisted in following their standard operating procedures until their navy was ultimately destroyed.
As for Neptune's Inferno it is almost exclusively about the U.S. naval engagements in support of the Marine efforts to invade and conquer the island of Guadalcanal during WWII. I have mentioned several times in other reviews that WWII is not a serious interest of mine for reasons I will not bore you with now. However, I love history and a good history of any period is always worth reading. As I stated above my particular interest in this book is based on the experience I had reading another book
with a similar subject, WWII naval combat. What most of us know about Guadalcanal is that it was an extremely demanding land battle for the U.S. Marines. Some of us may know of Navy involvement and some criticism of the Navy for "abandoning" the Marines on Guadalcanal but otherwise very little is known about what the Navy did there. This book attempts to correct that impression as well as to use this battle to illustrate a number of important factors in the evolution of modern warfare.
To begin with one of the things the Navy did at Guadalcanal was to amass three times the fatalities that the Marine Corps did. That was a stunning fact to learn so the idea that this island was entirely a Marine Corps show and that the Navy had little or nothing to contribute to the ultimate taking of the island is a serious misconception. The Japanese were aggressively committed to keeping this island and to pushing the Marines back into the sea. To achieve this goal the Japanese Navy, the IJN, sent one multi-ship task force after another to bombard the Marine's Henderson airfield on Guadalcanal and then to land an amphibious counter invasion force. In seven separate engagements from August to November of 1942 the surface naval forces of the IJN and the U.S. faced off in do or die struggles resulting in horrific slaughter and destruction on both sides but with the U.S. getting the worst of both. While suffering severely the Navy managed to prevent the Japanese from achieving their objectives and thus insured the Marine victory on the island.
While the book clearly illustrates the massive destructive power of modern naval weaponry and what it does to both men and machines the book does a great deal more. The early introduction of radar in naval combat highlights the use of modern technology in warfare and its rejection by old school senior naval officers. Guadalcanal was the re-birth by fire of the U.S. Navy into the modern era. Antiquated thinking and methods would no longer work and the ideas and methods of younger men would need to be considered and implemented if victory was to be achieved. The limitations of fighting a two theater war is also illustrated. Guadalcanal's protection was hampered by the fact that naval resources were divided by two wars being fought on opposite sides of the world. At the same time Guadalcanal was being fought the invasion of North Africa in Operation Torch was also underway. These two campaigns each had their demands for material resources as well as for personel and the Pacific was not as high on priority list at that time. Certainly starting with the U.S. success at Midway it was becoming more evident that the aircraft carrier was now the major capital ship in any navy and that battleships were diminishing in value and usefulness. One of seven naval engagements at Guadalcanal pitted battleships v battleships but it was the smaller destroyers and cruisers that were responsible for the majority of the destruction. The composition of U.S. fleets would need to rethought as well as how ships should be utilized and deployed. There is a lot to be learned from reviewing the details of what happened at Guadalcanal and how that event resulted in significant changes which the U.S. Navy successfully made while the IJN persisted in following their standard operating procedures until their navy was ultimately destroyed.
December 19, 2021
In the summer and fall of 1942, fresh off the victory at Midway, the U.S. Navy wasn't ready for its light forces--its cruisers and destroyers--to be the primary weapons of a major naval campaign. By the end of November 1942, it wouldn't need to use much else to finish the job in the southern Solomon Islands. This is the fascinating and frequently frustrating story of how the navy learned the hard way how to fight the Imperial Japanese Navy. It is an intense and vivid narrative, expertly researched and told by the great historian and talented writer, James Hornfischer. The battle scenes had me on the edge of my seat and sometimes exclaiming out loud, I was so caught up in the action and gore. And I am in awe of the bravery and grit of our servicemen in WWII. An excellent book, I highly recommend it.
March 29, 2017
You'll find yourself next to the captain on the bridge, while all around you the grenades are falling. With great attention to detail, the author informs us about the battles between Americans and Japanese naval forces during the Battle of Guadalcanal. The author knows how to keep a good balance between personal experiences and the larger military strategic context. He shows how the Americans, although in the beginning inexperienced with the night battles, increasingly learned from their mistakes and ultimately defeated the Japanese through their perseverance. A perfect report on the battle of Guadalcanal, which would become the Japanese Stalingrad and the beginning of the end.
January 1, 2015
Overall this is an Excellent book. It covers the Naval portion of the Battle to take Guadalcanal away from the Japanese. The book covers just enough of the Ground force action to give a framework, but little else in that regard. This isn't a criticism of the book, this book is focused on the Naval actions and it is nice to have a little framework but not required in an absolute sense.
In regards to the focus of the book, the author takes a much wider scope than many of the books on the subject that are available. He takes in the Command aspect of this sector of the War and the change in overall command and the reasoning behind it. It also takes into account the most crucial of the Carrier actions, while still focusing on the main actions of the surface ships.
The book seems to concentrate on the battle where US Cruisers 'charged' Japanese Battleships. It covers the first battle of the surface forces in a fair amount of detail, but this one it covers in great detail. The US Battleship engagement is also covered fairly well, but the battle where the US lost a number of cruisers to Japanese Destroyers is treated somewhat as an after thought.
While the coverage of the battles ranges from almost none at all, to very detailed, the real strength of this book is covering the things that happened afterwards, the changes in training styles, the inquiry into the losses of so many ships and men, and the effects in had on the survivors.
An incredible book and one that should be on every reading list of Naval enthusiasts of WWII.
In regards to the focus of the book, the author takes a much wider scope than many of the books on the subject that are available. He takes in the Command aspect of this sector of the War and the change in overall command and the reasoning behind it. It also takes into account the most crucial of the Carrier actions, while still focusing on the main actions of the surface ships.
The book seems to concentrate on the battle where US Cruisers 'charged' Japanese Battleships. It covers the first battle of the surface forces in a fair amount of detail, but this one it covers in great detail. The US Battleship engagement is also covered fairly well, but the battle where the US lost a number of cruisers to Japanese Destroyers is treated somewhat as an after thought.
While the coverage of the battles ranges from almost none at all, to very detailed, the real strength of this book is covering the things that happened afterwards, the changes in training styles, the inquiry into the losses of so many ships and men, and the effects in had on the survivors.
An incredible book and one that should be on every reading list of Naval enthusiasts of WWII.
February 9, 2017
A while back while I was at the local branch library with my two kids, I decided to take a look through my to-read list on Goodreads and see if they had any of the books on hand. I struck out on most of them but finally I came to Hornfischer’s book and lo and behold they had it. I checked it out despite the fact that I currently was reading two other books.
I’ve read a lot about the war in the Pacific over the years and consider myself to be pretty knowledgeable on the subject. What intrigued me about this book was that it was strictly about the U.S. Navy’s experiences in the Guadalcanal campaign. Before this most of my reading had been about the Marines and Army on the island itself or the exploits of the Cactus Air Force. The naval battles are mentioned in most books, but seemingly never in great detail and the Navy’s battles are seldom given the weight they deserve in the winning of the campaign. Hornfischer’s book corrects this and then some. It turns out that the U.S. Navy’s ordeal in the Solomons was crucial to the victory since without them the Marines may well have died on the vine and experienced another Bataan.
Overall I enjoyed this book a great deal. As mentioned in other reviews, Hornfischer’s battle narratives are excellent. Actually, harrowing is closer to the mark. He manages to bring alive the confusion and horror of these surface engagements that makes one really feel for those poor sailors as they were slaughtered wholesale with nowhere to run or hide. The entire campaign was done on a shoestring and the Navy was nowhere near prepared for the fury of the Japanese response to the invasion. We learn how unprepared the Navy was for night surface actions in their tactics, procedures and leadership. The new search and targeting radars were poorly understood and few ship’s captains were willing to trust the new apparatus and the ones that were most proficient in its use were often not in the requisite positions of authority within the task force. Even the Navy’s victories were generally pyhrric in nature with the Imperial Navy often giving better than they got. Ultimately the Navy learned from these costly battles. They learned the proper battle tactics and how to use their radars. Finally they just ground the Japanese down in a battle of attrition all the while getting better and stronger while the strength of the Imperial fleet slowly wasted away.
I was all set to give this book five stars until I got approximately three-quarters of the way through. Prior to this point all of the battle narratives are outstanding. However, when he writes about the Battle of Tassafaronga, he lost me a little bit. He handles this battle in a perfunctory way. He tells us the names of the ships and the captains and how the task force was handily defeated by the torpedo dealing Japanese destroyers, but that’s about all. There is no real battle narrative like there is for the other battles. The reason for this change mystified me. Maybe it was just me. This (perceived) deficiency kind of set the tone for the last part of the book where we learn about the far reaching fallout from the battles in the Solomons. It almost seems like he lost the handle at this point and the book just kind of peters out. It’s a shame, really, since the majority of the book was so good.
Even with the flaws that arise at the end of the book, I am glad that I read it and would recommend it to anyone who wants to learn more about the naval portion of the Guadalcanal campaign. Overall it is a solid effort and I will probably read more of Hornfischer’s books.
I’ve read a lot about the war in the Pacific over the years and consider myself to be pretty knowledgeable on the subject. What intrigued me about this book was that it was strictly about the U.S. Navy’s experiences in the Guadalcanal campaign. Before this most of my reading had been about the Marines and Army on the island itself or the exploits of the Cactus Air Force. The naval battles are mentioned in most books, but seemingly never in great detail and the Navy’s battles are seldom given the weight they deserve in the winning of the campaign. Hornfischer’s book corrects this and then some. It turns out that the U.S. Navy’s ordeal in the Solomons was crucial to the victory since without them the Marines may well have died on the vine and experienced another Bataan.
Overall I enjoyed this book a great deal. As mentioned in other reviews, Hornfischer’s battle narratives are excellent. Actually, harrowing is closer to the mark. He manages to bring alive the confusion and horror of these surface engagements that makes one really feel for those poor sailors as they were slaughtered wholesale with nowhere to run or hide. The entire campaign was done on a shoestring and the Navy was nowhere near prepared for the fury of the Japanese response to the invasion. We learn how unprepared the Navy was for night surface actions in their tactics, procedures and leadership. The new search and targeting radars were poorly understood and few ship’s captains were willing to trust the new apparatus and the ones that were most proficient in its use were often not in the requisite positions of authority within the task force. Even the Navy’s victories were generally pyhrric in nature with the Imperial Navy often giving better than they got. Ultimately the Navy learned from these costly battles. They learned the proper battle tactics and how to use their radars. Finally they just ground the Japanese down in a battle of attrition all the while getting better and stronger while the strength of the Imperial fleet slowly wasted away.
I was all set to give this book five stars until I got approximately three-quarters of the way through. Prior to this point all of the battle narratives are outstanding. However, when he writes about the Battle of Tassafaronga, he lost me a little bit. He handles this battle in a perfunctory way. He tells us the names of the ships and the captains and how the task force was handily defeated by the torpedo dealing Japanese destroyers, but that’s about all. There is no real battle narrative like there is for the other battles. The reason for this change mystified me. Maybe it was just me. This (perceived) deficiency kind of set the tone for the last part of the book where we learn about the far reaching fallout from the battles in the Solomons. It almost seems like he lost the handle at this point and the book just kind of peters out. It’s a shame, really, since the majority of the book was so good.
Even with the flaws that arise at the end of the book, I am glad that I read it and would recommend it to anyone who wants to learn more about the naval portion of the Guadalcanal campaign. Overall it is a solid effort and I will probably read more of Hornfischer’s books.
September 6, 2017
Phenomenal book about one of the biggest Navy battles in the Pacific.
October 17, 2017
When I was in sixth grade, my class and several others did a WWII unit, and I wrote a report on Guadalcanal. But I honestly didn’t remember many of the details before I picked up this book.
The book was well-written, and full of quotable bits like Halsey’s willingness to divide the Pacific Ocean with Japan (“We would take the top; Japan would take the bottom.”). The various sea battles were told in great detail, from a variety of perspectives. It was a bit of a sad book, though, because Guadalcanal was a testing and learning ground for the U.S. Navy, and learning those hard lessons cost a lot of sailors their lives. I hadn’t realized that more sailors died than Marines at Guadalcanal.
It was a tricky situation. The Marines held the airbase, so that the U.S. could control the skies, or at least compete in the skies. The Japanese kept landing troops on the island so they could take the airbase. They did it at night, and the U.S. Navy tried to prevent them from succeeding. And both navies clashed frequently with heavy costs on both sides. Ultimately, the U.S. could fight on despite the losses longer than the Japanese could. (That’s an oversimplification, but that’s the general idea.)
Overall, I enjoyed the read and I learned a lot. It took me longer than expected to read it (close to two months) because a few projects popped up and a few library books had due dates, so I had to put it aside a few times. Recommended, but I liked The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy's Finest Hour more than this one.
The book was well-written, and full of quotable bits like Halsey’s willingness to divide the Pacific Ocean with Japan (“We would take the top; Japan would take the bottom.”). The various sea battles were told in great detail, from a variety of perspectives. It was a bit of a sad book, though, because Guadalcanal was a testing and learning ground for the U.S. Navy, and learning those hard lessons cost a lot of sailors their lives. I hadn’t realized that more sailors died than Marines at Guadalcanal.
It was a tricky situation. The Marines held the airbase, so that the U.S. could control the skies, or at least compete in the skies. The Japanese kept landing troops on the island so they could take the airbase. They did it at night, and the U.S. Navy tried to prevent them from succeeding. And both navies clashed frequently with heavy costs on both sides. Ultimately, the U.S. could fight on despite the losses longer than the Japanese could. (That’s an oversimplification, but that’s the general idea.)
Overall, I enjoyed the read and I learned a lot. It took me longer than expected to read it (close to two months) because a few projects popped up and a few library books had due dates, so I had to put it aside a few times. Recommended, but I liked The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy's Finest Hour more than this one.
March 5, 2011
As the title suggests, “Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal” is a detailed account of the naval actions during the early pacific portion of WWII. I found most of this book to be a knowledgeable and interesting account of the naval actions, which was what I was looking for. While attempting to guard against Monday morning quarterbacking this 70 year old event, James Hornfischer tells a story of brave sailors whose lives were cut short for a variety of unnecessary reasons. This was the dawn of naval radar, but the technology was there before the Admirals knew what to do with it. Many of the battles seem more like a slugfest in the dark than the execution of battle plans. This non-fiction book gives the reader a fair assessment for the mechanics of how Japan and the US used each type of warship and the strengths and weaknesses of each vessel. It also shows the ineptness of the leadership and how naval traditions of the 40’s prevented the best men from being in control when it was needed. I would have given Neptune’s Inferno an extra star, but the extensive details from of the stories of 30 sailors who either died, nearly died or saw terrible things was presented as a long and disjointed discussion that left the reader jumping from one bulkhead to another among the ships of the conflict. This could have been a good nearly first person account of battle but it did not work. I would recommend Neptune’s Inferno to anyone interested in the lesser known navel battles of WWII. I give this a good read.
February 15, 2011
Author Hornfischer has a way of blending the history of
strategy and tactics with personal stories and analysis that
make 'Neptune' an engaging read. I found myself reading
more slowly as not to miss anything and also, put off getting
to the end.
A great job is done with the descriptions of the chaos
that ensues during naval night fighting and the terror
of commanders as they wonder if they are firing on their
own ships. The carnage afterward is almost too much to
bear as you hear of surviving shipmates cleaning up
body parts that are strewn all over.
The Guadalcanal year of the war in the Pacific is fascinating.
As mentioned in the prologue, it was probably the only time
where Japan and the USA were in a contest of equals. Each
side had an edge in different areas, for example, expertise in
night fighting for the Japanese, over come by the new gizmo,
radar by the Americans.
As the title tells ya, 'the US Navy at', so the focus is on
the sea. Naturally, what's going on with the Marines ashore is
covered in context with the events, but if you're looking for
a lot of details on banzai charges they aren't here.
If there is a lacking it's that the story of each ship
can't be told so thoroughly, for example the sinking of
the Astoria is well covered, but the Wasp, not much,
but yes, if they were, then the book would be 3000 pages
long.
February 26, 2022
Having grown up about as far from the ocean as any American can, I have always had a fascination with those who go down to the sea in ships. For the past half century, I have read just about anything I could, fiction or nonfiction, that had to do with ships or submarines. I even joined the Navy when I was old enough to do so but spent my entire enlistment stationed ashore.
I say all this because I want readers to understand how much it means when I say that James D. Hornfischer is, bar none, the best author there is when it comes to naval history in general and the Pacific Theater of the Second World War in particular. I first read The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors several years ago and it is still my all-time favorite book about naval combat, mainly because Hornfischer doesn't just write about ships. He writes mainly about the men who sail in them and the tremendous courage it takes to leave the shore in a tiny ship and willingly confront ships many times larger and more powerful than their own.
In Neptune's Inferno, Hornfischer tells the same story but, rather than covering a relatively small engagement in a large battle, as he did in Last Stand, he has chosen to tell the story of the Navy's roll in the battle for Guadalcanal. During the several months that the U.S. Marines and the Imperial Japanese Army battled for control of this tiny island, the U.S. and allied navies battled the Imperial Japanese Navy in a series of horrendously costly battles, with each side doing their utmost to support their troops ashore. Most of the books on the subject of the Guadalcanal campaign focus on the hardships of the troops ashore and many suggest that the Navy pretty much abandoned them to their fates but a single glance at the casualty counts show the truth of the matter. The total KIA among the Army and Marines at Guadalcanal was 1,592 while more than 5,000 U.S. Navy personnel lost their lives in support of the campaign, a number that doesn't even include the British and Australian sailors lost when the Canberra was torpedoed and sunk.
I'm rambling, I know. But Hornfischer has a habit of doing that. He tells long-neglected stories that should be common knowledge and that bring up a lot of emotions.
I'll stop now. Youi should read this book.
I say all this because I want readers to understand how much it means when I say that James D. Hornfischer is, bar none, the best author there is when it comes to naval history in general and the Pacific Theater of the Second World War in particular. I first read The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors several years ago and it is still my all-time favorite book about naval combat, mainly because Hornfischer doesn't just write about ships. He writes mainly about the men who sail in them and the tremendous courage it takes to leave the shore in a tiny ship and willingly confront ships many times larger and more powerful than their own.
In Neptune's Inferno, Hornfischer tells the same story but, rather than covering a relatively small engagement in a large battle, as he did in Last Stand, he has chosen to tell the story of the Navy's roll in the battle for Guadalcanal. During the several months that the U.S. Marines and the Imperial Japanese Army battled for control of this tiny island, the U.S. and allied navies battled the Imperial Japanese Navy in a series of horrendously costly battles, with each side doing their utmost to support their troops ashore. Most of the books on the subject of the Guadalcanal campaign focus on the hardships of the troops ashore and many suggest that the Navy pretty much abandoned them to their fates but a single glance at the casualty counts show the truth of the matter. The total KIA among the Army and Marines at Guadalcanal was 1,592 while more than 5,000 U.S. Navy personnel lost their lives in support of the campaign, a number that doesn't even include the British and Australian sailors lost when the Canberra was torpedoed and sunk.
I'm rambling, I know. But Hornfischer has a habit of doing that. He tells long-neglected stories that should be common knowledge and that bring up a lot of emotions.
I'll stop now. Youi should read this book.
August 21, 2015
In spite of the US Navy's success at Midway, James Hornfisher says that "combat readiness simply wasn't the order of the day" (pg 87) - and it showed painfully at Guadalcanal. Over the course of about four months in late 1942 the Navy engaged in several sea battles with ships from the Japanese fleet (IJN). This was different from Midway, where planes fought each other hundreds of miles from their carriers. At Guadalcanal the fighting was mostly battleships, cruisers, and destroyers and a lot of them went to the bottom of Ironbottom Sound. And, in spite of the fact that US commanders were frequently caught unawares and generally failed to take advantage of radar, losses and casualties were about the same for both sides, but the US held on to the island and began to push back the Japanese. It was a costly experience for the navy to learn how to fight in a new age.
Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal focuses more on the naval side of the battle than the conflicts on the island, and Hornfisher makes each battle come alive. He doesn't write for the novice history reader, but those who are already used to reading such books will love the excitement. There were a lot of people, places, ships, and even planes involved, and it can seem a bit overwhelming at times. I find I enjoy it more when I don't worry so much about trying to remember every name and detail and keep everything straight, but maybe that'll come with increased familiarity, too.
But Hornfisher has a way with words, and his writing pulls you in to the story making it hard to put down. What I like most is how insightful his books are. He includes the accounts of admirals and regular sailors in his narrative, and sets it against the greater backdrop of events and pulls out the important lessons. He points out that major navies during WWII were "between the age of fighting sail and the age of nuclear propulsion when fuel was consumable and therefore a critical limit on their reach" (pg 37) and how this factored into objectives and events. His first book, The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy's Finest Hour is one of my all-time favorites, and if this one lacks anything in comparison it's the more inspirational ending of the other. Nonetheless, highly recommended reading for those interested in WWII history.
Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal focuses more on the naval side of the battle than the conflicts on the island, and Hornfisher makes each battle come alive. He doesn't write for the novice history reader, but those who are already used to reading such books will love the excitement. There were a lot of people, places, ships, and even planes involved, and it can seem a bit overwhelming at times. I find I enjoy it more when I don't worry so much about trying to remember every name and detail and keep everything straight, but maybe that'll come with increased familiarity, too.
But Hornfisher has a way with words, and his writing pulls you in to the story making it hard to put down. What I like most is how insightful his books are. He includes the accounts of admirals and regular sailors in his narrative, and sets it against the greater backdrop of events and pulls out the important lessons. He points out that major navies during WWII were "between the age of fighting sail and the age of nuclear propulsion when fuel was consumable and therefore a critical limit on their reach" (pg 37) and how this factored into objectives and events. His first book, The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy's Finest Hour is one of my all-time favorites, and if this one lacks anything in comparison it's the more inspirational ending of the other. Nonetheless, highly recommended reading for those interested in WWII history.
October 28, 2017
Inferno doesn't begin to describe it. Guadalcanal represented the first major invasion by U.S. forces in the 20th century and many hard lessons had to be learned. The oft-repeated charge that the Marines were abandoned there by the Navy is belied by the statistic that for every Marine who was killed on land, five sailors died at sea in the horrific battles there. “The puzzle of victory was learned on the fly and on the cheap.”
Hornfischer brilliantly, succinctly (and often horrifically as he describes the dreadful injuries suffered by the sailors) sets the stage discussing the personal and political challenges and conflicts that affected and drove the allocation of resources: the Army v the Navy (McArthur v Nimitz and King) in the Pacific; Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin in the Atlantic, with George Marshall stuck in the middle. The importance of Midway in boosting moral and altering the overall strategy cannot be overstated.
Here’s an interesting little detail. Admiral Kinkaid was a day late getting to the staging area because his charts showed the International Date Line in the wrong place. Personally, the thing always confuses me, but his staff were careful not to let the higher brass learn of the error.
Things got off to a bad start right from the beginning. Admiral Fletcher, (supported by Nimitz) in charge of the carriers, and Admiral Turner(supported by King), commanding the landing, hated each other. At the planning meeting at Saratoga, Fletcher worried about the risk to his carriers and refused to provide air support for more than 3 days. Turner, knowing the supply ships had not been combat loaded (so the most important supplies could be off-loaded first) knew that he could not afford to have the Marines abandoned after three days. This became infamous as the “Navy Bug-Out.” Whether Fletcher was correct in arguing that the risk to the carriers was far more strategically important is a debate that continues to this day. Hornfischer explains the rationale from both perspectives without coming down on either side.
The Japanese were already suffering from “victors’” disease and tended to dismiss the landings as inconsequential and but a diversion aimed at slowing down the Japanese advance on Port Moresby. The Japanese had their own army-navy slugfest of distrust. The Army, in fact, had not told the Navy that the U.S. had broken their operational code. There was no central intelligence gathering unit and army commanders had to rely as much on their instincts as hard intelligence that was virtually non-existent.
But the US Navy had a lot of hard lessons to learn. The Battle of Savo Island (otherwise known as the Battle of Five Sitting Ducks) revealed that the three minutes it took to get everyone in place after calling for general quarters was way too long. Especially as it meant having everyone run around changing places from where they had been. Leaving float planes on the decks of cruisers during action meant having aviation-fueled bombs on the rear deck. And captains ignoring the warnings of some of those being supervised could be deadly, not to mention poor communications and reluctance to trust new radar. Admiral Turner summed it up nicely: "The Navy was still obsessed with a strong feeling of technical and mental superiority over the enemy. In spite of ample evidence as to enemy capabilities, most of our officers and men despised the enemy and felt themselves sure victors in all encounters under any circumstances. The net result of all this was a fatal lethargy of mind which induced a confidence without readiness, and a routine acceptance of outworn peacetime standards of conduct. I believe that this psychological factor, as a cause of our defeat, was even more important than the element of surprise".
There were lots of lessons to be learned and many heads to roll. Communications was a big problem as frequencies differed between services and even between planes and ships. One little tidbit was that southern boys, of which there were many, had to be kept off the radios since their heavy regional accents often made them incomprehensible to those on the other end of the wireless. Another was the importance of communications and knowing the difference between friend and foe. Many casualties occurred and ships sunk because the combatants couldn't tell the difference at night.
Guadalcanal became the trial run for many of the islands that were to follow.
Hornfischer brilliantly, succinctly (and often horrifically as he describes the dreadful injuries suffered by the sailors) sets the stage discussing the personal and political challenges and conflicts that affected and drove the allocation of resources: the Army v the Navy (McArthur v Nimitz and King) in the Pacific; Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin in the Atlantic, with George Marshall stuck in the middle. The importance of Midway in boosting moral and altering the overall strategy cannot be overstated.
Here’s an interesting little detail. Admiral Kinkaid was a day late getting to the staging area because his charts showed the International Date Line in the wrong place. Personally, the thing always confuses me, but his staff were careful not to let the higher brass learn of the error.
Things got off to a bad start right from the beginning. Admiral Fletcher, (supported by Nimitz) in charge of the carriers, and Admiral Turner(supported by King), commanding the landing, hated each other. At the planning meeting at Saratoga, Fletcher worried about the risk to his carriers and refused to provide air support for more than 3 days. Turner, knowing the supply ships had not been combat loaded (so the most important supplies could be off-loaded first) knew that he could not afford to have the Marines abandoned after three days. This became infamous as the “Navy Bug-Out.” Whether Fletcher was correct in arguing that the risk to the carriers was far more strategically important is a debate that continues to this day. Hornfischer explains the rationale from both perspectives without coming down on either side.
The Japanese were already suffering from “victors’” disease and tended to dismiss the landings as inconsequential and but a diversion aimed at slowing down the Japanese advance on Port Moresby. The Japanese had their own army-navy slugfest of distrust. The Army, in fact, had not told the Navy that the U.S. had broken their operational code. There was no central intelligence gathering unit and army commanders had to rely as much on their instincts as hard intelligence that was virtually non-existent.
But the US Navy had a lot of hard lessons to learn. The Battle of Savo Island (otherwise known as the Battle of Five Sitting Ducks) revealed that the three minutes it took to get everyone in place after calling for general quarters was way too long. Especially as it meant having everyone run around changing places from where they had been. Leaving float planes on the decks of cruisers during action meant having aviation-fueled bombs on the rear deck. And captains ignoring the warnings of some of those being supervised could be deadly, not to mention poor communications and reluctance to trust new radar. Admiral Turner summed it up nicely: "The Navy was still obsessed with a strong feeling of technical and mental superiority over the enemy. In spite of ample evidence as to enemy capabilities, most of our officers and men despised the enemy and felt themselves sure victors in all encounters under any circumstances. The net result of all this was a fatal lethargy of mind which induced a confidence without readiness, and a routine acceptance of outworn peacetime standards of conduct. I believe that this psychological factor, as a cause of our defeat, was even more important than the element of surprise".
There were lots of lessons to be learned and many heads to roll. Communications was a big problem as frequencies differed between services and even between planes and ships. One little tidbit was that southern boys, of which there were many, had to be kept off the radios since their heavy regional accents often made them incomprehensible to those on the other end of the wireless. Another was the importance of communications and knowing the difference between friend and foe. Many casualties occurred and ships sunk because the combatants couldn't tell the difference at night.
Guadalcanal became the trial run for many of the islands that were to follow.
February 19, 2016
Having read the author's previous works on the Battle of Leyte Gulf and the U.S.S. Houston, I was definitely looking forward to reading this one. I was not disappointed.
The American victory at Guadalcanal was one of the most important in the war with Japan in that it not only taught American marines, pilots and sailors how to fight the Japanese, but also that the Japanese were not invincible. The learning curve was often quite steep but the lessons learned in the seas around Guadalcanal, and on the island itself, proved invaluable in later engagements and invasions.
Beginning with the planning stages of the invasion of Guadalcanal through the final evacuation of the island by the Japanese, this book covers all the main naval engagements of the campaign, and a few minor ones as well. Others have offered criticism that not enough detail is provided for some of the battles, and I'd agree. But this doesn't detract from the book's overall excellence. Using a variety of resources, including personal recollections from both American and Japanese participants, Hornfischer has woven together a fine history of the naval battles which were so vital to the possession of the island. Key figures such as Nimitz, King, Ghormley, Halsey, Scott, Callaghan and Lee are all examined, and some of them are found wanting.
While I still think Hornfischer's "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors" is the best book on World War II naval combat I've ever read, this one can stand proudly beside it.
The American victory at Guadalcanal was one of the most important in the war with Japan in that it not only taught American marines, pilots and sailors how to fight the Japanese, but also that the Japanese were not invincible. The learning curve was often quite steep but the lessons learned in the seas around Guadalcanal, and on the island itself, proved invaluable in later engagements and invasions.
Beginning with the planning stages of the invasion of Guadalcanal through the final evacuation of the island by the Japanese, this book covers all the main naval engagements of the campaign, and a few minor ones as well. Others have offered criticism that not enough detail is provided for some of the battles, and I'd agree. But this doesn't detract from the book's overall excellence. Using a variety of resources, including personal recollections from both American and Japanese participants, Hornfischer has woven together a fine history of the naval battles which were so vital to the possession of the island. Key figures such as Nimitz, King, Ghormley, Halsey, Scott, Callaghan and Lee are all examined, and some of them are found wanting.
While I still think Hornfischer's "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors" is the best book on World War II naval combat I've ever read, this one can stand proudly beside it.
August 3, 2021
I found this book to be a slow starter focusing too much on bureaucracy in a manner that wasn't terribly interesting, and I fault the writing here, not the issues. The US Navy was in a quandary before Guadalcanal. There was too much ocean to cover, too many Japanese to deal with, and most of the US fleet was at the bottom of Pearl Harbor.
Essentially, the Navy had to do or die at Guadalcanal. The Japanese fleet were pouring men into the area in a series of reinforcements known as the Tokyo Express, and the US Navy had to put a stop to the Japanese or lose their toehold on the strategically important island. Hornfischer could have built up the tension here, but he failed to do that. Nonetheless, once the action starts, the tale picks up. The author delivers plenty of gore and drama, though I thought he went a little overboard with the former. One of the nighttime engagements was described by a naval officer as a 'barroom brawl with the lights out.'
I was left with the impression of battles fought with a scratched-together force commanded by men who frankly were somewhat inept, and who kept scoring own goals as they shot up their own ships and killed their own men in their attempts to get at the enemy. Nonetheless, our side did so much damage to the Japanese as to thoroughly discourage them. However, the victory comes across as a Pyrrhic one, in which the US Navy was so badly damaged you could scarcely believe they could fight another battle.
I wish the author had assessed the commanders in greater depth. The book could also have used more detail, and the narrative is a bit disjointed. Hornfischer could have added a few passages about life on a naval warship to help ground the reader more thoroughly inside the story, but on the whole, I enjoyed this book.
Essentially, the Navy had to do or die at Guadalcanal. The Japanese fleet were pouring men into the area in a series of reinforcements known as the Tokyo Express, and the US Navy had to put a stop to the Japanese or lose their toehold on the strategically important island. Hornfischer could have built up the tension here, but he failed to do that. Nonetheless, once the action starts, the tale picks up. The author delivers plenty of gore and drama, though I thought he went a little overboard with the former. One of the nighttime engagements was described by a naval officer as a 'barroom brawl with the lights out.'
I was left with the impression of battles fought with a scratched-together force commanded by men who frankly were somewhat inept, and who kept scoring own goals as they shot up their own ships and killed their own men in their attempts to get at the enemy. Nonetheless, our side did so much damage to the Japanese as to thoroughly discourage them. However, the victory comes across as a Pyrrhic one, in which the US Navy was so badly damaged you could scarcely believe they could fight another battle.
I wish the author had assessed the commanders in greater depth. The book could also have used more detail, and the narrative is a bit disjointed. Hornfischer could have added a few passages about life on a naval warship to help ground the reader more thoroughly inside the story, but on the whole, I enjoyed this book.
June 1, 2015
Quite simply - one of the best narrative histories l have read about any period and essential for anybody interested in WW2. This is history - and human endeavour - on an epic scale. I thought that this author could never repeat the excellence of his previous books but this one exceeds all superlatives.
Read
January 22, 2022A Masterclass in Naval Warfare
Neptune’s Inferno (2011) is the third of James D. Hornfischer’s World War II books, the earlier being The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors in 2004 and Ship of Ghosts in 2006. Although Hornfischer died in 2021 at the age of 55, these three works and the two that followed (Service: A Navy SEAL at War with Marcus Luttrell and The Fleet at Flood Tide: America at Total War in the Pacific, 1944–1945) cement his position as one of the most gifted historians and authors of naval warfare.
Combining an expansive view of the battlefield and minute details of ships and gun batteries, Hornfischer describe the series of battles that defined America’s fight for Guadalcanal leaving the reader reeling, and as confused and panic stricken as those who fought aboard the navy’s ships. For the layman, not knowing a light cruiser from a heavy cruiser from a battleship can lead to periods of befuddlement, but, Hornfischer wisely adds liberal doses of tales at the human level that bring readers alongside, feeling the ships shudder as they are hit, vibrate as their big guns fire, and surrender as they fall beneath the surface.
After the first battle, he writes (and quotes), “The day was beautiful, the sea like glass and the ship was slowly overturning and sinking . . . Men were in the water, boats were picking them up. It would have made a gripping picture. It was just past noon on the ninth when the Astoria began settling by the stern. Then she was gone.” The horrific but calm scene is as much respite as the reader will find. All are vivid with Hornfischer’s frequent use of sensory details. Again, in another battle scene, as the men on the island were shelled, he quotes, “The air was filled with the bedlam of sound; the screaming of shells, the dull roar of cannonading off shore, the whine of shrapnel, the thud of palm trees as they were severed and hit the ground, and in the lulls from the big noises, the ceaseless sifting of dirt into foxhole.”
While most films and tales of Guadalcanal address the land war on the island complete with vicious hand-to-hand combat and near starvation conditions, this is a tale of the battles at sea. And when both sides withdraw at the end of six months, while the US newspapers and ticker-tape parades claimed victory, Hornfischer paints a picture of a more subdued outcome. Yes, the Japanese casualties were extraordinary and, yes, the Imperial Japanese Navy was forced to evacuate its soldiers from the island, but the US was forced to return to safe harbor to regroup and review its naval battle strategy, communications, command capabilities, and sailors’ preparedness before taking to the seas again.
A highly recommended read to anyone with an interest in history and World War II battles at sea rather than on land. For, as Hornfischer’s explains, quoting a naval strategist: “It has been said that an army is as brave as its privates and as good as its generals. In a navy, the dynamics are different. On a ship bound for battle, admirals and seamen alike stand equally exposed to the hazards of combat . . . The ship and crew members will go where [the admiral] directs them . . . but his is the choice of the hazard that will incur.”
Near the end, Hornfischer says, “Victory did not come by way of a shattering decisive battle. It came through attrition, exacted relentlessly, night after night. Victory, when it came, did not march on parade.” And later, “But the significance of the Guadalcanal campaign was never just about war materiel or real estate . . . It had to be seized by men with an active will to fight.
Neptune’s Inferno (2011) is the third of James D. Hornfischer’s World War II books, the earlier being The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors in 2004 and Ship of Ghosts in 2006. Although Hornfischer died in 2021 at the age of 55, these three works and the two that followed (Service: A Navy SEAL at War with Marcus Luttrell and The Fleet at Flood Tide: America at Total War in the Pacific, 1944–1945) cement his position as one of the most gifted historians and authors of naval warfare.
Combining an expansive view of the battlefield and minute details of ships and gun batteries, Hornfischer describe the series of battles that defined America’s fight for Guadalcanal leaving the reader reeling, and as confused and panic stricken as those who fought aboard the navy’s ships. For the layman, not knowing a light cruiser from a heavy cruiser from a battleship can lead to periods of befuddlement, but, Hornfischer wisely adds liberal doses of tales at the human level that bring readers alongside, feeling the ships shudder as they are hit, vibrate as their big guns fire, and surrender as they fall beneath the surface.
After the first battle, he writes (and quotes), “The day was beautiful, the sea like glass and the ship was slowly overturning and sinking . . . Men were in the water, boats were picking them up. It would have made a gripping picture. It was just past noon on the ninth when the Astoria began settling by the stern. Then she was gone.” The horrific but calm scene is as much respite as the reader will find. All are vivid with Hornfischer’s frequent use of sensory details. Again, in another battle scene, as the men on the island were shelled, he quotes, “The air was filled with the bedlam of sound; the screaming of shells, the dull roar of cannonading off shore, the whine of shrapnel, the thud of palm trees as they were severed and hit the ground, and in the lulls from the big noises, the ceaseless sifting of dirt into foxhole.”
While most films and tales of Guadalcanal address the land war on the island complete with vicious hand-to-hand combat and near starvation conditions, this is a tale of the battles at sea. And when both sides withdraw at the end of six months, while the US newspapers and ticker-tape parades claimed victory, Hornfischer paints a picture of a more subdued outcome. Yes, the Japanese casualties were extraordinary and, yes, the Imperial Japanese Navy was forced to evacuate its soldiers from the island, but the US was forced to return to safe harbor to regroup and review its naval battle strategy, communications, command capabilities, and sailors’ preparedness before taking to the seas again.
A highly recommended read to anyone with an interest in history and World War II battles at sea rather than on land. For, as Hornfischer’s explains, quoting a naval strategist: “It has been said that an army is as brave as its privates and as good as its generals. In a navy, the dynamics are different. On a ship bound for battle, admirals and seamen alike stand equally exposed to the hazards of combat . . . The ship and crew members will go where [the admiral] directs them . . . but his is the choice of the hazard that will incur.”
Near the end, Hornfischer says, “Victory did not come by way of a shattering decisive battle. It came through attrition, exacted relentlessly, night after night. Victory, when it came, did not march on parade.” And later, “But the significance of the Guadalcanal campaign was never just about war materiel or real estate . . . It had to be seized by men with an active will to fight.
June 16, 2015
Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal by James D. Hornfischer is, ostensibly, the story of the naval fight in the waters around Guadalcanal. It goes beyond the story of just the naval battles to tell the story of how the U.S. Navy and specifically its small surface fleet (cruisers and destroyers) learned how to fight World War II. This book looks at the battle itself and the impact the battle had on both the U.S. and Imperial Japanese navies.
"And despite the the ostensible lesson of the Battle of Midway, which ahd supposedly crowned the aircraft carrier as queen of the seas, the combat sailors of America's surface fleet had a more than incidental voice in who would prevail."
With the Navy's carrier fleet depleted after Midway and further depleted during the fighting around Guadalcanal, the burden fell on the backs of the cruiser and destroyer sailors. Seven major naval battles occurred around Guadalcanal. Two of them were decided by aviation during the day, all the rest were surface battles at night. It was the cruisers and destroyers who did most of the fighting, occasionally joined by the larger aircraft carriers and battleships. In the beginning, the Japanese Navy had the upper hand and were superior at night fighting. As the campaign moved on, the U.S. Navy learned it's lessons and some of their leaders learned how to use the new tool of radar to beat the Japanese at night.
Hornfischer doesn't look at the naval fighting around Guadalcanal with rose colored glasses. The U.S. Navy's leadership committed many blunders at Guadalcanal. In many of the major battles around Guadalcanal, the U.S. Navy was technically the victor, but only because the tenacity and spirit of the ships' crews. Admiral Norman Scott and Admiral Willis Lee stand out as those who learned the lessons of the battles that came before and used the advantages in technology that the U.S. Navy had to win battles.
In Neptune's Inferno, Hornfischer also sets right the popular notion that the Navy abandoned the Marine Corps at Guadalcanal; while that could be true at the beginning of the campaign it certainly wasn't by the end. As bloody as the fighting was on Guadalcanal, by the end of the campaign three sailors died at sea for every marine/soldier who died on land. That gives you an idea of how savage and deadly the war between the US Navy and the Japanese Navy was in water around Guadalcanal.
The above just scratches the surface of Neptune's Inferno. It is an extraordinarily well written book that engages the reader from the Prologue through the end. The accounts of the battles are detailed. Hornfischer uses individual sailors' and officers' accounts of the fighting to vividly and graphically describe what happened during the fighting and how the fighting effected men both physically and mentally. Throughout, the fighting in the waters and Guadalcanal was a closely run thing and Hornfischer never lets you forget it. Additionally, the battle narratives are well supported with maps that show the positions and movements of the fleets and task forces (the maps are of particularly good quality for a Kindle!). This is a must read book for those interested in World War II or Naval history and easily rates five out of five stars.
"And despite the the ostensible lesson of the Battle of Midway, which ahd supposedly crowned the aircraft carrier as queen of the seas, the combat sailors of America's surface fleet had a more than incidental voice in who would prevail."
With the Navy's carrier fleet depleted after Midway and further depleted during the fighting around Guadalcanal, the burden fell on the backs of the cruiser and destroyer sailors. Seven major naval battles occurred around Guadalcanal. Two of them were decided by aviation during the day, all the rest were surface battles at night. It was the cruisers and destroyers who did most of the fighting, occasionally joined by the larger aircraft carriers and battleships. In the beginning, the Japanese Navy had the upper hand and were superior at night fighting. As the campaign moved on, the U.S. Navy learned it's lessons and some of their leaders learned how to use the new tool of radar to beat the Japanese at night.
Hornfischer doesn't look at the naval fighting around Guadalcanal with rose colored glasses. The U.S. Navy's leadership committed many blunders at Guadalcanal. In many of the major battles around Guadalcanal, the U.S. Navy was technically the victor, but only because the tenacity and spirit of the ships' crews. Admiral Norman Scott and Admiral Willis Lee stand out as those who learned the lessons of the battles that came before and used the advantages in technology that the U.S. Navy had to win battles.
In Neptune's Inferno, Hornfischer also sets right the popular notion that the Navy abandoned the Marine Corps at Guadalcanal; while that could be true at the beginning of the campaign it certainly wasn't by the end. As bloody as the fighting was on Guadalcanal, by the end of the campaign three sailors died at sea for every marine/soldier who died on land. That gives you an idea of how savage and deadly the war between the US Navy and the Japanese Navy was in water around Guadalcanal.
The above just scratches the surface of Neptune's Inferno. It is an extraordinarily well written book that engages the reader from the Prologue through the end. The accounts of the battles are detailed. Hornfischer uses individual sailors' and officers' accounts of the fighting to vividly and graphically describe what happened during the fighting and how the fighting effected men both physically and mentally. Throughout, the fighting in the waters and Guadalcanal was a closely run thing and Hornfischer never lets you forget it. Additionally, the battle narratives are well supported with maps that show the positions and movements of the fleets and task forces (the maps are of particularly good quality for a Kindle!). This is a must read book for those interested in World War II or Naval history and easily rates five out of five stars.
April 4, 2012
Recently I read Guadalcanal Diary, Richard Tregaskis' reporting of the land battle for Guadalcanal. From general knowledge, I knew that the fighting on Guadalcanal was deadly for the both the Marines and soldiers involved with 1,592 killed in action (KIA). What I didn't know was that during the time frame of the land battle the U.S. Navy was involved with seven naval battles with the Imperial Japanese Navy that claimed the lives of 5,041 seamen. In Neptune's Inferno, James Hornfischer details the Navy's involvement in the battle for Guadalcanal. While Hornfischer's focus is on the naval portion of the battle, he integrates the land portion of the battle to give context to the Navy's actions.
Neptune's Inferno however is not simply a recitation of the the seven battles. Hornfischer does provide a considerable amount of detail on each battle but not to the point of being mind-numbing. For example, during the description of each battle Hornfischer does provide information on the general maneuvers each ship took and the blows delivered and received by each ship. However, he does not describe each battle in great detail. What he does do is provide detailed descriptions of what each ship and her personnel encountered before, during and after each battle. His narrative of the battles makes the reader feel the horrific conditions the men of both navies endured.
Hornfischer, however, does not gloss over the mistakes made by the Navy which cost the U.S. both lives and ships. He provides the information about those mistakes in detail and, at times, the reader is left to wonder how the U.S. was able to prevail in the struggle for Guadalcanal.
Neptune's Inferno describes the previously unappreciated contribution that the Navy made to the victory at Guadalcanal. Hornfischer presents the premise that while the land combatants fought and died for the real estate of the island they would not have been successful without the Navy's contribution in blood and treasure. I believe that the author successfully defended his premise.
I recommend Neptune's Inferno to anyone interested in the history of the Pacific Theater of Operations in WWII. After reading this book, if the reader is interested in further detail about the Battle of Savo Island, I recommend Disaster in the Pacific: New Light on the Battle of Savo Island by Denis Ashton Warner, Peggy Warner, and Sadao Senoo.
Neptune's Inferno however is not simply a recitation of the the seven battles. Hornfischer does provide a considerable amount of detail on each battle but not to the point of being mind-numbing. For example, during the description of each battle Hornfischer does provide information on the general maneuvers each ship took and the blows delivered and received by each ship. However, he does not describe each battle in great detail. What he does do is provide detailed descriptions of what each ship and her personnel encountered before, during and after each battle. His narrative of the battles makes the reader feel the horrific conditions the men of both navies endured.
Hornfischer, however, does not gloss over the mistakes made by the Navy which cost the U.S. both lives and ships. He provides the information about those mistakes in detail and, at times, the reader is left to wonder how the U.S. was able to prevail in the struggle for Guadalcanal.
Neptune's Inferno describes the previously unappreciated contribution that the Navy made to the victory at Guadalcanal. Hornfischer presents the premise that while the land combatants fought and died for the real estate of the island they would not have been successful without the Navy's contribution in blood and treasure. I believe that the author successfully defended his premise.
I recommend Neptune's Inferno to anyone interested in the history of the Pacific Theater of Operations in WWII. After reading this book, if the reader is interested in further detail about the Battle of Savo Island, I recommend Disaster in the Pacific: New Light on the Battle of Savo Island by Denis Ashton Warner, Peggy Warner, and Sadao Senoo.
November 10, 2021
Not my favorite, but I understand the praise it gets.
Three of James D. Hornfischer's books about the Pacific War have been praised a lot and this was my first of his works. I understand why he is as praised, his writing is colorful, he paints a "pretty" picture of battle even if it's just chaos. Yet I found his use of metaphors and analogs occasionally too distracting. To me the book's weakness was in the battle descriptions that were occasionally too fragmented and seemed to just jump all over the place. It wasn't easy to follow the battles, especially since he liked to put the battle compositions at the end of the description rather than at the beginning, as to save us from spoilers. In my version there were no footnotes or superscript numbers to direct to, just endnotes, which I find always irritating. The book lacks the Japanese side of battle, but one can hardly fault it for it considering the title. The book's strengths were in the description of what happened before and after the battle, especially inside the ships. Also I liked Hornfischer's handling of the controversy that seems to follow every US naval action.
I would recommend this book to anyone not familiar with the naval campaigns of Guadalcanal and who want's just that. Hornfischer is easy to read even if you're not very familiar with the war. If you want the whole shebang, go for Richard B. Frank's Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle.
Three of James D. Hornfischer's books about the Pacific War have been praised a lot and this was my first of his works. I understand why he is as praised, his writing is colorful, he paints a "pretty" picture of battle even if it's just chaos. Yet I found his use of metaphors and analogs occasionally too distracting. To me the book's weakness was in the battle descriptions that were occasionally too fragmented and seemed to just jump all over the place. It wasn't easy to follow the battles, especially since he liked to put the battle compositions at the end of the description rather than at the beginning, as to save us from spoilers. In my version there were no footnotes or superscript numbers to direct to, just endnotes, which I find always irritating. The book lacks the Japanese side of battle, but one can hardly fault it for it considering the title. The book's strengths were in the description of what happened before and after the battle, especially inside the ships. Also I liked Hornfischer's handling of the controversy that seems to follow every US naval action.
I would recommend this book to anyone not familiar with the naval campaigns of Guadalcanal and who want's just that. Hornfischer is easy to read even if you're not very familiar with the war. If you want the whole shebang, go for Richard B. Frank's Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle.
October 23, 2013
Neptune's Inferno was by all accounts a very interesting and informative book on a subject that had been a bit neglected by many. It gives its proper dues to all the brave American sailors who fought and too often died around Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands in 1942-43. It also exposes the failings and mistakes of too many American senior Navy commanders involved in that fighting, but the book has been rather charitable/apologetic when it came to apportion blame for those failings and mistakes. One officer in particular who was treated rather gently (in my opinion) by the author was the captain of the heavy cruiser USS CHICAGO, a martinet of an officer who managed to lead his ship the wrong way and left combat while the other cruisers of his task force were being slaughtered. Another commander who should have been blamed more severely (again in my opinion) was Vice-Admiral Fletcher, who withdrew his carrier force prematurely and without even waiting for permission to do so, even though his main mission was to provide air cover for the Marines on Guadalcanal and the American ships guarding the approaches to the island. Many excused him on account that he needed to refuel and to preserve his precious carrier intact, but he still put the safety of his carrier above that of the whole Guadalcanal task force. Hornfisher also often goes into too much personal details and accounts, without linking them together to make a more coherent story. That cost him a possible 5-star rating from me. Still, it is a book I would recommend to all who are interested about the history of the fighting in the Pacific.
March 20, 2020
4.5 stars rounded up.
Most think that the turning point in the Pacific war was the Battle of Midway. However, as important as Midway was, after reading Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal, I am now convinced that the true turning point was the fight for Guadalcanal.
This book focuses mainly on naval action. The land fight on the island was very tough. The naval fight, however, was ferocious with more than triple the KIAs in the ground fight. It was not a single battle. There were seven major naval engagements starting with the Battle of Savo Island and ending with the Battle of Tassafaronga. One of those was a carrier fight. The other battles were primarily surface unit slugfests using guns and torpedoes.
I was struck once again by how poorly prepared the US military was mentally for total war in the early parts of WW2. As in the Battle of Kasserine Pass on the other side of the world, the US forces were complacent and overconfident prior to the Battle of Savo Island. There, an unprepared allied force met a very sharp samurai sword with disastrous results for the allied ships. After that, the US navy proved that it could learn very fast by rapidly instituting new training and operational doctrines and by moving true fighting men into important command slots.
The losses were very heavy on both the Japanese and Allied sides, with both displaying plenty of courage and skill in the hell of battle. The deeper resources of the US finally prevailed.
Good book.
Most think that the turning point in the Pacific war was the Battle of Midway. However, as important as Midway was, after reading Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal, I am now convinced that the true turning point was the fight for Guadalcanal.
This book focuses mainly on naval action. The land fight on the island was very tough. The naval fight, however, was ferocious with more than triple the KIAs in the ground fight. It was not a single battle. There were seven major naval engagements starting with the Battle of Savo Island and ending with the Battle of Tassafaronga. One of those was a carrier fight. The other battles were primarily surface unit slugfests using guns and torpedoes.
I was struck once again by how poorly prepared the US military was mentally for total war in the early parts of WW2. As in the Battle of Kasserine Pass on the other side of the world, the US forces were complacent and overconfident prior to the Battle of Savo Island. There, an unprepared allied force met a very sharp samurai sword with disastrous results for the allied ships. After that, the US navy proved that it could learn very fast by rapidly instituting new training and operational doctrines and by moving true fighting men into important command slots.
The losses were very heavy on both the Japanese and Allied sides, with both displaying plenty of courage and skill in the hell of battle. The deeper resources of the US finally prevailed.
Good book.
March 2, 2021
Review of Neptune’s Inferno
This book suffers from a number of problems.
Firstly, there are already two classic war books written on Guadalcanal: the novel ‘The Thin Red Line’ and the memoir ‘My Helmet for a Pillow’. These books cover the combat experience on Guadalcanal and are among the best war books ever written. This book however had few first hand experiences on the horror of Guadalcanal instead choosing to focus on the naval aspects.
Secondly there are too many individual battles - mostly naval - within the six month long campaign covered here. The author lost me proverbially in the trees amongst the forest.
Additionally there was little focus on the big picture and importance of Guadalcanal. Since the author knows his material, I sense this was inadvertent but a big miss nonetheless.
Lastly. Although the writing is quite good I did not care for the structure. I found myself constantly referring to the Wikipedia page on Guadalcanal to re-orient myself. Forty-five unnamed chapters without clear timelines and summaries is a problem. I read a recent five star book on the Battle of Midway that had none of these problems.
3 stars. I thought there should have been an opportunity to give more voice to the sailors and maybe the marines. With more informational resources now available online covering WWII, battle history books of today need to emphasize the stories more.
This book suffers from a number of problems.
Firstly, there are already two classic war books written on Guadalcanal: the novel ‘The Thin Red Line’ and the memoir ‘My Helmet for a Pillow’. These books cover the combat experience on Guadalcanal and are among the best war books ever written. This book however had few first hand experiences on the horror of Guadalcanal instead choosing to focus on the naval aspects.
Secondly there are too many individual battles - mostly naval - within the six month long campaign covered here. The author lost me proverbially in the trees amongst the forest.
Additionally there was little focus on the big picture and importance of Guadalcanal. Since the author knows his material, I sense this was inadvertent but a big miss nonetheless.
Lastly. Although the writing is quite good I did not care for the structure. I found myself constantly referring to the Wikipedia page on Guadalcanal to re-orient myself. Forty-five unnamed chapters without clear timelines and summaries is a problem. I read a recent five star book on the Battle of Midway that had none of these problems.
3 stars. I thought there should have been an opportunity to give more voice to the sailors and maybe the marines. With more informational resources now available online covering WWII, battle history books of today need to emphasize the stories more.
August 12, 2013
This is a well needed and very readable account of the naval battles in and around the Solomon Islands and the Guadalcanal campaign. All too often works on this campaign focus on the fighting on the island and only mention Admiral Fletcher deciding to withdraw the US naval forces and "abandon" the Marines on the island. Some works will mention the disaster in the Battle of Savo Island, but Neptune's Inferno does a masterful job of telling the whole story of the naval actions that were essential to ensuring the victory ashore. In many ways, the naval battles in the Solomons Campaign were the massive surface combatant actions that naval thinkers had anticipated before the aircraft carrier changed the reality of naval warfare. The story of surface actions involving cruisers and battleships at night and at close range is gripping and awe inspiring. This work is well researched and readable, and offers a well balanced account of the heroes and goats of this early phase of the war. One of the most telling facts of the importance of these battles is that by the time that Guadalcanal was declared secure three US sailors died for every infantryman.
December 28, 2010
Mr. Hornfischer blew me away with Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors and I was pleasantly happy with Ship of Ghosts. Because of this and the fact I’ve been enjoying reading about the battles in the South and Southwest Pacific, I pre-ordered Neptune’s Inferno looking forward to Mr. Hornfischer’s mix of storytelling and history until I received an offer to read Neptune’s Inferno from Amazon’s Vine program (for those not familiar, Amazon lets some readers receive Advanced Uncorrected Proofs of a book in exchange for reviewing it). Needless to say I went for the uncorrected proof…
For those not familiar with the Guadalcanal Campaign, Neptune’s Inferno tells the tale of the naval engagement around Guadalcanal, focusing on the surface engagements in the water off Guadalcanal and Savo Island (the carrier war is talked about but it’s more of a side show helping to set the situation up for the surface actions). These surface actions were special because they were the first time that both sides (the Japanese and the American) were ready to fight each other on fairly equal terms (each side had tactical advantages but the strategic environment was fairly neutral with neither side having air superiority). The engagements were vicious, sudden affairs where ships and their crews could go from success to failure in seconds depending on fates fickle hand. Of the combatants, the Japanese Navy had a solid doctrine they’d practiced and used in fighting the Allies off Indonesia (night engagements with timed torpedo and gunnery fire on enemy forces), the US Navy was in something of a flux due to the introduction of radar and its variability on the battlescape (radar was in its infancy, many senior officers didn’t understand what radar could and couldn’t do and how to leverage it for the coming battles).
The opening was a weaker than The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors. Focus was on establishing the opening of the war and the setup for the invasion of Guadalcanal; while necessary there was discussion on the tempo for the navies involved and ignoring the earlier surface components between Allied and Japanese naval forces (while the US was generally unaware of their forces performance near Indonesia, the Japanese were aware of their units performance). From this opening, Mr. Hornfischer dives into the battles around Guadalcanal, opening the Battle of Savo Island, continuing thru the Battle of Tassafarango. Each battle receives its own coverage from opening thru the retirement of the forces. In the opening description Mr. Hornfischer describes the forces involved, their disposition, and provides a map for each of the surface engagements (for those interested, the maps are similar to those used by Samuel E Morison in the Two Ocean War though lacking the torpedo tracks and associated times). Engagements are generally described from the American perspective with good details provided from survivor diaries and interviews. There are limited provisions from the Japanese perspective, usually provided from CAPT Tameichi Hara’s Japanese Destroyer Captain or Vice Admiral Raizo Tanaka’s inputs to different sources. Mr. Hornfischer’s descriptions of the different battles vary with the Battle of Cape Esperance and the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal being high points (I was a little disappointed when Mr. Hornfischer failed to elaborate more on Rear Admiral Scott’s contributions to the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, especially sense Rear Admiral Scott received the Medal of Honor for that and the Battle of Cape Esperance) and the Battle of Tassafarango being a low (unfortunately this left me feeling that Mr. Hornfischer was saying, “the US failed to learn from their earlier successes and got waxed”, and not much else). Mr. Hornfischer does provide good insight of the US Navy’s leaders and their contributions (or lack thereof) and their understanding of tactics and technology but only weakly pursued the logical problems faced by both fleets. Because of these factors and Mr. Hornfischer’s style I’ll call this one a solid 4 star book; and to emphasis this, I didn’t cancel my order for the actual book, I’m planning to read it after it gets in.
For those not familiar with the Guadalcanal Campaign, Neptune’s Inferno tells the tale of the naval engagement around Guadalcanal, focusing on the surface engagements in the water off Guadalcanal and Savo Island (the carrier war is talked about but it’s more of a side show helping to set the situation up for the surface actions). These surface actions were special because they were the first time that both sides (the Japanese and the American) were ready to fight each other on fairly equal terms (each side had tactical advantages but the strategic environment was fairly neutral with neither side having air superiority). The engagements were vicious, sudden affairs where ships and their crews could go from success to failure in seconds depending on fates fickle hand. Of the combatants, the Japanese Navy had a solid doctrine they’d practiced and used in fighting the Allies off Indonesia (night engagements with timed torpedo and gunnery fire on enemy forces), the US Navy was in something of a flux due to the introduction of radar and its variability on the battlescape (radar was in its infancy, many senior officers didn’t understand what radar could and couldn’t do and how to leverage it for the coming battles).
The opening was a weaker than The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors. Focus was on establishing the opening of the war and the setup for the invasion of Guadalcanal; while necessary there was discussion on the tempo for the navies involved and ignoring the earlier surface components between Allied and Japanese naval forces (while the US was generally unaware of their forces performance near Indonesia, the Japanese were aware of their units performance). From this opening, Mr. Hornfischer dives into the battles around Guadalcanal, opening the Battle of Savo Island, continuing thru the Battle of Tassafarango. Each battle receives its own coverage from opening thru the retirement of the forces. In the opening description Mr. Hornfischer describes the forces involved, their disposition, and provides a map for each of the surface engagements (for those interested, the maps are similar to those used by Samuel E Morison in the Two Ocean War though lacking the torpedo tracks and associated times). Engagements are generally described from the American perspective with good details provided from survivor diaries and interviews. There are limited provisions from the Japanese perspective, usually provided from CAPT Tameichi Hara’s Japanese Destroyer Captain or Vice Admiral Raizo Tanaka’s inputs to different sources. Mr. Hornfischer’s descriptions of the different battles vary with the Battle of Cape Esperance and the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal being high points (I was a little disappointed when Mr. Hornfischer failed to elaborate more on Rear Admiral Scott’s contributions to the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, especially sense Rear Admiral Scott received the Medal of Honor for that and the Battle of Cape Esperance) and the Battle of Tassafarango being a low (unfortunately this left me feeling that Mr. Hornfischer was saying, “the US failed to learn from their earlier successes and got waxed”, and not much else). Mr. Hornfischer does provide good insight of the US Navy’s leaders and their contributions (or lack thereof) and their understanding of tactics and technology but only weakly pursued the logical problems faced by both fleets. Because of these factors and Mr. Hornfischer’s style I’ll call this one a solid 4 star book; and to emphasis this, I didn’t cancel my order for the actual book, I’m planning to read it after it gets in.
March 6, 2021
Mi primer audiolibro. Me costó mucho terminarlo porque no soy un buen escucha; puedo estarte mirando mientras me hablas y yo puedo no estar escuchando. Pero estuvo bien, muy bien, tan bien de hecho que ahora lo necesito en papel para releerlo.
April 2, 2011
EXCELLENT, EXCELLENT, EXCELLENT ... this is a Five Star book without a doubt... superbly researched and well written... a whole new insight into the first major offensive sea battle in the Pacific during WWII. Before the history of the sacrifices our parents and grandparents made during the last world war are lost, we owe it to our children and grandchildren to learn more about those who lived, served, and for many, died serving our country. Our nation was in the midst of two wars; one in Europe which was mostly on land and in the air, and one in the Pacific that also included the vast element of ocean.
For many of us, the name Guadalcanal is the name of some island in the South Pacific... and its meaning is too often lost as we try to pull together dates and battles and their significance among the pages of history. But the name Guadalcanal deserves far more than a passing acknowledgement... we should know and understand what happened at Guadalcanal between August and November of 1942, less than a year since Pearl Harbor. We should know that along with our great victory at Midway several months before, what took place at Guadalcanal was also significant in turning the course of the war toward victory. But Guadalcanal was not an easy victory, and only through the reading of the pages of this excellent book can we really appreciate the sacrifices we made in men, ships and planes to achieve this victory. Few of those at home as this battle was raging on and around an island no one had ever heard of had any idea at the time the horrifics that were taking place in the South Pacific. Few of us even today realize the tremendous losses that were suffered on both sides during this battle which is too often just a name. For every marine and soldier who was killed in battle on the island, three times as many were sailors lost in battle at sea... over 5000. If that number is staggering, consider that close to 21,000 Japanese soldiers lost their lives on the island, and over 4000 of their sailors were lost. Both sides lost 24 ships, and both sides lost about 440 planes. We also learn from reading the accounts of these battles is that mistakes were made, but there were also many tales of heroism... and not all of the heros survived. This was also a time when lessons were learned, not only from battle to battle, but in how we fought the rest of the war.
As a personal aside, I might mention that as the battles were being fought in the South Pacific, my father, who was a highly decorated submariner, was fighting his battles against the Japanese in the Western Pacific He spent the entire course of the war in the Pacific and was on hand on board USS MIssouri in September of 1945 to witness the surrender of the Japanese in Tokyo Bay. As I was growing up many of my friends had fathers who were heros of the Pacific war... I recognized many on their names while reading this book. I also came to learn that later while at the Naval Academy, a good number of my classmates and other recent graduates also had fathers who had been at Guadalcanal. Although I did not appreciate it at the time, most of our neighbors during those years after the war were heros, just as my father was a hero, and for this I think my life was all that much more better. For those who served, and for those who died, our nation is grateful. May neither we, nor our grandchildren or their grandchildren, take for granted the sacrifices made by the Greatest Generation to whom we are so indebted.
For many of us, the name Guadalcanal is the name of some island in the South Pacific... and its meaning is too often lost as we try to pull together dates and battles and their significance among the pages of history. But the name Guadalcanal deserves far more than a passing acknowledgement... we should know and understand what happened at Guadalcanal between August and November of 1942, less than a year since Pearl Harbor. We should know that along with our great victory at Midway several months before, what took place at Guadalcanal was also significant in turning the course of the war toward victory. But Guadalcanal was not an easy victory, and only through the reading of the pages of this excellent book can we really appreciate the sacrifices we made in men, ships and planes to achieve this victory. Few of those at home as this battle was raging on and around an island no one had ever heard of had any idea at the time the horrifics that were taking place in the South Pacific. Few of us even today realize the tremendous losses that were suffered on both sides during this battle which is too often just a name. For every marine and soldier who was killed in battle on the island, three times as many were sailors lost in battle at sea... over 5000. If that number is staggering, consider that close to 21,000 Japanese soldiers lost their lives on the island, and over 4000 of their sailors were lost. Both sides lost 24 ships, and both sides lost about 440 planes. We also learn from reading the accounts of these battles is that mistakes were made, but there were also many tales of heroism... and not all of the heros survived. This was also a time when lessons were learned, not only from battle to battle, but in how we fought the rest of the war.
As a personal aside, I might mention that as the battles were being fought in the South Pacific, my father, who was a highly decorated submariner, was fighting his battles against the Japanese in the Western Pacific He spent the entire course of the war in the Pacific and was on hand on board USS MIssouri in September of 1945 to witness the surrender of the Japanese in Tokyo Bay. As I was growing up many of my friends had fathers who were heros of the Pacific war... I recognized many on their names while reading this book. I also came to learn that later while at the Naval Academy, a good number of my classmates and other recent graduates also had fathers who had been at Guadalcanal. Although I did not appreciate it at the time, most of our neighbors during those years after the war were heros, just as my father was a hero, and for this I think my life was all that much more better. For those who served, and for those who died, our nation is grateful. May neither we, nor our grandchildren or their grandchildren, take for granted the sacrifices made by the Greatest Generation to whom we are so indebted.
September 3, 2021
Great history and enthralling narrative. Had me on the edge of my seat on multiple points and tearing up on others.
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