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Eastward to Tartary: Travels in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus
Eastward to Tartary , Robert Kaplan's first book to focus on a single region since his bestselling Balkan Ghosts , introduces readers to an explosive and little-known part of the world destined to become a tinderbox of the future.
Kaplan takes us on a spellbinding journey into the heart of a volatile region, stretching from Hungary and Romania to the far shores of the oil-rich Caspian Sea. Through dramatic stories of unforgettable characters, Kaplan illuminates the tragic history of this unstable area that he describes as the new fault line between East and West. He ventures from Turkey, Syria, and Israel to the turbulent countries of the Caucasus, from the newly rich city of Baku to the deserts of Turkmenistan and the killing fields of Armenia. The result is must reading for anyone concerned about the state of our world in the decades to come.
Kaplan takes us on a spellbinding journey into the heart of a volatile region, stretching from Hungary and Romania to the far shores of the oil-rich Caspian Sea. Through dramatic stories of unforgettable characters, Kaplan illuminates the tragic history of this unstable area that he describes as the new fault line between East and West. He ventures from Turkey, Syria, and Israel to the turbulent countries of the Caucasus, from the newly rich city of Baku to the deserts of Turkmenistan and the killing fields of Armenia. The result is must reading for anyone concerned about the state of our world in the decades to come.
384 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 2000
About the author
Robert D. Kaplan
49 books1,123 followersRobert David Kaplan is an American journalist, currently a National Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly. His writings have also been featured in The Washington Post, The New York Times, The New Republic, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs and The Wall Street Journal, among other newspapers and publications, and his more controversial essays about the nature of U.S. power have spurred debate in academia, the media, and the highest levels of government. A frequent theme in his work is the reemergence of cultural and historical tensions temporarily suspended during the Cold War.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 113 reviews
February 6, 2016
Back in the late 70's and early 80's, I used to read newspaper articles by this same author, when he was an Athens-based young freelancer frequently published in the Toronto Globe and Mail, which I read religiously. Covering the Middle East, Near East and the Balkans, he seemed to me to be the best reporter covering the area at the time. Judging by this book (published about 20 years later), he just kept getting better and better. He's multi-lingual, knows the history of the areas he covers, and looks for the big picture in what's going on politically in the countries he covers. Considering that he's spent a lot of time covering wars (the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Caucasus, etc), it's also a considerable advantage that he served in the Israeli Army and knows something of military affairs at first hand. (I don't quite get this business of serving in another country's army while still being a U.S. citizen, but that's one of the quirks of our relationship with Israel). He's also extraordinarily prolific, having written 13 books and countless articles, while spending considerable time on the lecture circuit and even serving a stint starting in 2009 on the Defense Policy Board, a federal advisory committee to the United States Department of Defense. Today, he works for a Washington DC-based think tank focused mainly on security issues.
This is the first of his books I have ever read, and it is superb. If you want a very fast, broad brush introduction to the history and current politics of the countries covered in this book, embedded in a travelogue kind of format, this is the book to read. He travels by bus, taxi and rental car through most of the countries that once made up the Ottoman Empire: Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Georgia, South Ossetia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh -- essentially in one trip, though Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are tacked on in a separate trip shortly thereafter. I can almost guarantee you that if you have any touch of wanderlust at all, and any interest in the history and politics of the region, this book will inspire you to want to hit the road to some of these places in the very near future. It may also persuade you to give a wide berth to some of them, such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. This is an unusual kind of travel book, but you would be hard put to find a better one of its kind.
If I could summarize some of the themes of this book, I would say the following:
• This part of the world is a hodge-podge of intermixed ethnic and religious groups, with a long history of hatreds frequently spilling into armed conflict. For now, things have settled down considerably after working through a lot of the redrawing of borders and the mass migrations (often forced migrations) caused by the 20th century collapse of multiple empires: the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires in World War I; the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe in 1989; and then the Soviet Union itself in 1991. But the situation is still unstable, because populations continue to be mixed -- e.g. Syria, Lebanon, Turkey -- and governments are generally weak because of immature democracies or over-ripe autocracies.
• The particular form of capitalism unleashed in the former Communist states is the worst form of capitalism ever devised, consisting of a blend of kleptocracy and crony capitalism. In effect, government in such countries becomes essentially a form of organized crime. Some of the worst examples of this are those countries cursed with oil: Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. In these places, government consists of an armed battle over the spoils. Almost all of those spoils will go to foreigners and foreign corporations, or to a small number of members of the local elite.
• Islam is often a barrier to economic development, but not inevitably. In Turkey, for instance, it is the Islamist party that is the modernizing force, and it is the secular old elite centered in the armed forces that has been the reactionary force holding back modernization. (Postscript from five years later, in 2016: looking at Turkey now, I am not nearly so sanguine about the modernizing role of the Islamist party, the AKP, which has been in power since about 2002. President Erdogan has taken a hard turn towards authoritarianism and towards nationalist exploitation of ethnic divisions with Turkish Kurds in order to reinforce his hold on his country. After so many years in power, he is decidedly no longer the modernizer he once seemed to be.]
All in all, I highly recommend this book.
This is the first of his books I have ever read, and it is superb. If you want a very fast, broad brush introduction to the history and current politics of the countries covered in this book, embedded in a travelogue kind of format, this is the book to read. He travels by bus, taxi and rental car through most of the countries that once made up the Ottoman Empire: Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Georgia, South Ossetia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh -- essentially in one trip, though Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are tacked on in a separate trip shortly thereafter. I can almost guarantee you that if you have any touch of wanderlust at all, and any interest in the history and politics of the region, this book will inspire you to want to hit the road to some of these places in the very near future. It may also persuade you to give a wide berth to some of them, such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. This is an unusual kind of travel book, but you would be hard put to find a better one of its kind.
If I could summarize some of the themes of this book, I would say the following:
• This part of the world is a hodge-podge of intermixed ethnic and religious groups, with a long history of hatreds frequently spilling into armed conflict. For now, things have settled down considerably after working through a lot of the redrawing of borders and the mass migrations (often forced migrations) caused by the 20th century collapse of multiple empires: the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires in World War I; the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe in 1989; and then the Soviet Union itself in 1991. But the situation is still unstable, because populations continue to be mixed -- e.g. Syria, Lebanon, Turkey -- and governments are generally weak because of immature democracies or over-ripe autocracies.
• The particular form of capitalism unleashed in the former Communist states is the worst form of capitalism ever devised, consisting of a blend of kleptocracy and crony capitalism. In effect, government in such countries becomes essentially a form of organized crime. Some of the worst examples of this are those countries cursed with oil: Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. In these places, government consists of an armed battle over the spoils. Almost all of those spoils will go to foreigners and foreign corporations, or to a small number of members of the local elite.
• Islam is often a barrier to economic development, but not inevitably. In Turkey, for instance, it is the Islamist party that is the modernizing force, and it is the secular old elite centered in the armed forces that has been the reactionary force holding back modernization. (Postscript from five years later, in 2016: looking at Turkey now, I am not nearly so sanguine about the modernizing role of the Islamist party, the AKP, which has been in power since about 2002. President Erdogan has taken a hard turn towards authoritarianism and towards nationalist exploitation of ethnic divisions with Turkish Kurds in order to reinforce his hold on his country. After so many years in power, he is decidedly no longer the modernizer he once seemed to be.]
All in all, I highly recommend this book.
December 10, 2018
The title is something of a misnomer as only the final section of the book travels 'eastward to Tartary'. Kaplan first revisits the Balkans, reflecting on his earlier visits described in 'Balkan Ghosts' then crosses into Turkey and onwards into Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine. Kaplan served in the Israeli Army - a fact I was unaware of previously but which gave an interesting perspective to his views - then returns to Turkey and crosses over into Georgia, travelling on into Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and finally Armenia. It was this final section that I really enjoyed because I was learning about countries I knew nothing whatsoever about.
The book was written at the turn of the 21st century so Kaplan speculates on what will happen in the future in all of these countries. Sometimes he is right, sometimes wrong - neither he nor anyone he interviewed saw the Syrian civil war coming - but he is capturing moments in time when countries and their people were having to make choices.
This was a slow read because I spent quite a lot time researching the current situation in many countries. I enjoyed it overall as a learning experience but I also enjoy Kaplan's writing which is often beautiful:
'the Arab world disappeared as though it had been washed away and a more familiar, down-at-the-heels Western world began, cold and damp in the winter at this altitude, where rain clouds smudged the sky like candle smoke on an icon.'
The book was written at the turn of the 21st century so Kaplan speculates on what will happen in the future in all of these countries. Sometimes he is right, sometimes wrong - neither he nor anyone he interviewed saw the Syrian civil war coming - but he is capturing moments in time when countries and their people were having to make choices.
This was a slow read because I spent quite a lot time researching the current situation in many countries. I enjoyed it overall as a learning experience but I also enjoy Kaplan's writing which is often beautiful:
'the Arab world disappeared as though it had been washed away and a more familiar, down-at-the-heels Western world began, cold and damp in the winter at this altitude, where rain clouds smudged the sky like candle smoke on an icon.'
August 27, 2017
Robert Kaplan is a bit like a modern Richard Burton or Ibn Battuta figure and has written a number of books in which he sets out on journeys across various regions of the world while recording his observations. These books are always laden with lots of historical context and interviews with important local figures, which makes for interesting reading. Since many of the places that he visits are not the subjects of intense global media scrutiny, there is also a sense of discovery and much to be learned from his accounts.
Having learned a lot about the politics of east Asia from Kaplan's book on the South China Sea, I initially picked this book up because I wanted to read about his travels to the Middle East in 1990s and get a sense of how many of the trends he identified at that time have now come to fruition. But, surprisingly, that was the least interesting part of this book. The far more eye-opening parts were his travels in the formerly Soviet countries of eastern Europe and Central Asia. Over the course of roughly a year Kaplan travels by land from Hungary all the way down to Israel, and then back up through Turkey into Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Armenia. Along the way he describes staying in many bad hotels and being ripped off by local hustlers, but also evinces a lot of empathy for the struggles and histories of the people that he is traveling amongst. He has conversations with men and women in streets, in bars and in the offices of politicians and news agencies. He tries to understand the aspirations of people struggling to free themselves from the leaden tyranny of Communism, as well their disappointments, fears for the future and the national histories that guide the way they look at the world. There are lots of explications of simmering conflicts over places like Transylvania and Nagorno-Karbakh that are obscure to the rest of the world (including me) but mean the universe to people in places like Romania and Armenia.
Like a lot of well-traveled people who are educated in history, Kaplan is a bit of a pessimist. While he correctly predicts the collapse of Syria and Iraq in this book, its less clear whether his often dire prognostications for Central Asia are going to come to pass. He is very bullish on Israel, which is perhaps a product of his own personal ties to that country having volunteered in the military there. Nonetheless he evinces a nuanced understanding of the social coarseness of life in modern Israel compared with the elaborate politeness of the traditional societies that border it. I like how he expounds upon the great histories of cities that are relative backwaters today like Antakya, Tyre and Merv. From his writing you get a good sense of how great cities and great empires rise and fall, and he does his best to try and predict where they may rise again in the future.
This is a decently written and structured book. although the sheer number of places that Kaplan visits can be a bit overwhelming within 300 pages. As a member of the global elite, he spends a lot of time with journalists, politicians, dissidents, which allows him to get a better sense of the big picture of life in these countries. I found his accounts of places that I've been (like Turkey and Jordan) to be a little light, but his accounts of countries like Romania, Turkmenistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan were so evocative that they made me want to travel there in the future as well.
I will definitely remember this book with appreciation for expanding my horizons, just like I remember his South China Sea book for the same reason. If nothing else, Kaplan's books always give a humbling reminder of just how vast and complex the world we inhabit really is.
Having learned a lot about the politics of east Asia from Kaplan's book on the South China Sea, I initially picked this book up because I wanted to read about his travels to the Middle East in 1990s and get a sense of how many of the trends he identified at that time have now come to fruition. But, surprisingly, that was the least interesting part of this book. The far more eye-opening parts were his travels in the formerly Soviet countries of eastern Europe and Central Asia. Over the course of roughly a year Kaplan travels by land from Hungary all the way down to Israel, and then back up through Turkey into Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Armenia. Along the way he describes staying in many bad hotels and being ripped off by local hustlers, but also evinces a lot of empathy for the struggles and histories of the people that he is traveling amongst. He has conversations with men and women in streets, in bars and in the offices of politicians and news agencies. He tries to understand the aspirations of people struggling to free themselves from the leaden tyranny of Communism, as well their disappointments, fears for the future and the national histories that guide the way they look at the world. There are lots of explications of simmering conflicts over places like Transylvania and Nagorno-Karbakh that are obscure to the rest of the world (including me) but mean the universe to people in places like Romania and Armenia.
Like a lot of well-traveled people who are educated in history, Kaplan is a bit of a pessimist. While he correctly predicts the collapse of Syria and Iraq in this book, its less clear whether his often dire prognostications for Central Asia are going to come to pass. He is very bullish on Israel, which is perhaps a product of his own personal ties to that country having volunteered in the military there. Nonetheless he evinces a nuanced understanding of the social coarseness of life in modern Israel compared with the elaborate politeness of the traditional societies that border it. I like how he expounds upon the great histories of cities that are relative backwaters today like Antakya, Tyre and Merv. From his writing you get a good sense of how great cities and great empires rise and fall, and he does his best to try and predict where they may rise again in the future.
This is a decently written and structured book. although the sheer number of places that Kaplan visits can be a bit overwhelming within 300 pages. As a member of the global elite, he spends a lot of time with journalists, politicians, dissidents, which allows him to get a better sense of the big picture of life in these countries. I found his accounts of places that I've been (like Turkey and Jordan) to be a little light, but his accounts of countries like Romania, Turkmenistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan were so evocative that they made me want to travel there in the future as well.
I will definitely remember this book with appreciation for expanding my horizons, just like I remember his South China Sea book for the same reason. If nothing else, Kaplan's books always give a humbling reminder of just how vast and complex the world we inhabit really is.
December 25, 2017
interesting analysis over traveller's tales
Robert Kaplan doesn't travel first class, he keeps his ear to the ground, and he pays attention to details. Unlike most of our leaders, he knows his history and doesn't believe it's "bunk". He may like to use the words "national character" where I would use "culture", but if you read this brilliant book you'll see he's talking about the same thing. Kaplan cannot be an expert on every place he goes; perhaps his pictures are either inaccurate or stereotypical at times, but he has a feel for the main point, for the big picture.
After the 77 reviews already here, nobody needs another one telling you what this book is about. I would prefer to say why I think it's a great book. First, it's very well-written. There are interesting observations and facts on every page. History and religion are woven in very well. Second, he's a reasonable man, even if, as people point out, he's not that optimistic. We don't need more pie-in-the-sky optimism or undue pessimism. We need realism. Third, he doesn't try to come up with solutions. It's not up to some journalist from the USA to decide what would be best for all the countries concerned. They'll have to work it out, or it will be worked out by history anyhow. Sometimes it's impossible to predict the future. Despite all his insights and incisive comments, Kaplan could not foresee the US invasion of Iraq with its many repercussions. Well, who could have seen that piece of idiocy coming? But fourth, I like the book because his comments so often hit home. For example, he predicted decline and near-collapse in Romania and Bulgaria if they didn't get into the European Union and NATO. Europe obviously saw it the same way. They got in. He points out again and again that just because a few blocks of a capital city rock with Western goodies and flashy cars doesn't mean economic success. He picked Israel and Turkey as the most vibrant and successful societies of all he visited. This certainly has held true. As states and blocs slowly realign in the Middle East, their stability will become ever more evident. He writes that Gaza and the West Bank might become alienated from each other and that is exactly what has happened. He asks, "If Vladimir Putin consolidates Russia as a new and aggressive autocracy, what will the West do ?" Exactly again. He appraises the Communist legacy as far more devastating than just Russian colonial rule or lack of capitalist knowhow. He links rising violence in the Middle East with large numbers of unemployed, frustrated youth. And of course, the most important of all---that democracy cannot be implanted from outside. It has to grow. Elections without a civil society and strong institutions mean the rise of nationalist or fundamentalist parties that will bring more chaos, not less.
Perhaps others have written similar things, but few create "the big picture" the way Kaplan does. Some of what he says may be wrong, but the idea is to THINK about the problems, to grasp the interrelations of the several countries he visited, to try to gather together the multitude of impressions and glean some overarching tendencies. I think that is why this is an interesting book, why I have given it five stars.
Robert Kaplan doesn't travel first class, he keeps his ear to the ground, and he pays attention to details. Unlike most of our leaders, he knows his history and doesn't believe it's "bunk". He may like to use the words "national character" where I would use "culture", but if you read this brilliant book you'll see he's talking about the same thing. Kaplan cannot be an expert on every place he goes; perhaps his pictures are either inaccurate or stereotypical at times, but he has a feel for the main point, for the big picture.
After the 77 reviews already here, nobody needs another one telling you what this book is about. I would prefer to say why I think it's a great book. First, it's very well-written. There are interesting observations and facts on every page. History and religion are woven in very well. Second, he's a reasonable man, even if, as people point out, he's not that optimistic. We don't need more pie-in-the-sky optimism or undue pessimism. We need realism. Third, he doesn't try to come up with solutions. It's not up to some journalist from the USA to decide what would be best for all the countries concerned. They'll have to work it out, or it will be worked out by history anyhow. Sometimes it's impossible to predict the future. Despite all his insights and incisive comments, Kaplan could not foresee the US invasion of Iraq with its many repercussions. Well, who could have seen that piece of idiocy coming? But fourth, I like the book because his comments so often hit home. For example, he predicted decline and near-collapse in Romania and Bulgaria if they didn't get into the European Union and NATO. Europe obviously saw it the same way. They got in. He points out again and again that just because a few blocks of a capital city rock with Western goodies and flashy cars doesn't mean economic success. He picked Israel and Turkey as the most vibrant and successful societies of all he visited. This certainly has held true. As states and blocs slowly realign in the Middle East, their stability will become ever more evident. He writes that Gaza and the West Bank might become alienated from each other and that is exactly what has happened. He asks, "If Vladimir Putin consolidates Russia as a new and aggressive autocracy, what will the West do ?" Exactly again. He appraises the Communist legacy as far more devastating than just Russian colonial rule or lack of capitalist knowhow. He links rising violence in the Middle East with large numbers of unemployed, frustrated youth. And of course, the most important of all---that democracy cannot be implanted from outside. It has to grow. Elections without a civil society and strong institutions mean the rise of nationalist or fundamentalist parties that will bring more chaos, not less.
Perhaps others have written similar things, but few create "the big picture" the way Kaplan does. Some of what he says may be wrong, but the idea is to THINK about the problems, to grasp the interrelations of the several countries he visited, to try to gather together the multitude of impressions and glean some overarching tendencies. I think that is why this is an interesting book, why I have given it five stars.
April 5, 2015
Crossposted to 238 books in 238 days.
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Apparently, the first part of this book is like a sequel to Kaplan's Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History. I'd just like to mention that I haven't read that, and didn't know anything about its significance until I read about it in other reviews, and therefore I can't offer an opinion on that.
As for "Eastward to Tartary" - despite the curiously outdated title, this book seems to be incredibly current for its time. It is interesting to read this 13 years later, as Kaplan offers a lot of predictions on what is going to happen to the regions he visits in the near future. A lot of those have come true, and since other reviewers have said that this is also true for "Balkan Ghosts", I am inclined to look at Kaplan's other writings.
Kaplan's destinations are extremely exciting - he starts out from Budapest and travels through Romania and Bulgaria to Turkey, then moves on to Syria, Lebanon and Israel, before returning to Turkey and continuing his journey through Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
The author does a great job of outlining the most important historical events and describing their influences on modern day political struggles. From the things he explains and the things he doesn't it is obvious that he writes for an American audience, but that way I also learned something about U.S. politics through looking things up, so I don't mind :). His view on international politics is also greatly influenced by his apparent belief in super-powers, and as this is my first encounter with an author who openly judges the fate of smaller states considering their relationships with big ones, it was very thought-provoking. I'm not sure I would agree with all of his opinions, and I certainly sometimes wished that he could just shut up about the oil and other natural reserves, but as his writing is never offensive or aggressive, I think it was a good introduction to another way of thinking.
There is one thing you have to know before reading this book though - it is classed as travel literature, and Kaplan does go on an journey and meets people - but all of that doesn't make a travel writer. It makes for great non-fiction reading about politics, complete with some day-to-day examples of common folk.
What I love about travel writing is the anecdotal way of storytelling, the beautiful language that brings a different culture to life before my eyes and makes me feel as though I am living this experience as well. What I love about travel writing is that it makes me want to go on that journey myself. And I certainly want to see all the countries Kaplan has visited. But I have already wished that before reading this book, and despite being an excellent provider of much-needed background information, it has not influenced my wishes in either way.
----------
Apparently, the first part of this book is like a sequel to Kaplan's Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History. I'd just like to mention that I haven't read that, and didn't know anything about its significance until I read about it in other reviews, and therefore I can't offer an opinion on that.
As for "Eastward to Tartary" - despite the curiously outdated title, this book seems to be incredibly current for its time. It is interesting to read this 13 years later, as Kaplan offers a lot of predictions on what is going to happen to the regions he visits in the near future. A lot of those have come true, and since other reviewers have said that this is also true for "Balkan Ghosts", I am inclined to look at Kaplan's other writings.
Kaplan's destinations are extremely exciting - he starts out from Budapest and travels through Romania and Bulgaria to Turkey, then moves on to Syria, Lebanon and Israel, before returning to Turkey and continuing his journey through Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
The author does a great job of outlining the most important historical events and describing their influences on modern day political struggles. From the things he explains and the things he doesn't it is obvious that he writes for an American audience, but that way I also learned something about U.S. politics through looking things up, so I don't mind :). His view on international politics is also greatly influenced by his apparent belief in super-powers, and as this is my first encounter with an author who openly judges the fate of smaller states considering their relationships with big ones, it was very thought-provoking. I'm not sure I would agree with all of his opinions, and I certainly sometimes wished that he could just shut up about the oil and other natural reserves, but as his writing is never offensive or aggressive, I think it was a good introduction to another way of thinking.
There is one thing you have to know before reading this book though - it is classed as travel literature, and Kaplan does go on an journey and meets people - but all of that doesn't make a travel writer. It makes for great non-fiction reading about politics, complete with some day-to-day examples of common folk.
What I love about travel writing is the anecdotal way of storytelling, the beautiful language that brings a different culture to life before my eyes and makes me feel as though I am living this experience as well. What I love about travel writing is that it makes me want to go on that journey myself. And I certainly want to see all the countries Kaplan has visited. But I have already wished that before reading this book, and despite being an excellent provider of much-needed background information, it has not influenced my wishes in either way.
June 18, 2014
This book is overwhelming. Writing for a mostly American audience, Robert Kaplan being the gifted writer that he is, had me right beside him as he interviews scholars, political figures and regular locals as he traveled through Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and then continuing through Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
He outlines the important historical events and the influence they have had on the modern day struggles of this region. I don’t agree with all of his opinions, but he does make some very interesting and logical predictions which have actually come true (the book was published in 2000). We live in a reality of our own making after all, and Kaplan’s writing in this book is engaging as it pulls you in and doesn't really let go. I've always been fascinated by this region of the world, and I would say Kaplan does do the retelling of its history justice.
He outlines the important historical events and the influence they have had on the modern day struggles of this region. I don’t agree with all of his opinions, but he does make some very interesting and logical predictions which have actually come true (the book was published in 2000). We live in a reality of our own making after all, and Kaplan’s writing in this book is engaging as it pulls you in and doesn't really let go. I've always been fascinated by this region of the world, and I would say Kaplan does do the retelling of its history justice.
January 31, 2022
Takie 3,5/5. Miejscami nudne, za dużo geopolityki i szczegółowej historii, a za mało podróży. Nie urzekła mnie.
November 29, 2011
All the time I have lived in and contemplated Romania and the Balkans, I have assumed that they were a periphery to Western Europe. This book made me realize this is misguided. Historically, the Balkans and Romania are peripheral to constantinople and then Istambul. (With exception of 200 or so years under Roman rule from Rome) This came as such a revelation to me. Bucharest is only 400 or so Kilometers from Istanbul, whereas it is thousands from Paris.
If history is any guide, the Balkans natural orbit lies east, and not west. It's weird, but when I visit Romania again, I imagine I will feel different. I will allow myself to recognize the gravitational pull of historical Constantinople. I look forward to this. It's a relief to stop trying to orient myself in the other direction.
This book was written in 1998 and 1999, and leaves the reader of 2011 with the benefit of eleven years of hindsight to see how Kaplan's predictions have played out. But knowing ten years have passed also increases the terror of the ticking time bomb that is Syria, the Caucuses, the Near East, and Russia.
If his predictions play out, when Syria does explode--which promises to be very soon--it will be an ethnic and humanitarian nightmare similar to Iraq.
But this is not a doomsday book. Kaplan is optimistic despite the dark clouds on the horizon. Using millennia of history as his guide, he paints a hopeful picture for the potential of bustling trade ruled by humanistic pluralism historically present in the golden era of all the places he visits.
Time for a quiz. Can you match the following countries to their corresponding capitals?
Armenia
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Turkmenistan
Yerevan
Baku
Ashgabat
Tibilisi
If not, it is not too late. If Kaplan is right, now is the time to learn, as these countries will be explosive zones in the 21st Century both in economic growth and conflict.
If history is any guide, the Balkans natural orbit lies east, and not west. It's weird, but when I visit Romania again, I imagine I will feel different. I will allow myself to recognize the gravitational pull of historical Constantinople. I look forward to this. It's a relief to stop trying to orient myself in the other direction.
This book was written in 1998 and 1999, and leaves the reader of 2011 with the benefit of eleven years of hindsight to see how Kaplan's predictions have played out. But knowing ten years have passed also increases the terror of the ticking time bomb that is Syria, the Caucuses, the Near East, and Russia.
If his predictions play out, when Syria does explode--which promises to be very soon--it will be an ethnic and humanitarian nightmare similar to Iraq.
But this is not a doomsday book. Kaplan is optimistic despite the dark clouds on the horizon. Using millennia of history as his guide, he paints a hopeful picture for the potential of bustling trade ruled by humanistic pluralism historically present in the golden era of all the places he visits.
Time for a quiz. Can you match the following countries to their corresponding capitals?
Armenia
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Turkmenistan
Yerevan
Baku
Ashgabat
Tibilisi
If not, it is not too late. If Kaplan is right, now is the time to learn, as these countries will be explosive zones in the 21st Century both in economic growth and conflict.
March 1, 2012
Starting his book with a quote from Isaiah Berlin (“To know the worst is not always to be liberated from its consequences; nevertheless it is preferable to ignorance.” from “The Originality of Machiavelli”), Eastward to Tartary is Kaplan’s superb follow-up to his Balkan Ghosts. The book provides information on the post-1989 development of Balkan states (Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria), Turkey & Greater Syria (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, & Israel), and the Caucus & Tartary (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, & Turkmenistan). The overall premise is that the development of these areas during the 20th Century (Versailles Treaty to 1989) was an anomaly and that they are in the process of returning to more traditional ethnic/religious organization. Kaplan is refreshing in that he is a pragmatist in his approach to viewing other nations; he does not claim that the free market, globalization, or US/European Community-forced “democracy” will produce miracles in these places. Indeed he is as critical of unrestrained capitalism and the results (Huge splits between the nouveau riches and the poor, with the nouveau riches building gated compounds to keep themselves away from the ever-growing masses of the poor, etc.) as he is of the neo-fascist leaders/mafiacrats who are springing up in these post-Soviet/Soviet-influenced places.
This book is well worth the read.
This book is well worth the read.
June 26, 2017
This book follows a journey from Hungary (Budapest) through Romania (Bucharest) into Bulgaria, through Turkey, eastward to Georgia near the Russian border, then Armenia, Azerbaijan, and then across the Caspian Sea into Turkemnistan near to the Iranian border. It's a political travelogue. The areas visited are not areas I know anything about. The book is fascinating. Kaplan is an astute commentator who looks IMO for the truly telling things. Most interesting to me were how clearly the history of these places shows in their current culture and situation. It is apparently very clear to see where Russia left off and the Ottoman Empire began. There is a dramatic difference between Budapest and Bucharest. It was interesting to see how different Bulgaria is from Rumania. And most interesting I think was the fact that the area east of the Caspian (Turkmenistan) is desert and has a great deal of oil. It is has glitzy hotels and for foreigners with oil interests including Iranians and Israelis. There is everywhere globalization taking place in the form of cheap plastic goods for sale. Political boundaries do not follow the loyalties of clan. The governments are tyrannical but the prospect of a tyrant is less frightening than the prospect of anarchy. This area is of great international significance and is not I think very well known. I highly recommend this book.
September 23, 2015
Balkan Ghosts is one of the best books I've read in the last few years. It has a great anecdotal style, spinning gripping tales of a bloody and tumultuous history, spanning centuries. Eastward to Tartary is labelled as a sequel to that book, so I was expecting a continuation of sorts. Unfortunately, It takes a very different approach, and ends up reading like an extended article in The Economist (or what I imagine The Economist reads like), a vague cross section of prime ministers and the political climate from Romania to Turkmenistan circa 1998. As such it comes across dated and dull. Disappointing.
October 28, 2018
If you're going to judge places based on how close to the West they are, how wealthy the local people, and how beautiful the women, stop traveling and save people the trouble of having to deal with your annoying self.
May 14, 2008
It's just fun to say "Tartary."
October 23, 2013
A great combination of travel literarture, history and political observations!!!
December 10, 2017
a sweeping travelogue, stretching from budapest to turkmenistan. kaplan writes about lots of places that don't get much attention (especially the caucasus and central asia, but also places in the middle east that lie off the usual journalistic track), and for the most part i enjoyed tailing along with him. the book works well as a sweeping introduction to a broad swath of the globe, packed with history ancient and modern alike.
that said, a few things bugged me throughout. for one, kaplan recurrently returns to the question of how and whether (mostly how) "the west" should intervene in the places he visits -- opinions seemingly confirmed by the various diplomats, politicians, and foreign businessman that form the bulk of his interviews in most locations. given the disastrous consequences of various interventions (capitalist and military alike) since then, these musings feel short-sighted, distracting, and a little imperious (if not outright imperialist) -- particularly when kaplan sometimes seems to confuse "western interests" with those of the poor and unstable societies he visits.
relatedly, he has an irritating tendency to attribute all backwardness he encounters -- from poverty and provincialism to inequality and dictatorship -- to "asianness." he does it from the very beginning, describing impoverished post-cold war romania, nestled well within europe, as a deceptively "asian" country. (in a more subtle hint about his biases, he approvingly describes a foreign businessman he meets later on in azerbaijan as "kiplingesque.)
however, if you can put up with these eye-rolling biases, kaplan travels far, and reading along is generally worthwhile.
that said, a few things bugged me throughout. for one, kaplan recurrently returns to the question of how and whether (mostly how) "the west" should intervene in the places he visits -- opinions seemingly confirmed by the various diplomats, politicians, and foreign businessman that form the bulk of his interviews in most locations. given the disastrous consequences of various interventions (capitalist and military alike) since then, these musings feel short-sighted, distracting, and a little imperious (if not outright imperialist) -- particularly when kaplan sometimes seems to confuse "western interests" with those of the poor and unstable societies he visits.
relatedly, he has an irritating tendency to attribute all backwardness he encounters -- from poverty and provincialism to inequality and dictatorship -- to "asianness." he does it from the very beginning, describing impoverished post-cold war romania, nestled well within europe, as a deceptively "asian" country. (in a more subtle hint about his biases, he approvingly describes a foreign businessman he meets later on in azerbaijan as "kiplingesque.)
however, if you can put up with these eye-rolling biases, kaplan travels far, and reading along is generally worthwhile.
December 6, 2017
It's odd to look at this nearly 20 years after the trip it was written about. A lot of things have changed. (Budapest is very different, and Ganja is no longer even remotely "a dump.") Some of the predictions and analyses are spot on, and some of them were way off. I'm probably best at evaluating things in the Caucasus, so:
*The Rose Revolution was relatively peaceful and non-chaotic, which didn't seem to be Kaplan's expectation of post-Shevardnadze Georgia. That said, he was of course right to recognize Saakashvili as a key player. It has been far from smooth since (some periods of mass demonstrations, the Russo-Georgian war), but I would never say Georgia "descended into chaos."
*Every single person Kaplan talked to about Azerbaijani politics seemed to think Ilham Aliyev had no chance of consolidating power, but then, it seemed like he mostly talked to either opposition leaders or foreigners. Was it really that much of a surprise? Because if so, then it's been an unlikely 14 years, I guess?
*This felt pretty true, though: "In the Caucasus one could be optimistic in the capital cities, but in the provinces one confronted the hardest truths." I don't know that the Baku I lived in really inspired optimism, but it definitely could be a very different world from the rayons.
I thought a lot of the best commentary wasn't Kaplan's but was from some of the people he talked to (and often not the politicians). This bit from a Romanian historian, for example: "If right-wing nationalism grew in France and Italy, or Germany, and separatist violence grew in Spain and elsewhere, that could have a nasty influence on new democracies in Eastern Europe."
Kaplan had an attitude throughout this book that was very Western-centric and pro-Western. As he moved further east, he'd referred to particularly developed places as being like little pieces of Europe, in at least one case expressed that the way to "fix" things was increasing Western control, took it for granted that "freedom and democracy certainly make for the strongest states" everywhere.
Reading this felt particularly strange: "Of course, it's hard to deny that the destruction of the Soviet Union was a good thing. But ever since I crossed into Georgia from Turkey, I found people whose lives had been ruined by it." The people whose lives had been ruined by the fall of the Soviet Union had literally told him the end of the Soviet Union wasn't a good thing for them. It's not hard for them to deny at all.
My jaw dropped when I realized he was crossing into NK. It seems like the policy wasn't in place at the time, but that gets you blacklisted in Azerbaijan now.
It felt like an odd choice to me to include Turkmenistan here? I realize it was on the same trip, but then the epilogue was in Armenia, which was a different-ish trip, apparently. There is a lot to say about Turkmenistan in relation to Azerbaijan, for example, but isolating it from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (at least two of which he covers in a different book) felt unnatural. There was also a sentence that implied he hadn't initially planned on including Armenia, and that would have been bizarre (and I think would have lessened the value of the entire discussion of the Caucasus.)
I was really confused as to why Kaplan wrote place names in Turkey in Turkish but romanized Azerbaijani place names? Sumqayıt, for example, uses no characters that he didn't use at some point in a Turkish place name.
A few examples of language/attitude things I had issues with:
*"The women, with their innate fashion consciousness"
*"He looked like a 1950s South American dictator."
*describes Shi'ite men as wearing robes but women as wearing tents
*frequent use of Orient/Oriental, some use of a slur for Roma, one use of "blacks"
*frequent description of Orthodoxy and Orthodox practices as pagan or primitive
*The Rose Revolution was relatively peaceful and non-chaotic, which didn't seem to be Kaplan's expectation of post-Shevardnadze Georgia. That said, he was of course right to recognize Saakashvili as a key player. It has been far from smooth since (some periods of mass demonstrations, the Russo-Georgian war), but I would never say Georgia "descended into chaos."
*Every single person Kaplan talked to about Azerbaijani politics seemed to think Ilham Aliyev had no chance of consolidating power, but then, it seemed like he mostly talked to either opposition leaders or foreigners. Was it really that much of a surprise? Because if so, then it's been an unlikely 14 years, I guess?
*This felt pretty true, though: "In the Caucasus one could be optimistic in the capital cities, but in the provinces one confronted the hardest truths." I don't know that the Baku I lived in really inspired optimism, but it definitely could be a very different world from the rayons.
I thought a lot of the best commentary wasn't Kaplan's but was from some of the people he talked to (and often not the politicians). This bit from a Romanian historian, for example: "If right-wing nationalism grew in France and Italy, or Germany, and separatist violence grew in Spain and elsewhere, that could have a nasty influence on new democracies in Eastern Europe."
Kaplan had an attitude throughout this book that was very Western-centric and pro-Western. As he moved further east, he'd referred to particularly developed places as being like little pieces of Europe, in at least one case expressed that the way to "fix" things was increasing Western control, took it for granted that "freedom and democracy certainly make for the strongest states" everywhere.
Reading this felt particularly strange: "Of course, it's hard to deny that the destruction of the Soviet Union was a good thing. But ever since I crossed into Georgia from Turkey, I found people whose lives had been ruined by it." The people whose lives had been ruined by the fall of the Soviet Union had literally told him the end of the Soviet Union wasn't a good thing for them. It's not hard for them to deny at all.
My jaw dropped when I realized he was crossing into NK. It seems like the policy wasn't in place at the time, but that gets you blacklisted in Azerbaijan now.
It felt like an odd choice to me to include Turkmenistan here? I realize it was on the same trip, but then the epilogue was in Armenia, which was a different-ish trip, apparently. There is a lot to say about Turkmenistan in relation to Azerbaijan, for example, but isolating it from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (at least two of which he covers in a different book) felt unnatural. There was also a sentence that implied he hadn't initially planned on including Armenia, and that would have been bizarre (and I think would have lessened the value of the entire discussion of the Caucasus.)
I was really confused as to why Kaplan wrote place names in Turkey in Turkish but romanized Azerbaijani place names? Sumqayıt, for example, uses no characters that he didn't use at some point in a Turkish place name.
A few examples of language/attitude things I had issues with:
*"The women, with their innate fashion consciousness"
*"He looked like a 1950s South American dictator."
*describes Shi'ite men as wearing robes but women as wearing tents
*frequent use of Orient/Oriental, some use of a slur for Roma, one use of "blacks"
*frequent description of Orthodoxy and Orthodox practices as pagan or primitive
November 29, 2012
Robert Kaplan travels to areas which tourists rarely see. His "Ends of the Earth" starts in Sierra Leone and ends in Cambodia, his "Balkan Ghosts" surveys the fragments of Yugoslavia and their neighbors, and "East to Tartary" wends its way through Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey to Syria, Jordan and Israel, then continues to the fragmented nations of the Caucasus and ends in the deserts of Turkmenistan east of the Caspian Sea, part of what Victorian Britain knew as "Tartary."
After one crosses the Carpathian mountains between Hungary and Romania, he notes, the social climate changes, from that of western Europe to one bearing the imprint of Ottoman Turkey and its empire, which once covered much of that area. It is a part of the world where democracy is the exception, not the rule, where bloody history has left marks all over, intolerant nationalism (often with religious overtones) is rampant, and where poverty and neglect are widespread and getting worse. Yet those countries also have a rich political and cultural history, skillfully traced by Kaplan, who prepared himself by extensive reading and by enlisting a supporting network of local friends, all these acknowledged at the end.
It is uncanny how Kaplan tracks down past leading players in that history--now displaced, aging and living in reduced circumstances with their memories and libraries. He also meets outspoken academics familiar with their countries and history. Too bad that such people tend to talk in the ambiguous jargon of politics and economics, whose meaning is sometimes hard to pin down.
But the overall picture is clear: trouble now, more trouble to come. Kaplan does not dwell on the population explosion of the 20th century, although he is surely aware of it, but the stress it imposes is evident: cities stagnate with little employment, poverty everywhere, decaying roads, what used to be grand hotels now barely function. In an Armenian city destroyed by earthquake seven years earlier, people still live in makeshift shacks. A few glittering oases buck the trend, sustained by oil money, but even there the benefits seem to stop before reaching the surrounding countryside.
It is a sober and pessimistic account, ending with visits to the sites of two huge genocides, 700 years apart, by Mongols in Turkmenistan and by Turks against Armenians. Such horrors have happened in the past, history seems to be telling us, and they can happen again. He holds out little hope for democracy in the region, where people free to vote are likely to elect extremists. The multi-ethnic empires of the past, he tells us, were actually more tolerant of minorities and often ruled better and more benevolently than the nationalistic tribal nations which replaced them. The future seems dark. Any freely elected government is not likely to be able to provide all the needs of its people--e.g. security, prosperity, education, and national pride--so, even if one comes to power, it will probably not last. Even oil money can be destabilizing.
There seem to be lessons here to be learned by all of us. Somewhere a clock is ticking, the count-down has begun.
After one crosses the Carpathian mountains between Hungary and Romania, he notes, the social climate changes, from that of western Europe to one bearing the imprint of Ottoman Turkey and its empire, which once covered much of that area. It is a part of the world where democracy is the exception, not the rule, where bloody history has left marks all over, intolerant nationalism (often with religious overtones) is rampant, and where poverty and neglect are widespread and getting worse. Yet those countries also have a rich political and cultural history, skillfully traced by Kaplan, who prepared himself by extensive reading and by enlisting a supporting network of local friends, all these acknowledged at the end.
It is uncanny how Kaplan tracks down past leading players in that history--now displaced, aging and living in reduced circumstances with their memories and libraries. He also meets outspoken academics familiar with their countries and history. Too bad that such people tend to talk in the ambiguous jargon of politics and economics, whose meaning is sometimes hard to pin down.
But the overall picture is clear: trouble now, more trouble to come. Kaplan does not dwell on the population explosion of the 20th century, although he is surely aware of it, but the stress it imposes is evident: cities stagnate with little employment, poverty everywhere, decaying roads, what used to be grand hotels now barely function. In an Armenian city destroyed by earthquake seven years earlier, people still live in makeshift shacks. A few glittering oases buck the trend, sustained by oil money, but even there the benefits seem to stop before reaching the surrounding countryside.
It is a sober and pessimistic account, ending with visits to the sites of two huge genocides, 700 years apart, by Mongols in Turkmenistan and by Turks against Armenians. Such horrors have happened in the past, history seems to be telling us, and they can happen again. He holds out little hope for democracy in the region, where people free to vote are likely to elect extremists. The multi-ethnic empires of the past, he tells us, were actually more tolerant of minorities and often ruled better and more benevolently than the nationalistic tribal nations which replaced them. The future seems dark. Any freely elected government is not likely to be able to provide all the needs of its people--e.g. security, prosperity, education, and national pride--so, even if one comes to power, it will probably not last. Even oil money can be destabilizing.
There seem to be lessons here to be learned by all of us. Somewhere a clock is ticking, the count-down has begun.
April 9, 2014
"'The Prussian work ethic was not entrepreneurial, but fitted to bureaucracy and mass industrialization. It functioned only if someone else supplied the jobs and told people what to do. In a postindustrial entrepreneurial age ... don't expect the formerly Prussian parts of Germany to be economically impressive. Budapest and the rest of Hungary are closer to Catholic Munich than to Prussian-Protestant Berlin, and in a new Europe of region-states, the region oriented toward Munich may be stronger.'" (quoting Hungarian economist Laszlo Csaba, 15)
"There were cellphones everywhere [in Bucharest], whose beeping filled the cafes: the perfect accessory item for hustler economies with weak hard-wired infrastructures." (31)
"Flying from place to place encourages abstractions, whereas land travel brings one face-to-face with basic, sometimes unpleasant truths." (86)
"Lebanon suggested that the 'end of history' is not democracy or humanism but materialism." (158)
"The Georgian capital, Tbilisi, has been destroyed twenty-nine times." (228)
"Only war is a faster locomotive than oil for change in the Third World." (266)
"There were cellphones everywhere [in Bucharest], whose beeping filled the cafes: the perfect accessory item for hustler economies with weak hard-wired infrastructures." (31)
"Flying from place to place encourages abstractions, whereas land travel brings one face-to-face with basic, sometimes unpleasant truths." (86)
"Lebanon suggested that the 'end of history' is not democracy or humanism but materialism." (158)
"The Georgian capital, Tbilisi, has been destroyed twenty-nine times." (228)
"Only war is a faster locomotive than oil for change in the Third World." (266)
December 29, 2013
Totally disappointing. Kaplan's conclusions tend to be extremely facile and his view of the world is often Orientalist. I love reading about this region but I couldn't get through the book.
June 19, 2019
In this sordid age of journalistic wickedness when those of that treasured profession have decided against their ancient sacred trust of informing, of shining beautiful white light into the darkened corners of our tired world, sometimes nevertheless you come across a champion. Like a knight in shining armor, following an olden code driven onward by honor and dutybound to carry out his chosen burden in good faith; holding his cherished joy in an open hand lest he should clutch it in rage and impunity and destroy it, for it is delicate and fragile, he seeks to tell a story. A minstrel; a griot; a bard.
I find Robert Kaplan’s writing to be like this. He is a journalist from a bygone era, full of curiosity and compassion and insight when nowadays all we have is shallow hubris and hate propping up the sad enraged opinions of the uninformed informers. His works are long; as long as the journeys he undergoes to attempt to get to the heart of the issue, to understand it in order to then explain it to those of us who cannot take the time necessary to understand it ourselves. He journeys by bus, not the first class tickets and executive lounges that have become the norm these days by those who nevertheless wish to be our guides. He traverses countries through lost land-borders, like the powerless are forced to. He stays in the ratty hotels of provincial capitals; because it is there where the merchants and miscreants stay, those who govern the world away from the shiny buildings in the capital wherein rest the television studios with their painted pundits. He does the hard work, for those of us who would love to but cannot find the time – the months and months of travel and the dozens of painstaking interviews that the job demands, the compost from which grows understanding.
I picked up a copy of “Eastward to Tartary” while I was on a quick vacation in Dubai with my family. My little boy was searching out a copy of “Dog Man” (of which I will not be writing a review – though I was immensely pleased to go into a bookstore for my tiny lad to hunt down a book; though the mark was something less than literature, I’ll take it!); and I took the opportunity for myself. I was actually looking for “Revenge of Geography”; but that will have to wait, for “Eastward” is about the Caucuses and Balkans and Syria and Turkey – written twenty years ago at a time of great flux and turmoil (a turmoil which, ironically or perhaps not, has only gotten worse).
I have been spending significant time myself in the Caucuses recently – though without the opportunity and platform to turn my own wanderings into anything, at least not yet. And I wanted to read what Kaplan had to say about the place. I was not to be disappointed – in true Kaplan fashion he outlines a 4000 mile trek through the south-eastern edges of Europe; going farther and farther from Europe and Turkey to end up in the bizarre backwater of Turkmenistan. There are so many places, far at the edge of empire yet with a resonance all their own – that echo with a past of greatness and significance though today the names no longer fall freely from the lips of merchants and mercenaries and diplomats. Places we should nevertheless consider.
What I always take from Kaplan’s writing – and “Eastward” was no different – is the cyclical nature of history; of how places rise and fall and often rise again, usually in a different form, but returning to our imaginations after long at the inverse of epicenter. Places like Damascus; like Jaffa; like Jerusalem and Baku – Moscow, which always sees itself as one of the great guardians of Europe after Rome and Istanbul. Places which endure; and stories we must know if we are to divine what will happen in the future, and from whence we came. Modern journalists could take a page from the book of Kaplan’s life: rediscovering their curiosity they could deny the sirens call of arrogance and moderate themselves, perhaps even finding wisdom through so great a study which always – always – reminds us of how little we actually know about what we think we can control.
A quick aside; the one thing I did not like about “Eastward” was the perfunctory or perhaps postscript nature of Kaplan’s section on Armenia. Written as an epilogue, and focusing mostly on the genocide and the war with Azerbaijan, he does not do justice to the epic 2500 (at least) year story of Armenia; especially given the amazing fact that in each other section of the book – from great places such as Istanbul and Aleppo and Jerusalem to the lost ones like Ashkabat on the far side of the silent Caspian Sea – he describes the presence of Armenians and their impact on areas far from their gentle valley under their ancient mountain.
Maybe in his next book!
I find Robert Kaplan’s writing to be like this. He is a journalist from a bygone era, full of curiosity and compassion and insight when nowadays all we have is shallow hubris and hate propping up the sad enraged opinions of the uninformed informers. His works are long; as long as the journeys he undergoes to attempt to get to the heart of the issue, to understand it in order to then explain it to those of us who cannot take the time necessary to understand it ourselves. He journeys by bus, not the first class tickets and executive lounges that have become the norm these days by those who nevertheless wish to be our guides. He traverses countries through lost land-borders, like the powerless are forced to. He stays in the ratty hotels of provincial capitals; because it is there where the merchants and miscreants stay, those who govern the world away from the shiny buildings in the capital wherein rest the television studios with their painted pundits. He does the hard work, for those of us who would love to but cannot find the time – the months and months of travel and the dozens of painstaking interviews that the job demands, the compost from which grows understanding.
I picked up a copy of “Eastward to Tartary” while I was on a quick vacation in Dubai with my family. My little boy was searching out a copy of “Dog Man” (of which I will not be writing a review – though I was immensely pleased to go into a bookstore for my tiny lad to hunt down a book; though the mark was something less than literature, I’ll take it!); and I took the opportunity for myself. I was actually looking for “Revenge of Geography”; but that will have to wait, for “Eastward” is about the Caucuses and Balkans and Syria and Turkey – written twenty years ago at a time of great flux and turmoil (a turmoil which, ironically or perhaps not, has only gotten worse).
I have been spending significant time myself in the Caucuses recently – though without the opportunity and platform to turn my own wanderings into anything, at least not yet. And I wanted to read what Kaplan had to say about the place. I was not to be disappointed – in true Kaplan fashion he outlines a 4000 mile trek through the south-eastern edges of Europe; going farther and farther from Europe and Turkey to end up in the bizarre backwater of Turkmenistan. There are so many places, far at the edge of empire yet with a resonance all their own – that echo with a past of greatness and significance though today the names no longer fall freely from the lips of merchants and mercenaries and diplomats. Places we should nevertheless consider.
What I always take from Kaplan’s writing – and “Eastward” was no different – is the cyclical nature of history; of how places rise and fall and often rise again, usually in a different form, but returning to our imaginations after long at the inverse of epicenter. Places like Damascus; like Jaffa; like Jerusalem and Baku – Moscow, which always sees itself as one of the great guardians of Europe after Rome and Istanbul. Places which endure; and stories we must know if we are to divine what will happen in the future, and from whence we came. Modern journalists could take a page from the book of Kaplan’s life: rediscovering their curiosity they could deny the sirens call of arrogance and moderate themselves, perhaps even finding wisdom through so great a study which always – always – reminds us of how little we actually know about what we think we can control.
A quick aside; the one thing I did not like about “Eastward” was the perfunctory or perhaps postscript nature of Kaplan’s section on Armenia. Written as an epilogue, and focusing mostly on the genocide and the war with Azerbaijan, he does not do justice to the epic 2500 (at least) year story of Armenia; especially given the amazing fact that in each other section of the book – from great places such as Istanbul and Aleppo and Jerusalem to the lost ones like Ashkabat on the far side of the silent Caspian Sea – he describes the presence of Armenians and their impact on areas far from their gentle valley under their ancient mountain.
Maybe in his next book!
December 10, 2018
The first question a reader may want to ask about a book published in 2000 is whether it still has any relevance in a fast changing world. In fact, Kaplan’s predictions about the future of the countries through which he traveled have held up remarkably well, but this is probably because experience had taught him to lower his expectations of political and social progress. Expect corruption and incompetence, because that is what you are most likely to find.
The main value to be had from reading this book is the historical context he develops for each of the regions. Knowing the factors that shaped them twenty years ago is still valuable information for understanding them today, and Kaplan’s grasp of the big picture, of key developments, is excellent.
He made a point of traveling by ground wherever possible, by bus, train, and taxi for the most part. Although he speaks with a number of former leaders, most of them seem to be more interested in polishing their reputation than providing insights about their countries. Far more informative are Kaplan’s encounters with the everyday people he meets. He has a talent for drawing out not just their opinions but their aspirations.
He has sympathy for the lives of the people he meets, but not much optimism. Indeed, pessimism is probably the most useful approach because it injects some realism into the situation. Over and over again democracy is seen as just a fig leaf to cover oligarchy at best, and often outright kleptocracy. With histories of religious, tribal, and ethnic distrust and separation, and without a tradition of democratic values and institutions there is little pressure to embrace pluralism and good government, and indeed, no benefit to the politicians for doing so. It is all depressing to read, but better a harsh reality than a comforting illusion. It reminded me of the line by Dorothy Parker where she says that no matter how cynical I get, it’s never enough….
Democracy is under threat all over the world, and even those countries with the strongest traditions of personal liberty and respect for the rule of law are under assault. What chance, then, have countries with weak institutions, corrupt judiciaries, and sectarian violence? Add religion to an already volatile mix and the situation is unlikely to end well. Even when elections are free and mostly fair the most highly organized parties and thus the most likely to win, are the hard line religious ones. As the Communists once cynically observed, once they had used democracy to win elections, they would their newfound power to destroy it.
Kaplan is an excellent writer who is able to describe people, places, and complex events with great clarity. His books are never dull. If you are looking for a book that provides insight and context, he is a great writer to go to. Just don’t expect optimism.
The main value to be had from reading this book is the historical context he develops for each of the regions. Knowing the factors that shaped them twenty years ago is still valuable information for understanding them today, and Kaplan’s grasp of the big picture, of key developments, is excellent.
He made a point of traveling by ground wherever possible, by bus, train, and taxi for the most part. Although he speaks with a number of former leaders, most of them seem to be more interested in polishing their reputation than providing insights about their countries. Far more informative are Kaplan’s encounters with the everyday people he meets. He has a talent for drawing out not just their opinions but their aspirations.
He has sympathy for the lives of the people he meets, but not much optimism. Indeed, pessimism is probably the most useful approach because it injects some realism into the situation. Over and over again democracy is seen as just a fig leaf to cover oligarchy at best, and often outright kleptocracy. With histories of religious, tribal, and ethnic distrust and separation, and without a tradition of democratic values and institutions there is little pressure to embrace pluralism and good government, and indeed, no benefit to the politicians for doing so. It is all depressing to read, but better a harsh reality than a comforting illusion. It reminded me of the line by Dorothy Parker where she says that no matter how cynical I get, it’s never enough….
Democracy is under threat all over the world, and even those countries with the strongest traditions of personal liberty and respect for the rule of law are under assault. What chance, then, have countries with weak institutions, corrupt judiciaries, and sectarian violence? Add religion to an already volatile mix and the situation is unlikely to end well. Even when elections are free and mostly fair the most highly organized parties and thus the most likely to win, are the hard line religious ones. As the Communists once cynically observed, once they had used democracy to win elections, they would their newfound power to destroy it.
Kaplan is an excellent writer who is able to describe people, places, and complex events with great clarity. His books are never dull. If you are looking for a book that provides insight and context, he is a great writer to go to. Just don’t expect optimism.
August 24, 2022
"Eastward to Tartary" isn't exactly current -- it was written nearly a quarter of a century ago, but Robert D. Kaplan's travels through the Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus still illuminate events in that critical, and yet pretty much unknown, part of the world.
And throughout the book, written when the ramifications of the fall of the Soviet Union were still echoing in that area of the world, the weight of history lies heavily on the people and institutions of the countries he visits. And history here goes back further than Stalin and the brutalist regimes that followed him. The imprints of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled most of these areas for centuries before its collapse in World War I, still have a profound impact on the cultures and governments of countries as far apart as Bulgaria and Azerbaijan, and Armenia and Jordan.
And the actions of the British and the French, who drew borders for new nations after World War I, cannot be ignored either, as they forced together, or split apart, ethnic and religious communities that to this day must deal with the blind imposition of straight lines on a world map.
To get an idea of the kind of complexities Kaplan tries to unravel in this very well-done book, consider Syria and Lebanon -- which most Americans think of as free-standing, historical nations. But the reality is much more complex, because "Syria" would more accurately include Lebanon, and Jordan, and parts of Turkey, and Israel. "Greater Syria," after all, had been occupied and ruled by the Ottomans for hundreds of years, and that empire was unconcerned with nationalist, ethnic or even religious issues. As long as the Alawites and Maronite Christians, in what is now Lebanon, got along without too much friction, the Ottomans were happy. But today, there is no greater power to keep them in line, and as a result, we see Lebanon sinking into anarchy and Syria in the grip of a ruthless, cruel dictatorship by a minority.
And Kaplan's unusual methodology adds flavor and depth. Instead of flying from big city to big city, he prefers to ride buses -- one trip was 12+ hours -- and trains. That way, he sees the people up close and gets a much more nuanced view of the geography of an area and how it affects the people who live there.
All in all, "Eastward to Tartary," despite its age, was a revelatory read, though I confess I googled countries like Turkmenistan and Georgia to see what had happened since the book was published. And if nothing else, the book opened my eyes to an author I need to read more of, as it seemed that every page I was learning something new and important about the world.
And throughout the book, written when the ramifications of the fall of the Soviet Union were still echoing in that area of the world, the weight of history lies heavily on the people and institutions of the countries he visits. And history here goes back further than Stalin and the brutalist regimes that followed him. The imprints of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled most of these areas for centuries before its collapse in World War I, still have a profound impact on the cultures and governments of countries as far apart as Bulgaria and Azerbaijan, and Armenia and Jordan.
And the actions of the British and the French, who drew borders for new nations after World War I, cannot be ignored either, as they forced together, or split apart, ethnic and religious communities that to this day must deal with the blind imposition of straight lines on a world map.
To get an idea of the kind of complexities Kaplan tries to unravel in this very well-done book, consider Syria and Lebanon -- which most Americans think of as free-standing, historical nations. But the reality is much more complex, because "Syria" would more accurately include Lebanon, and Jordan, and parts of Turkey, and Israel. "Greater Syria," after all, had been occupied and ruled by the Ottomans for hundreds of years, and that empire was unconcerned with nationalist, ethnic or even religious issues. As long as the Alawites and Maronite Christians, in what is now Lebanon, got along without too much friction, the Ottomans were happy. But today, there is no greater power to keep them in line, and as a result, we see Lebanon sinking into anarchy and Syria in the grip of a ruthless, cruel dictatorship by a minority.
And Kaplan's unusual methodology adds flavor and depth. Instead of flying from big city to big city, he prefers to ride buses -- one trip was 12+ hours -- and trains. That way, he sees the people up close and gets a much more nuanced view of the geography of an area and how it affects the people who live there.
All in all, "Eastward to Tartary," despite its age, was a revelatory read, though I confess I googled countries like Turkmenistan and Georgia to see what had happened since the book was published. And if nothing else, the book opened my eyes to an author I need to read more of, as it seemed that every page I was learning something new and important about the world.
February 15, 2024
Автор є спеціалістом по Балканах та Близькому Сходу. В цій книзі він захоплює ще трошки Кавказу. Він описує свою подорож наприкінці 90-х років (Угорщина, Болгарія, Румунія, Туреччина, Сирія, Ліван, Йорданія, Ізраїль, Грузія, Азербайджан, Таджикистан та Вірменія), розповідає трохи про місцевий контекст, трохи пояснює історичні події, порівнює країни з його візитом в 80-ті, спілкується з місцевими і видає якісь типу геополітичні висновки. Тобто це репортажистика, але дуже специфічна.
Його тон, мова, ставлення - просто поза усіма нормами. Це настільки зверхнє ставлення до усіх, що просто не розумію нащо він працює над регіоном, якщо не має жодної поваги до людей. Жодного разу він не розмовляє з людьми, визнаючи за ними суб'єктність, автентичність. Зрештою, завершується книга дуже простими висновками про те чи є шанси на демократію в країнах, як поводитися США з ними, що робити і таке інше. Це неймовірно дратує. Він зібрав і колоніальне бінго, і орієнталістське. Зрештою, я подивилася статтю про нього, виявилося, що він щось типу побратима Хаттінгтона і отримує за свої матеріали багацько критики.
Тим не менш, кинути читати мені не хотілося, було дуже цікаво читати про контекст кінця 90-х та 80-х. В випадках Сирії та Ізраїля-Палестини просто смішно, бо ані він, ані хтось інший, не міг уявити що буде далі. А в усіх інших випадках, де мова йшла про країни соц. табору, там було дуже цікаво. Більш менш усе, що не Близький Схід - усе зазнавало і продовжує зазнавати величезного впливу від росії. Він описує і економічні моменти (бантитизм), і політичні. Багато екскурсу в історію з описом усіх підлих та добре спланованих проблем (включно з Нагорним Карабахом, депортаціями, викоріненням культур). Я не уявляю як читали цю книжку американці, але всі ці історії переконують, що росія об'єктивно монстр, який руйнує усе навкруги і українська історія лише один з тисяч прикладів жахливої колонізації.
Окремо зазначу, що зустріч автора з "молодим опозиціонером Саакашвілі" це дуже круто і трохи сумно, пам'ятаючи де він зараз і що взагалі відбувається з Грузією.
Його тон, мова, ставлення - просто поза усіма нормами. Це настільки зверхнє ставлення до усіх, що просто не розумію нащо він працює над регіоном, якщо не має жодної поваги до людей. Жодного разу він не розмовляє з людьми, визнаючи за ними суб'єктність, автентичність. Зрештою, завершується книга дуже простими висновками про те чи є шанси на демократію в країнах, як поводитися США з ними, що робити і таке інше. Це неймовірно дратує. Він зібрав і колоніальне бінго, і орієнталістське. Зрештою, я подивилася статтю про нього, виявилося, що він щось типу побратима Хаттінгтона і отримує за свої матеріали багацько критики.
Тим не менш, кинути читати мені не хотілося, було дуже цікаво читати про контекст кінця 90-х та 80-х. В випадках Сирії та Ізраїля-Палестини просто смішно, бо ані він, ані хтось інший, не міг уявити що буде далі. А в усіх інших випадках, де мова йшла про країни соц. табору, там було дуже цікаво. Більш менш усе, що не Близький Схід - усе зазнавало і продовжує зазнавати величезного впливу від росії. Він описує і економічні моменти (бантитизм), і політичні. Багато екскурсу в історію з описом усіх підлих та добре спланованих проблем (включно з Нагорним Карабахом, депортаціями, викоріненням культур). Я не уявляю як читали цю книжку американці, але всі ці історії переконують, що росія об'єктивно монстр, який руйнує усе навкруги і українська історія лише один з тисяч прикладів жахливої колонізації.
Окремо зазначу, що зустріч автора з "молодим опозиціонером Саакашвілі" це дуже круто і трохи сумно, пам'ятаючи де він зараз і що взагалі відбувається з Грузією.
July 22, 2024
Very interesting travelogue/history of the region stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, starting from Hungary all the way to the deserts of Turkmenistan - with an epilogue concerning Armenia.
It primarily focuses on the geopolitical aspect of the region, with some history from the Middle Ages and Antiquity for context. It is very American in its tone and in its presumed audience; so be mindful that it is coming from a very obvious perspective.
Kaplan's travels as detailed in this book were undertaken at the very end of the millennium, in 1999, and this lends it an interesting if not at times dated lens on the geopolitical concerns of the region, notably acession of certain states into multinational bodies such as NATO and the EU - many of which have joined these organisations since Kaplan's travels.
He identifies the potential hotspots for conflict or turmoil in the future, referencing the development of ex-Soviet states as they transition into capitalist democracies and how the former constituents of the USSR diverged ideologically, politically and economically after its dissolution.
As we have since seen conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Levant (which Kaplan visits in Israel, Palestine, Lebanon & Syria) the assessments of this region in the decade prior gives the reader more of an understanding of why these conflicts and tensions exist in the first place.
The title of this book really only refers to part three, in which Kaplan actually goes to 'Tartary', or 'Land of the Tartars'. The first part as I understand it is more of a sequel to his previous work concerning the Balkans specifically.
The sections detailing Syria, Georgia and Turkmenistan were the most interesting to me.
It primarily focuses on the geopolitical aspect of the region, with some history from the Middle Ages and Antiquity for context. It is very American in its tone and in its presumed audience; so be mindful that it is coming from a very obvious perspective.
Kaplan's travels as detailed in this book were undertaken at the very end of the millennium, in 1999, and this lends it an interesting if not at times dated lens on the geopolitical concerns of the region, notably acession of certain states into multinational bodies such as NATO and the EU - many of which have joined these organisations since Kaplan's travels.
He identifies the potential hotspots for conflict or turmoil in the future, referencing the development of ex-Soviet states as they transition into capitalist democracies and how the former constituents of the USSR diverged ideologically, politically and economically after its dissolution.
As we have since seen conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Levant (which Kaplan visits in Israel, Palestine, Lebanon & Syria) the assessments of this region in the decade prior gives the reader more of an understanding of why these conflicts and tensions exist in the first place.
The title of this book really only refers to part three, in which Kaplan actually goes to 'Tartary', or 'Land of the Tartars'. The first part as I understand it is more of a sequel to his previous work concerning the Balkans specifically.
The sections detailing Syria, Georgia and Turkmenistan were the most interesting to me.
January 8, 2020
Cuando tomé prestado este libro en la biblioteca lo hice pensando que en mi mano tenía un libro convencional sobre literatura de viajes, uno de mis géneros literarios favoritos. El viaje del autor (a través de Oriente Medio hasta Asia Central) parecía especialmente atractivo por el exotismo y aislamiento del resto del mundo de algunos de los países que recorre.
Ya en las primeras páginas me percaté de que no estaba ante un libro de viajes convencional, sino ante un análisis concienzudo de la geopolítica de la región. En un principio pensé que la lectura de este libro no me serviría de mucho porque fue escrito en 1998 y desde entonces Oriente Medio ha experimentado profundos cambios. Al haber perdido actualidad, supuse, el libro también habría perdido valor.
Estaba totalmente equivocado. Con deleite, he podido ver cómo la mayoría de las predicciones de Kaplan se han ido cumpliendo y como el autor aporta un análisis valiosísimo de las causas que han configurado durante las últimas dos décadas la región más convulsa del mundo.
Desde el resurgimiento de Rusia como potencia mundial a la Guerra Civil siria, Kaplan da con la tecla correcta en casi todos los temas que toca a lo largo de su periplo, y deja al lector valiosas lecciones que tienen plena validez en la actualidad.
Si no le otorgo 5 estrellas es porque aunque Kaplan es un excelente analista político, no profundiza lo suficiente en las personas que encuentra en su viaje y en las situaciones a las que hace frente. Al tocar solamente la superficie, creo que se pierden matices que harían este libro aún mejor.
Ya en las primeras páginas me percaté de que no estaba ante un libro de viajes convencional, sino ante un análisis concienzudo de la geopolítica de la región. En un principio pensé que la lectura de este libro no me serviría de mucho porque fue escrito en 1998 y desde entonces Oriente Medio ha experimentado profundos cambios. Al haber perdido actualidad, supuse, el libro también habría perdido valor.
Estaba totalmente equivocado. Con deleite, he podido ver cómo la mayoría de las predicciones de Kaplan se han ido cumpliendo y como el autor aporta un análisis valiosísimo de las causas que han configurado durante las últimas dos décadas la región más convulsa del mundo.
Desde el resurgimiento de Rusia como potencia mundial a la Guerra Civil siria, Kaplan da con la tecla correcta en casi todos los temas que toca a lo largo de su periplo, y deja al lector valiosas lecciones que tienen plena validez en la actualidad.
Si no le otorgo 5 estrellas es porque aunque Kaplan es un excelente analista político, no profundiza lo suficiente en las personas que encuentra en su viaje y en las situaciones a las que hace frente. Al tocar solamente la superficie, creo que se pierden matices que harían este libro aún mejor.
December 21, 2022
This book is heavy going. It is positively crammed with observations, names, places, and history one can hardly absorb in one pass. I have followed Robert Kaplan for years, and once again I am floored by his audacity, no, make that bravery, to travel in these parts of the world where so few of us can or would go, especially as a lone traveler, especially as an American/Israeli Jew.
And not to mention, once again, something that I always wonder about: how much research goes into writing such a book that covers so much territory, people, and time? Well, it can be discerned from bibliographies and/or footnotes where the details come from. And in this book, like his others, the appendices are impressive, and humbling. I feel like I will have to return to this book several times to better cement more facts and to organize my thoughts about what I have learned.
I have some background in the study of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, even a touch of the Middle East, but of Central Asia; that is, the old Victorian Tartary, no. I approach this one as a total ignoramus, and therein lies the fascination for the learner. Kaplan starts in Hungary visiting his host, who suggests they should start drinking red wine at 10 am, as it will "...loosen our tongues." Hahaha, got to love that guy! Then Kaplan travels down through Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel before he heads in the direction of "Tartary," that is, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, on the far side of the newly oil-rich Caspian Sea, and all the tribal subsections thereof, before reversing to Armenia.
It is clear from history this geography was the center of important ancient civilizations, which have been lost or outshined by the development of western Europe. The Central Asia region was always complex, but then it was thoroughly contaminated by imported cultures from Soviet Russia. At the collapse of the Soviet, the area was left even more confused, competitive, and dysfunctional.
Since this book was written after the fall of the Soviet Union, and after he had visited the same area earlier, we a get a comparison about the conditions before and after the Soviets, and it counterintuitively it appears that the Soviet era was better for many of these countries, considering the state disintegration and power vacuums that followed.
The details of the mostly desolate geography and the ramshackle towns are repetitive and depressing, but we begin to see the stirrings of the Caspian Sea area oil development and wonder how the river of money coming at them will change these ancient and nomadic cultures of Tartary.
One important lesson learned from Kaplan's investigations in Central Asia following the Soviet collapse is how countries get from state dictatorship to anarchy to strongmen to tribalism. Can they get to democracy with any of sort mature bureaucracy to keep order? The answer is, they usually don't, because from the state of dictatorial empire they collapse into a power vacuum where any sort of governmental institutions are absent and the dictatorship becomes just about a strongman. State assets are sold off at cheap prices and distributed to oligarchs, and personality cults arise. Then it becomes ever man for himself, and a retreat into clans and tribes for survival. This was Tartary at the time this book was written.
And not to mention, once again, something that I always wonder about: how much research goes into writing such a book that covers so much territory, people, and time? Well, it can be discerned from bibliographies and/or footnotes where the details come from. And in this book, like his others, the appendices are impressive, and humbling. I feel like I will have to return to this book several times to better cement more facts and to organize my thoughts about what I have learned.
I have some background in the study of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, even a touch of the Middle East, but of Central Asia; that is, the old Victorian Tartary, no. I approach this one as a total ignoramus, and therein lies the fascination for the learner. Kaplan starts in Hungary visiting his host, who suggests they should start drinking red wine at 10 am, as it will "...loosen our tongues." Hahaha, got to love that guy! Then Kaplan travels down through Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel before he heads in the direction of "Tartary," that is, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, on the far side of the newly oil-rich Caspian Sea, and all the tribal subsections thereof, before reversing to Armenia.
It is clear from history this geography was the center of important ancient civilizations, which have been lost or outshined by the development of western Europe. The Central Asia region was always complex, but then it was thoroughly contaminated by imported cultures from Soviet Russia. At the collapse of the Soviet, the area was left even more confused, competitive, and dysfunctional.
Since this book was written after the fall of the Soviet Union, and after he had visited the same area earlier, we a get a comparison about the conditions before and after the Soviets, and it counterintuitively it appears that the Soviet era was better for many of these countries, considering the state disintegration and power vacuums that followed.
The details of the mostly desolate geography and the ramshackle towns are repetitive and depressing, but we begin to see the stirrings of the Caspian Sea area oil development and wonder how the river of money coming at them will change these ancient and nomadic cultures of Tartary.
One important lesson learned from Kaplan's investigations in Central Asia following the Soviet collapse is how countries get from state dictatorship to anarchy to strongmen to tribalism. Can they get to democracy with any of sort mature bureaucracy to keep order? The answer is, they usually don't, because from the state of dictatorial empire they collapse into a power vacuum where any sort of governmental institutions are absent and the dictatorship becomes just about a strongman. State assets are sold off at cheap prices and distributed to oligarchs, and personality cults arise. Then it becomes ever man for himself, and a retreat into clans and tribes for survival. This was Tartary at the time this book was written.
June 30, 2020
This is another brilliant work of history and travel by Robert D. Kaplan. He finds that the old lines between East and West, even after the official demise of the Iron Curtain, still exist; on one side lands influenced by the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, on the other, beginning with Romania, lands not part of that heritage, instead heirs to Byzantine and Ottoman history. He calls this region, which is east of the European Union and NATO and south of Russia the "New Near East," and in this book he sought to explore it.
The book begins as a sequel to his _Balkan Ghosts_. He finds that Hungary has a booming economy, the economic gulf between it and Romania widening as foreign investment in Hungary is six times that what Romania has received, understandable given the complex and risky Romanian business climate. He fears that Romania is drifting into the Third World with squatter settlements, a low per capita income, and the consumer class restricted to a few districts of Bucharest. Its leaders desperate to "lock" Romania into Europe via entry into NATO, Romania is clearly at a crossroads.
Bulgaria he finds is very worried about entry into NATO, and is desperate lest it be forgotten by the West; indeed, so desirous of any coverage that Bulgaria's head of state personally thanked Kaplan for writing about his country! Bulgaria also faces the problem posed by the rise of criminal elements, called "groupings," that are an increasingly powerful element (one of the early groupings was unbelievably based around the Bulgarian Olympic wrestling team) and the threat of a subtle new imperialism from Russia, that of Russian organized crime, which threatens Bulgarian sovereignty in shadowy ways.
His trip to the Middle East was spellbinding. Concerned that he wasn't getting the full picture of the region from the international media, he sought to "discover the obvious" in his travels to Turkey and "Greater Syria." He writes that Turkey is a dynamic and fascinating country, one in which the economy was growing 7 percent a year and was forging its own strategic alliances independent of the US thanks to a growing relationship with Israel, which as Kaplan shows the two have a great deal in common. Few outside Turkey he writes appreciate the role of the military there - he called it the "deep state" - which sought to preserve the ideals of Kemal Ataturk's revolution, chiefly that the state be secular and to fight against such forces as ethnic separatism, an ideal that even Turkey's Islamists seem to have embraced, as they work within the system and are not terrorists.
Syria he finds is not a true nationality, but rather a "hodgepodge" of several ethnic and religious groups at odds with one another, though as yet have not fought each other as the various groups in Lebanon had. Syria was an artificial creation of France and Britain following World War I, one with all the potent ional after the passing of the Assad regime to go the way of Yugoslavia, a land comprised of a northern region centered around Aleppo with historical links to Mosul and Baghdad, the Sunni Muslim heartland of Hama, Homs, and Damascus, and a south that is Druze and the west which is Alawite, both of which are Shiite.
Syria, an austere country very similar to pre-1989 communist Europe is both dependent upon and dominant in Lebanon, an area historically part of Syria. Booming economically, seemingly having solved the violent struggles of the 1980s, Lebanon is controlled from Damascus; Lebanon is to Syria as Hong Kong is to China, essentially two systems, the smaller but more vibrant system existing only at the good will of the larger power.
Jordan is another artificial state, an "accident of history," a consolation prize to the British's World War I ally the emir Abdullah (ally of Lawrence of Arabia), a country that faces an uncertain future with water shortages and a rising Palestinian population, one which might one day combine with the urban Palestinians of the West Bank and overwhelm Jordan's "Bedouin monarchy."
After spending time in Israel Kaplan visits Georgia, a country the size of West Virginia with 5.6 million people, creator of one of the world's fourteen alphabets, a true dividing line between East and West, and divided along ethnic lines (particularly in South Ossetia in north-central Georgia). Once nearly destroyed after the Soviet Union by its democratically-elected president Zviad Gamsakhurdia during a time of anarchy and utter chaos, it was ironically saved by the former Soviet elite Eduard Shevardnadze, nothing unusual in the homeland of Stalin.
Azerbaijan, like so much of the New Near East, is not a unified nation with an agreed upon national identity. Many Azeri are more loyal to a particular region, with for instance those in Gandzha in the dusty hinterlands feeling they have little in common with the oil boom town of Baku. Kaplan raises a cautionary note with regards to these divisions and the future of Azerbaijan, a land with vast future oil reserves in the Caspian Sea basin, growing corruption rivaling the worst third world nations, and one which is a subtle battleground between Turkey and Iran for influence.
Kaplan also visits Turkmenistan and Armenia, which made for fascinating reading.
If this book can be said to have a central theme, it is twofold. One, the West's insistence on democracy in the New Near East is a fallacy; at stake is more often the very survival of these states, and it is more important to have good leadership than elections, which can lead to democratic governments that do terrible things, such as the ugly war over Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Two, the process whereby huge, multiethnic empires become smaller, uniethnic states is often a violent one, which has lead to much bloodshed in the region - such as with the Armenian Genocide - and will lead to it again in the future. This book should be on everyone's reading list
The book begins as a sequel to his _Balkan Ghosts_. He finds that Hungary has a booming economy, the economic gulf between it and Romania widening as foreign investment in Hungary is six times that what Romania has received, understandable given the complex and risky Romanian business climate. He fears that Romania is drifting into the Third World with squatter settlements, a low per capita income, and the consumer class restricted to a few districts of Bucharest. Its leaders desperate to "lock" Romania into Europe via entry into NATO, Romania is clearly at a crossroads.
Bulgaria he finds is very worried about entry into NATO, and is desperate lest it be forgotten by the West; indeed, so desirous of any coverage that Bulgaria's head of state personally thanked Kaplan for writing about his country! Bulgaria also faces the problem posed by the rise of criminal elements, called "groupings," that are an increasingly powerful element (one of the early groupings was unbelievably based around the Bulgarian Olympic wrestling team) and the threat of a subtle new imperialism from Russia, that of Russian organized crime, which threatens Bulgarian sovereignty in shadowy ways.
His trip to the Middle East was spellbinding. Concerned that he wasn't getting the full picture of the region from the international media, he sought to "discover the obvious" in his travels to Turkey and "Greater Syria." He writes that Turkey is a dynamic and fascinating country, one in which the economy was growing 7 percent a year and was forging its own strategic alliances independent of the US thanks to a growing relationship with Israel, which as Kaplan shows the two have a great deal in common. Few outside Turkey he writes appreciate the role of the military there - he called it the "deep state" - which sought to preserve the ideals of Kemal Ataturk's revolution, chiefly that the state be secular and to fight against such forces as ethnic separatism, an ideal that even Turkey's Islamists seem to have embraced, as they work within the system and are not terrorists.
Syria he finds is not a true nationality, but rather a "hodgepodge" of several ethnic and religious groups at odds with one another, though as yet have not fought each other as the various groups in Lebanon had. Syria was an artificial creation of France and Britain following World War I, one with all the potent ional after the passing of the Assad regime to go the way of Yugoslavia, a land comprised of a northern region centered around Aleppo with historical links to Mosul and Baghdad, the Sunni Muslim heartland of Hama, Homs, and Damascus, and a south that is Druze and the west which is Alawite, both of which are Shiite.
Syria, an austere country very similar to pre-1989 communist Europe is both dependent upon and dominant in Lebanon, an area historically part of Syria. Booming economically, seemingly having solved the violent struggles of the 1980s, Lebanon is controlled from Damascus; Lebanon is to Syria as Hong Kong is to China, essentially two systems, the smaller but more vibrant system existing only at the good will of the larger power.
Jordan is another artificial state, an "accident of history," a consolation prize to the British's World War I ally the emir Abdullah (ally of Lawrence of Arabia), a country that faces an uncertain future with water shortages and a rising Palestinian population, one which might one day combine with the urban Palestinians of the West Bank and overwhelm Jordan's "Bedouin monarchy."
After spending time in Israel Kaplan visits Georgia, a country the size of West Virginia with 5.6 million people, creator of one of the world's fourteen alphabets, a true dividing line between East and West, and divided along ethnic lines (particularly in South Ossetia in north-central Georgia). Once nearly destroyed after the Soviet Union by its democratically-elected president Zviad Gamsakhurdia during a time of anarchy and utter chaos, it was ironically saved by the former Soviet elite Eduard Shevardnadze, nothing unusual in the homeland of Stalin.
Azerbaijan, like so much of the New Near East, is not a unified nation with an agreed upon national identity. Many Azeri are more loyal to a particular region, with for instance those in Gandzha in the dusty hinterlands feeling they have little in common with the oil boom town of Baku. Kaplan raises a cautionary note with regards to these divisions and the future of Azerbaijan, a land with vast future oil reserves in the Caspian Sea basin, growing corruption rivaling the worst third world nations, and one which is a subtle battleground between Turkey and Iran for influence.
Kaplan also visits Turkmenistan and Armenia, which made for fascinating reading.
If this book can be said to have a central theme, it is twofold. One, the West's insistence on democracy in the New Near East is a fallacy; at stake is more often the very survival of these states, and it is more important to have good leadership than elections, which can lead to democratic governments that do terrible things, such as the ugly war over Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Two, the process whereby huge, multiethnic empires become smaller, uniethnic states is often a violent one, which has lead to much bloodshed in the region - such as with the Armenian Genocide - and will lead to it again in the future. This book should be on everyone's reading list
February 6, 2024
wow! This might be my favorite ever travel book. It’s the late 90s and our venerable hero Robert Kaplan travels through a crumbling set of countries in various states of disarray- hungary to Romania to Bulgaria to Turkey to Syria to Lebanon to jordan to Israel up to Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and finally to Armenia. He is the least egotistical travel writer I’ve ever read but also quite honest (if a train station he visits is awful he’ll tell you). He provides a wildly concise set of histories: broad sweeps on the state of the post Yugoslavia balkans, post communist Romania / Bulgaria, a modernizing Turkey struggling with ghosts of its own past, post colonial Syria Lebanon and jordan, mid expansion israel, and Georgia Azerbaijan Turkmenistan and Armenia all dealing with the consequences of post soviet rule. I feel quite a bit more informed after reading this book. Have also noted down some spots I’d like to visit some day. Walk, don’t run, and pick up this book!!!
April 12, 2018
Kaplan's title is deliberately retro. It sounds like something by Robert Byron. In places, it even reads like Byron. Unfortunately, that includes some of Byron's less admirable qualities as well the more positive ones. Kaplan is erudite, observant, and a gifted prose stylist. He is also ethnocentric and prone to sweeping generalizations (usually unflattering) about national temperaments. These are always heavy-handed and sometimes embarrassingly ill-informed, especially in contrast to his more savvy political analysis.
Despite its flaws, I did enjoy the book. One of the most interesting things to me was reading about places I've visited, usually about 20 years after Kaplan's visit. Budapest is almost unrecognizable from his version; Romania and Bulgaria have changed but incompletely.
February 24, 2020
Net als 'Balkan ghosts', waar dit boek in zekere zin een vervolg op is, combineert Robert Kaplan reisverhaal en politieke analyse in een boeiend relaas waarin zijn journalistieke contacten hem helpen vanuit de geschiedenis van de bezochte landen hun huidige status en mogelijke toekomst te begrijpen. Al is de analyse intussen ook alweer zo'n twintig jaar oud, ze blijft verhelderend, want Kaplan bezoekt niet alleen enkele Balkanlanden opnieuw maar reist verder naar het Midden-Oosten (Turkije, Syrië, Libanon, Jordanië en Israël) en de Centraal-Aziatische landen van de Kaukasus (Georgië, Armenië, Azerbeidjan en Turkmenistan). Zijn voorspellingen zijn zeker interessant maar doordat die landen zo weinig in onze berichtgeving voorkomen, zou het wat opzoekwerk vergen om te checken wat er intussen (al) van uitgekomen is...
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